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Abstract 
 
Emotions are gaining an increasingly prominent role in the study of International Relations. 
As a relatively new frontier, there is still considerable work to be done in streamlining various 
efforts into a systematic study. These efforts have largely circled on describing the cognitive 
and action potential of specific emotions, such as anger, fear and trust. This thesis is 
concerned with an extreme emotion, the emotion of rage. I stress the action potential of 
revenge, as well as the cognitive elements at play here, most specifically the issue of abrupt 
changes to morality. I use both Greek and Nietzschean philosophy to construct a binary 
approach to rage that acknowledges both the violent and bloody manifestation - we still 
witness today - as well as the silent, non-violent rancour that searches for an opportune 
moment before exploding into action. 
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Introduction 
 
 
A particularly interesting myth found in the plays of Ancient Greece tells of the dreaded 
Erinyes, a gang of three sisters dressed in tattered black robes. Their faces are covered in 
blood with discharge seeping from their eyes. They prefer dark places hiding their shrivelled 
faces and featherless wings. They do not speak but shriek and hiss and feast on human flesh. 
Modern culture would describe them as ghoulish vampires, half animal, half something once 
human. In the Greek myths in which they feature, the Erinyes show up after a terrible crime is 
committed. They lust for the blood of the criminal, besieging others, hissing and howling, 
incessantly screeching: “Get Him, Get Him, Get Him”. Their names are Alecta, the angry; 
Megaera, the grudging; and Tisiphone, the vengeful, and they are the personification of rage 
and revenge impulses in Ancient Greece. They are known as harbingers of disorder and civil 
war. Their lust for revenge is insatiable; every crime committed demands total punishment. 
But tragically every punishment becomes a crime in its own right, leading to endless cycles of 
violence. Their reputation is so fearsome that kings will dare not touch individuals, if they are 
rumoured to court the presence of these demons. 
 
It is hard to believe, but the Erinyes have an indispensable role in society; they are the 
ultimate guardians of order and fierce defenders of the rule of Zeus. Their unsightly presence 
is not accidental or the product of some curse but a clear and causal reaction to a breach of 
law and dismissal of Zeus’ order. The Erinyes appear and demand blood whenever subjects 
break the most sacred laws by murdering a fellow citizen. Their presence, in other words, is a 
natural reaction to acts of great wrongdoing and injustice. But despite such noble calling, their 
distorted and ghoulish appearances belie the very sense of civic duty and wisdom their 
presence implies. On the contrary, they resemble the uncivilized impulsiveness and carnal 
desires attributed to all those who undermine civil order by giving in to unthinking passions 
and private concerns. The raging Erinyes are at once cause and consequence, as well as judge 
and executioner. 
 
In today’s culture, the Erinyes are a mere shadow of their former self; they survive as 
vampires, witches or demons in scary movies preying on innocent teenagers. Their ghoulish 
and repulsive appearances still inspire fear but they have lost their political and judicial 
mandate. The underworld they represent no longer bares resemblance to ideas of political 
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injustice and civil disorder. This thesis in many ways aims to rehabilitate the myth of the 
Erinyes and return rage and revenge to their rightful place as reactions to injustice and 
wrongdoing. In Ancient Greece the connection between injustice and revenge was understood 
and gravely lamented. Playwrights tried to warn, explain, educate and ultimately resolve the 
inevitable curse of revenge cycles that would plunge entire communities into prolonged 
warfare, ending in death and devastation. Today’s world shares too many similarities to 
ignore the lessons of this ancient emotional economy. 
 
At the time of writing, the South China Sea is measuring up to become a critical boiling point 
in regional South East Asian relations and a litmus test for how Asian countries deal with 
China’s inevitable rise and concomitant hegemonic privileges and rights. Ukraine continues to 
be a battleground for separatist ambitions, fuelled by old rivalries reminiscent of the darkest 
days of the Cold War. The Middle East remains a timeless kaleidoscope of violence, 
grievance, bloodshed and uncompromising religious and moral fervour. The traditional view 
of warfare as a continuation of politics loses much of its appeal when those involved are 
fighting against their own nation or desire to see their opponent suffer rather than achieve 
long-lasting strategic aims. The discipline of International Relations has been slow to adopt a 
more modern psychological understanding of violence, instead only gradually weaning itself 
off a disastrous dependence on rational actor models and a far too narrow view on 
motivations in international affairs. 
 
The last decade has seen a rise in scholarship concerned with emotions in International 
Relations. Early explorations into neuroscientific research introduced the role of emotions 
into the field of cognition, making important qualifications on how nations – or specifically 
their leaders – make decisions, discount risk and select information. The events of 9/11 
provoked renewed interest in the motivational aspect of emotions, constructing linear 
causalities regarding how event X causes emotion Y, and in turn how emotion Y leads to 
response Z. Under the headwind of the terrorist attacks, scholars began researching concepts 
like humiliation, slights and ontological displacement to understand why groups engage in 
terrorist activities and seek such terrible results. These two streams have come together in the 
last few years and carried emotions into the mainstream of International Relations 
scholarship. The traditional study of interest-based politics was not supplanted but certainly 
forced to accommodate new insights and new modes of analysis. Emotions have become a 
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serious and dynamic new field of study, with an explanatory power quickly outstripping any 
rational actor model-based analysis. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of violence by exploring two 
distinct philosophical treatments of the “revenge” emotion. I pay homage to the causal view 
of emotion that some serious injustice or mistreatment leads to a desire for revenge; however 
the core of this research concerns itself with the cognitive and moral aspect. The peculiarity, I 
wish to highlight, is the total moral certainty found to operate in even the greatest acts of 
brutality and punishment. All acts of revenge found in literature or history are gilded by a 
sense of moral righteousness. The Erinyes enjoyed total moral certainty in their bloodlust 
because they took their judicial mandate from Zeus, the highest and most absolute source of 
authority. Transgressions invariably lead to just punishment, because the law of Zeus was 
absolute and every citizen knew this. The specific act of the revenge act becomes less 
interesting than the justification for it. Along with the Greek reading of revenge, however, I 
also wish to posit a reading of Nietzsche’ Ressentiment. Nietzsche’s investigation of revenge 
stressed even more the cognitive dimension and “inner life” of the revenge emotion. He 
argued that in light of inaction, the revenge impulse could be deflected into moral debasement 
alone. When an injustice is committed, the victim, now unable to act, would seek revenge by 
absorbing the rage into an act of moral transvaluation; like the lambs in Nietzsche’s famous 
story, who derided the values and virtues of their tormentors, instead of physically punishing 
them.  
 
The reason I chose the Greeks, specifically the myth of Erinyes, and Nietzsche as theoretical 
cornerstones and ignored the remaining canon of Western philosophers and theorists is 
straightforward: With the Greeks we get a beautifully constructed analysis that sets rage apart 
from anger and other negative emotions. The Erinyes were not angry or disappointed or 
resentful; they were raging - meaning they were geared for action, demanding total results. 
The Greek emotional economy allowed for anger and resentment to be felt and expressed 
within the civic order (nomos); however the revenge emotion lay outside the scope of civic 
order, and as such this emotion was immediately seen as animalistic and brutal, void of any 
social concern. For analytical purposes the flip from social emotions to asocial impulse is 
extremely enlightening. In the Greek myths, all raging heroes took on animalistic forms: 
disrobing, walking on all fours, and demanding the raw flesh of their enemies. The Greeks 
stressed that the framing of a negative emotion was a function of social standards, and that in 
	   12	  
rage alone the subject was seen as isolated in norms and values from her community. In other 
words, she became an asocial animal governed by inaccessible private concerns. To my 
knowledge there is no equal in the elegance of the Greek playwrights in expressing such a 
complex idea in such a simple form. 
 
So while one choice came down to a matter of aesthetic preference, the other was one of 
theoretical innovation. Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals provided the theoretical building 
blocks for Ressentiment, a dynamic emotion that could irreparably alter the subject’s identity. 
This became an interesting supplement. What the Greeks described as a transformation of the 
outward bodily appearance, Nietzsche began describing as an inward process. In many ways, 
the inaccessible private concerns of the raging Greek hero became the starting point of 
Nietzsche’s psychological investigation. Nevertheless, the Greeks and Nietzsche shared in 
equal measure in the condemnation of the rage emotion; the Greeks showed their disgust by 
having heroes regress to feral animals, while Nietzsche spoke enigmatically of a poisoning of 
the mind. But Nietzsche could do something the Greeks, and indeed any thinker before him, 
except for maybe Shakespeare and the likes of Gogol and Dostoyevsky, could not: Nietzsche 
no longer required any “tragic” proof for his analysis - in fact values and morality sufficed. 
His genealogical investigation could tease out the existence of rage, without having actors 
commit grotesque acts of violence and bloodshed. And how could they? Nietzsche’s subjects 
were the “weak” and incompetent. And so Ressentiment became a true innovation by 
describing how rage metastasized into a stiff rancour, ostensibly docile but in fact no less 
vicious and demanding than the Greek alternative. 
 
Nietzsche of course lamented this psychological mechanism and urged his readers to return to 
the pure behaviour of his beloved Greeks. Heroes like Achilles gave in to their emotions 
without second-guessing or moral deliberation; if they were angry, they punished; if they 
were sad, they wept. Arguably, however this noble behaviour is the product of an overly 
stylized literary prose and slightly out-dated psychological understanding. We now know that 
emotions and moral judgement occur simultaneously, with many scholars from diverse 
disciplines successfully arguing that they are in fact inseparable from one another.1 This thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment,” Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–34,; Jesse Prinz, “The Emotional Basis of 
Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations 9, no. 1 (March 2006): 29–43,; Martha Craven 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Robert C. Solomon, “The Emotions of Justice,” Social Justice Research 3, no. 4 (1989): 345–74; 
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will explore this complex interaction, and argue that the willingness to kill and 
instrumentalize others rests on moral exclusion and a withdrawal of compassion and mercy 
towards the target. This state of affairs will be shown to have an emotional foundation. 
However at the same time, I also wish to show that Nietzsche’s insight allows us to construct 
a scenario where the same rage can exist in moral valuation alone, provided the subject feels 
herself unable to act. This should raise serious questions regarding the issue of legitimacy and 
order in the face of a perceived lack of violence and bloody revolt.  
 
These efforts will lead to a construction of a Rage Binary: Following an injustice or 
mistreatment, actors will give in to the Erinyes’ demands and either engage in violence and 
open revenge or, hobbled by strategic incompetence and inaction, internalize the cries of the 
Erinyes through the Nietzschean mechanism of Ressentiment. The causal mechanism either 
way posits an injustice or grave mistreatment as the cause of the revenge impulse, and aligns 
with the existing literature on humiliation and slights in International Relations. From the 
view of the offender the ensuing violence is always justified and morally righteous; this moral 
absoluteness is what unites the Rage Binaries in revenge and Ressentiment, despite the 
obvious differences in manifestation. 
 
The Greek understanding of rage, borne from the actions of tragic figures, such as Achilles, 
Ajax and Hecuba, and Nietzsche’s theory of Ressentiment, which, despite its claim of cultural 
expertise, is, too, an individual-centred theory, cannot be transposed onto state-conduct 
without necessary explanation; in other words the move from individual psychology to 
international relations cannot be taken for granted. In the field of emotion, IR scholars have 
constructed diverse approaches regarding how to bridge the gap between individually felt 
emotions and their resonance on state conduct. Richard Ned Lebow for instance argues that 
the emotions of key decision-makers matter, because their decisions and preferences 
ultimately decide inter-state conduct.2 The German sociologist Axel Honneth takes a similar 
view, but does not ignore the “masses”, because their preferences and decisions necessarily 
feed through the democratic process - provided there is one.3 The German-American IR 
theorist Alexander Wendt looks at the precise mechanism of state emotionality and explains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?,” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 6, no. 12 (December 1, 2002): 517–23. 
2 Richard Ned Lebow, “Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International Relations,” 
International Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006): 431–48. 
3 Axel Honneth and John M. M. Farrell, “Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the 
Theory of Democracy Today,” Political Theory 26, no. 6 (December 1, 1998): 763–83. 
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that we readily impose personhood on states, especially when it concerns emotional 
reactions.4 But the emotionality of the state is not some semantic trick; it is simply a 
reference-shortcut to the shared emotionality of the people, who register the same emotional 
trigger and consequently portray a similar if not uniform reaction. IR scholarship has 
consequently turned to social psychology and the study of groups to bolster their 
understanding of shared emotionality. 
 
For the emotion of rage, as understood through a reading of the Greeks, certain provisions 
exist that facilitate the move from individual to group psychology. The rule of Zeus, or 
nomos, remains the guiding principle for an understanding of Greek rage. As we will discover 
in Chapter 1, nomos holds ontological importance for the individual; without nomos the 
individual is unable to relate to the world and to others. Rage, however, arises when nomos is 
intentionally breached. For the Greeks, a breach of nomos was extremely dangerous because 
it could set off a chain reaction, where one breach leads to another, until the very idea of civil 
order is forgotten. This lawlessness and disorder was the very state of affairs inhabited by the 
Erinyes, so vividly mirrored by their horrendous appearance. The importance of nomos for 
social identity and ontological security, along with its clear connection to the Erinyes, 
provides a strong foundation for the move into social psychology and group relations, 
allowing the wisdom of the Greeks to take on a modern social-scientific form. The issue then 
simply is how to translate the concept of nomos without loss. 
 
In the thesis I make the leap from individual psychology to group psychology and 
International Relations by taking a democratic stance on state emotionality. This is not to 
argue that elite leadership is not influential, or that there exists no political divorce between 
the “masses” and the appointed state leaders, but rather that rage affords a natural pathway 
that is essentially inclusive. Implicit to the Greek concept of nomos is the need for group 
membership; nomos exists between individuals and as more individuals acknowledge nomos, 
the group grows in numbers, yet it always remains a function of the nomos recognition. 
Individuals who threaten nomos are immediately chastised and exiled from the community; 
they have forfeited their citizenship by ignoring the rule of nomos and are no longer 
considered a good fit for the community. In Greek psychology, group membership was vital 
for a sense of self, more specifically the procurement of honour and standing, which Plato 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 30, 
no. 02 (2004): 289–316, doi:10.1017/S0260210504006084. 
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believed to be so fundamental to Greek life that it must constitute a dominant psychological 
drive, i.e. the thymos. In other words, Greeks needed the community in order to satisfy their 
psychological need for distinction and praise, and without nomos there could be no 
community. A modern psychological understanding of group membership has shifted the 
focus away from honour and standing towards a more existentially informed understanding of 
membership. For group theorists, individuals require group membership in order to create a 
sense of identity and belonging, warding off so-called “mortality salience” – a frightful 
realization of our own inevitable death and meaninglessness. The point however is not that 
Greek psychology was wrong in believing that individuals seek honour, because what they 
really seek is existential meaning, but rather to understand that the role of the group has not 
much changed since the days of the Greeks; whether for honour or existential security, we 
need to belong. The mechanism that unites individuals for their personal needs - forcing 
groups into existence - remains intact. The raison d’être might again be more refined for some 
later age, but the reliance on others remains engrained for all individuals alike. 
 
Rage is an “easy” emotion to analyse because it lends itself readily to absolutes. There are no 
half-measures in rage. For the Greeks, there are no half-breaches of nomos, no 
misunderstandings, no personal justification – a breach is a breach. The key point, however, is 
that such measures do not arise from some draconian legal system but rather from the 
independent and natural emotional capacity of individuals. The Erinyes could ultimately be 
banished by the Athenian judicial system, but they existed long before and indeed long after. 
The informal law of nomos and its centrality for the psychological health of the Greek 
individual meant that a dismissal of nomos flipped the Greeks from normal, considerate social 
beings into vile, cannibalistic animals – kindred spirits of the Erinyes. This mechanism, I 
argue, exists in modern group theory also. The law of nomos has been diluted into a general 
principle of group survival: If the group is threatened in its fundamental existential 
foundation, members become enraged with the culprit. In other words, if an outside force 
undermines the existential pillars of a group, the group becomes enraged because the 
existential needs of group members are being ignored –or even intentionally challenged. This 
allows all members to register the same emotion of rage because all members, despite their 
individualistic diversity, share the same fundamental need for the survival of their group. 
Nomos, in other words, re-emerges as the sanctity of group existence. Again, just as with the 
Greeks, there exist no half-measures, no misunderstandings, no justification; challenging the 
fundamental pillars of groups’ existence summons the Erinyes.  
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Hence, the Greek and Nietzschean psychologies used in the thesis still operate individually, 
but are simply held to operate equally for all individuals that belong to the same group. This 
allows us to transpose these individual mechanisms to group level and supplement the 
theoretical standpoints found in the existing literature on group dynamics and in social 
psychology. Of course this approach is not perfect: even in groups sub-sections always exist 
and identities often overlap. But for the purpose of bringing Greek and Nietzschean 
psychologies to bear on International Relations, we may ignore these shortcomings and move 
forward. So with this foundation set, the thesis develops along the following lines: 
 
In Chapter 1 I explore the Ancient Greek understanding of rage and revenge through an 
analysis of three plays that deal heavily with these themes: Euripides’ Hecuba, Homer’s Iliad 
and Aeschylus’ Oresteia. In order to approach the domain of the Erinyes, the concept of 
nomos, their judicial mandate, will be explored. In Euripides’ Hecuba and Homer’s Iliad I 
will argue that both characters suffered slights and injustices but only felt rage in one specific 
injustice; Hecuba suffered a series of tragedies but only engaged in revenge after her son 
Polydorus was found dead; equally Achilles famously withdraws from battle following a 
slight from Agamemnon, but only engages in his signature rage once Hector kills Patrocles. 
Through the insights of Classics scholars like Seaford, Nussbaum and Cartledge, I wish to 
show how an explicit breach of nomos is causally linked to these rage events, and that other 
insults and slights can be governed and indeed regulated by nomos, resulting in less severe 
emotional reactions. Following this, I will explore the world of the Erinyes and illustrate how 
breaches to nomos are regarded as polluting for individuals and communities alike, leading to 
socio-economic evils like droughts, plagues and civil war. I will probe into this interesting 
phenomenon and how the Greek playwrights were able to view rage as a socio-political 
malady rather than a human emotion and how this insight relates to our modern understanding 
of rage. 
 
Chapter 2 explores rage from a modern psychological standpoint. I will introduce theories on 
emotional genesis and explore the differences in the key theories. Following the scientific 
consensus, Cognitive Appraisal Theory will be explored in relation to rage. Insights from 
neuroscience will highlight how the brain operates during anger and aggression. However, in 
line with the overall critique on the limits of MRI scans for the study of emotions, I will turn 
to the social sciences to construct a paradigm of the trigger elicitation and action tendency of 
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rage; the trigger will be social in nature and thus depend on a specific set of appraisals that 
determine that rage is indeed the correct emotional reaction. Here I return to the Greeks and 
their understanding that rage relates to a breach of the fundamental law of nomos. I will 
introduce the emotional theories of the English philosopher P.F. Strawson and his distinction 
of emotional appraisal being predicated on either an objective attitude or a moral attitude; the 
former will be aligned with nomos-voiding behaviour, where the subject suffers an injustice 
that undermines her moral worth and consequently reacts in a way that takes this moral 
disregard as a legitimate foundation of an objective attitude that sets no limits on punishment 
and treats the target without compassion or any moral regard. I will refer to Frantz Fanon’s 
concept of emancipatory violence to illustrate this further. 
 
Chapter 3 elevates the discussion into the realm of inter-group relations. In accordance with 
social psychologist Marilynn Brewer’s Optimal Distinction Theory, I will elaborate a set of 
fundamental existential demands that each group must satisfy for their individual members. 
Following events that frustrate these demands, groups will experience the same register of 
moral mistreatment and injustice found in Fanon’s case but on a group-level scale. This leads 
to the creation of righteous group rage. I will explore prevalent theories on inter-group 
morality and emotions to understand how inter-group violence is understood. I will also make 
use of Gustav Ichheiser’s long forgotten, but very relevant, ideas on misunderstandings in 
International Relations and how groups labour under the illusion that all groups share the 
same conceptualization of justice and fairness, underlining the problem of false legitimacy in 
inter-group relations and hierarchies. Following this, I will argue that the mechanism outlined 
in Chapter 2 applies equally to inter-group relations, and illustrate how groups create moral 
mandates for action. Specifically, I will elaborate on two different moral mandates and how 
they relate to the sense of righteous rage and the moral certainty necessary for bloodshed and 
violence. I wish to show that the mandate of demonization follows the logic of righteous rage, 
explicated in the myth of the Erinyes, while the mandate of dehumanization, which has been 
found to coincide with guilt, problematizes the idea of moral certainty and righteous rage.  
 
Building on this, Chapter 4 reframes the ensuing violence and argues that  - following an 
injustice or mistreatment - groups exact not simply violence, but revenge. I will explore the 
meaning of revenge and illustrate differences to adjacent concepts like retribution, reprisal 
and deterrence. For this, I draw on numerous sources to crystallize the meaning and morality 
in revenge. I use insights from social psychology and moral philosophy as well as literary 
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criticism, drawing on revenge dramas both old and new, to show how revenge can often 
enough lead to an arrested state of being rather than satisfaction and release. This will 
ultimately lead to the Nietzschean interpretation of revenge that stresses the irredeemable past 
nature of injustices and that revenge is first and foremost a displacement, because of the 
underlining inability to move back time and undo the past injustice. With this in mind, I make 
a distinction between revenge and scapegoating. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces Nietzsche’s concept of Ressentiment. I take this to be a binary to violent 
revenge described in Chapter 4. I begin by contrasting Ressentiment with scapegoating as well 
as the theories of the anthropologist James C. Scott whose theory of hidden transcripts 
describes a type of suspended revenge. Hidden transcripts, like Ressentiment, retain the rage, 
but explode into violence once the subject has gained strategic leverage. Ressentiment is 
different and denies violence, instead producing a type of satisfaction and revenge based on 
moral superiority, while permanently demonizing the virtues and values of the offender. 
Nietzsche’s two classic examples of The Lambs and Birds of Prey and Knight and Priests will 
be augmented with a reading of Aesop’s Fox and the Sour Grapes. Aesop’s fable will be used 
to illustrate an important element in Ressentiment that is echoed in Nietzsche’s Doctrine of 
the Eternal Recurrence and offers a solution to the problem of Ressentiment, and by 
extension, the entire problem of revenge. The solution will be sketched in basic terms. 
 
The last chapter probes into the current literature on reconciliation. I explore different 
strategies, both old and new, and test whether any of them mistake Nietzschean Ressentiment 
for genuine forgiveness and a willingness to forego punishment. Practices found to operate in 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) will be scrutinized and explored from the angle 
of moral exclusion, arguing that there is still a strong inclination to view rage only through its 
overt, violent revenge binary instead of its more covert and vindictive Ressentiment binary. I 
argue that true reconciliation must be predicated on an inclusive moral attitude infused with 
compassion and moral regard for the offender. I then explore the psychological mechanism 
found in Cultures of Defeat in International Relations and argue that the prevalent themes of 
collective narrative reconstruction, vilification of past military elites and tropes of victimhood 
can be represented as a Ressentiment, but one that is somehow past orientated and thus 
perfectly situated to reframe the past injustice, thus allowing nations to move on and establish 
new sources of esteem and entertain a morality free of rancour and the objective attitude 
towards others. 
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In the conclusion, I take the theoretical insights and construct five ideal-type scenarios, 
covering the entire spectrum of rage manifestations; three are inspired by the Greek 
manifestation, two by the Nietzschean one. I also provide historical examples that capture the 
essence of each rage strategy. This should set the stage for a more empirically minded follow-
up project that leaves theory behind and instead focuses on real-life application, paving the 
way for a more nuanced understanding of violence and disorder in global affairs. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Rage in Ancient Greece 
 
 
The playwrights of Ancient Greece cultivated a rich understanding of rage that went beyond 
the emotional; rage was as much a reaction to a specific type of injustice as it was a disease 
that could pollute and erode the social foundation of entire communities. Almost all Greek 
tragedies played on some variation of these themes, and the list of characters and examples of 
awesome feats of destruction still resonate today; Achilles’ wrath is legendary and the Iliad 
remains the number one book for new recruits in the US army, while Ajax’s misguided 
rampage is often cited in debates on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).5 But more than 
inspire, these Greek myths can tell us something about the nature and causes of extreme 
violence. In order to use these insights, one must strip away the notion that their behaviour is 
somehow irrational or divinely inspired, implying a lack of agency or rationale on behalf of 
the subject; even today too much violence is still dismissed as the product of some alleged 
psychological deficiency.6 Instead, the fate of such tragic figures as Achilles, Hecuba, 
Oedipus or Orestes, must be understood through a reading of Greek psychology and socio-
political institutions. Any understanding of Greek rage and revenge, as encapsulated in the 
cult of the Erinyes, must be approached through the study of the role of nomos in Greek 
political life, as well as the psycho-political construct of the thymos. With the help of these 
two concepts it is possible to understand Greek rage and revenge. 
 
Scholars debate the usefulness in studying the customs of Ancient Greece, especially in the 
field of emotions, such as anger. Muellner argues that “there is no reason to assume that the 
… emotion that they represent and that we tend to experience as inherent in human nature are 
actually universal,”7 while Konstan agrees that “there is reason to think that the ancient Greek 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Christopher Coker, Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology Is Changing the Way We Fight 
and Think About War (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2013). 
6 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence In History And Its Causes 
(Penguin UK, 2011); John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘ethnic War,’” International Security 25, no. 1 
(2000): 42–70; H. H. A. Cooper, “Psychopath as Terrorist,” Legal Med. Q. 2 (1978): 253. 
7 Leonard Charles Muellner, The Anger of Achilles: Mēnis in Greek Epic (Cornell University Press, 
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concept (of anger) is in fact significantly different from the mode.”8 Against this trend of 
over-exoticizing the Greeks, scholars such as Nussbaum and Lebow point out that Aristotle’s 
take on emotion is increasingly vindicated in the field of cognitive neurology. Neurologists 
such as Richard Lazarus, Richard Davidson and Antonio Damasio all make explicit reference 
to Aristotle’s On Rhetoric in their work.9 The current scientific consensus in the study of 
emotion, known as Appraisal Theory, undoubtedly has its debt to pay to Aristotle. The most 
recent treatment of Greek anger by Kostas Kalimtzis favours a middle ground. Kalimtzis 
believes that “a possibility for dialogue between ancient cultures and our own exists; we must 
attempt it in a way which avoids both the naïve assumption of shared humanity and 
unsuccessful strategies of alienation.”10 A promising way to make good on these demands is 
to fully unpack the Greek ideas and concepts, making them accessible to us, while avoiding 
unnecessary excuses and post-rationalization in the process. There is no problem in admitting 
that the present economy of emotion no longer functions like that of the Greeks, while still 
admitting that there is something worth knowing or indeed instructive about these ancient 
practices. 
 
This chapter will begin with an explanation of the Greek concept of nomos, before moving on 
to discuss the role of nomos in Euripides’s Hecuba, and specifically how a breach of nomos 
led the Trojan Queen Hecuba to construct a new set of moral values, allowing her to exact a 
most brutal revenge. I will then proceed to comment on Achilles’ rage in Homer’s Iliad, 
striking important parallels to Hecuba’s behaviour and motivation; the key is to show that 
anger and rage are two distinct emotions, and recognizable as such. After this, I will unpack 
the Greek psychology of the thymos and how it relates to rage and revenge. This will then 
lead to a discussion of the Erinyes and their role in Aeschylus Oresteia, one of the key 
foundation myths of Western jurisprudence. Following from this the Greek socio-
psychological concept of miasma – or pollution - will be explored to show how a visitation of 
the Erinyes can lead to civil war and disaster. Lastly, I will comment on how the idea of 
pollution still resonates in today’s descriptions of violence and aggression, and how our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature 
(Toronto Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
9 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Penguin Books, 
2005); Richard S. Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation, Reprint edition (New York: Oxford University 
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understanding of rage remains – surprisingly – unchanged since the time of the great Greek 
playwrights. 
 
Nomos: A Divine Order of Man-made Laws 
 
According to Aeschylus’ Oresteia, nomos in ancient Greece is the domain of the Erinyes; 
they guard nomos and punish those who act against this social institution. Their merciless 
rage and revenge indicates that a breach of nomos is met with utmost fierceness and 
unmitigated severity. The literal translation of nomos is ‘law,’ ’custom,’ or ‘convention’. 
Nomos serves an important social function by regulating the behaviour of community 
members - much like laws and social conventions do today. However, nomos is invested with 
a different type of authority. Barry Sandywell argues that the emergence of nomos as a 
concept was intertwined with the increasing socialization of Greek life through the practice of 
myth making. Myths, Sandywell argues, “provided symbolic resources for the social 
construction of reflexive experience.”11 It was only through the increasing telling and re-
telling of myths that the world of the Greeks came to be. Myths, understood here as the 
practice of collective narrative and discourse formation, introduced ideas of agency and 
causality to the Greek mind, paving the way for an understanding of history that would value 
lessons (poetry) over facts (history).12  
 
Sandywell explains: “Myth socializes the word by sacralising the world.”13 The power 
principles and political order of Mount Olympus informed, and at the same time reproduced, 
the principles found in the model of Greek “kinship-ordered communities”.14 The patriarchy 
of the village became anchored in the patriarchy of Zeus. And the myths of Mount Olympus 
with their colourful intrigues, rampant jealousies and devastating angers, mirrored the 
communities they sought to educate and entertain. These divine schemas of behaviour and 
justice “became synonymous with the fundamental structure of the universe itself.”15 The 
social convention of nomos was taken from these myths invested with the awesome authority 
of Zeus, and thus became sacred. Those who lacked nomos were deemed savages. The Great 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Barry Sandywell, The Beginnings of European Theorizing: Reflexivity in the Archaic Age: 
Logological Investigations: Volume Two: 2 (London  ; New York: Routledge, 1995). p. 35 
12 see for instance R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, ed. Jan van der Dussen, Revised (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1994); chapter on Greek historiography. 
13 Sandywell, The Beginnings of European Theorizing. p. 5 
14 Ibid. p. 37 
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historian Herodotus, cites the Scythian tribe of the Androphogoi, whose name literally means 
“man-eaters’, as an example of such a people.16 In other words, nomos had a civilizing effect 
on people by providing a sense of moral order and civic experience. 
 
Sandywell argues that an opposition to nomos developed in relation to dike. Although both 
concepts are the product of Zeus’ supreme order, dike began to stand in conflict with nomos – 
at least by the time of Hesiod and most prominently in Sophocles’ Antigone. Understood as 
“mankind’s sole protection and defence against conflict and strife”17 and a type of feminine 
natural justice that existed beyond man-made convention and laws, dike was often invoked by 
those excluded or mistreated by nomos. In Sophocles, Antigone famously invokes dike when 
she acts against the patriarchal order of King Creon by burying her brother, Polynices. She 
explains her reasoning thus:  
 
“For these laws were not ordained by Zeus, and she who sits enthroned with gods 
below, justice (dike) enacted not these human laws (nomos). Nor did I deem that 
thou, a mortal man, couldst by a breath annul and override the unwritten laws of 
heaven. They were not born to day nor yesterday, They die not; and none knoweth 
whence they sprang.”18 
 
Antigone in a way overrules the written law of nomos by claiming that the decree ordered by 
Creon is not just, and thus cannot be sanctioned by Zeus, effectively dissolving the authority 
of her king’s demand. As mentioned, nomos originated in the kinship-order; the most 
important nomos consequently is moira, the law governing family relations. Thus Antigone’s 
claim that Creon’s decree lacks authority because it undermines the natural justice (dike) of 
the family (moira) is extremely relevant. The Greek Historian Herodotus was equally 
concerned with the ‘tyranny of nomos’, elaborating on the distinction between nomos 
meaning custom and convention and nomos meaning law, the latter often being corrupted and 
lending itself too easily to despotic and arbitrary rule, infused with divine authority.19  
 
Regardless of whether a set of laws is deemed just or unjust from one point of view or 
another, nomos in Ancient Greece creates order, and an order directly linked to Mount 	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19 Cartledge, The Greeks. p. 108 
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Olympus no less; its purpose transcends the gripes of individuals. Because nomos enables 
actors to invest their activity with certain expectations, it helps make sense of the world by 
aligning action with meaning. Consequently a breach of nomos is sacrilegious, because it 
questions the validity of the symbolic order. Expectations and actions misalign, paving the 
way for disorder. Breaches of nomos in all the Greek myths, without exception, lead to dire 
consequences. Even Antigone’s breach of nomos, which is clearly articulated and justified, 
not only ends in her tragic suicide but in the devastation of the entire city. There is a natural 
order expressed in nomos that demands obedience and reverence beyond personal feelings of 
mistreatment or injustice. Members of the community are expected to uphold nomos, and in 
turn can expect others do so. 
 
Martha Nussbaum stresses a more enveloping interpretation of nomos. Her understanding 
takes on an almost existential mantel. She takes her cue from Aristotle, who judges that 
nomos “has no power towards obedience but that of habit”; Nussbaum proceeds to argue how 
“enforced changes in these habits may lead to a climate of rootlesness and upheaval.”20 She 
bases her interpretation on Euripides’s Hecuba; a play discussed at length in the next section. 
Nussbaum believes that nomos holds ontological importance. This finds further support in 
Sandywell’s judgement that nomos as “the justice of Zeus became synonymous with the 
fundamental structure of the universe itself.”21 This way of thinking about nomos draws 
uncanny parallels to the concept of Ontological Security, and indeed the point has been made 
by Nussbaum and Lebow that nomos and ontological security share many important 
features.22  A breach of nomos then not only leads to violation of Zeus’ order but on a more 
practical level leads to a loss of identity as predicated on inter-subjective recognition of 
equality and distinction; if the oath between citizens is broken, there is no guarantee that 
citizens will recognize each other’s existential needs. If such a breach of nomos is one-sided, 
i.e. suffered by a single citizen at the hands of another, it amounts to an injustice of the 
highest order and a forced withdrawal from the nomos-order and civilization as a whole. 
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Nomos in Euripides’ Hecuba 
 
In Euripides’ Hecuba the relationship between injustice and revenge is analysed from a 
subjective angle, notably through the subjectivity of Hecuba, the Trojan Queen. Among the 
three prevalent playwrights, Euripides is unique in his approach to the Greek myths. 
According to the classicist Moses Hadas, Euripides eschews the formalistic style of 
Aeschylus and Sophocles and makes his characters modern in the sense that he imagines the 
Greek characters “as contemporaries, subject to contemporary kinds of pressure, and 
examines their motivations, conduct, and fate in the light of contemporary problems, usage 
and ideals.”23 Euripides avoids the use of established protocol and democratizes his plays by 
turning the heroes into everyday people. Although Euripides honours the narrative arch of the 
myths, which ultimately end in death and murder, his narrative stresses that there can be 
another way. As Susan Jacoby, author of Wild Justice, writes, “Aeschylus and Sophocles ask 
under what circumstance is revenge ordained by the Gods as human fate. Euripides asks: Is 
revenge ordained. By whom? Why?”24 - Similar sentiment is echoed in Herodotus’ criticism 
of the despotic rule of nomos. 
 
Euripides admonishes his audience to question their judgement and confront these myths not 
as pre-ordained moral manuals, but as moral dilemmas that can be resolved or at least 
questioned. Euripides believes that: “man needlessly adds to the burden by treating aspects of 
life which are in fact determined by convention as if they were determined by nature.”25 The 
fact that Euripides questions the deterministic moral universe also means that his plays have a 
subjective component that offers a rare glimpse into the psyche of those tragic heroes. With 
the help of Nussbaum’s interpretation of Euripides’ Hecuba, it is possible to show how a 
failure of nomos is regarded subjectively, instead of simply referring to the stylistic 
determinism in other plays such as Aeschylus’ Oresteia.  
 
Hence, the problem of rage and revenge in Classical Greek mythology is augmented by an 
important account that offers motivation and justification for a breach of nomos.  Hecuba’s 
revenge, as the Erinyes feared, creates its own justice and moral order, or what Martha 
Nussbaum calls the Nomos of Revenge. Initially, scholars were sceptical of the merit of 	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25 Euripides, Ten Plays by Euripides. p. xiii 
	   26	  
studying Euripides’ Hecuba, arguing that it was “poor and uninteresting” or defined by “two 
seemingly unrelated narratives,”26 held together only by a shared connection to the Hecuba 
figure. Hecuba’s act of revenge towards the end of the play was deemed grotesque and 
unhinged from Greek ideals of nobility and excellence. Only in recent decades has the debate 
shifted toward an appraisal of the overarching theme of nomos and how Hecuba struggles to 
relate to a sequence of personal tragedies. However, before looking at the role of nomos, it is 
probably wise to briefly outline the narrative in Euripides’ tragedy. The two tragedies that 
befall Hecuba are the murders of her two children, Polyxena and Polydorus, in the aftermath 
of the Trojan defeat. Her daughter Polyxena is sacrificed by Odysseus to honour the death of 
Achilles. Soon after, she discovers that her son Polydorus, who had been sent away into 
protection, had been brutally murdered by his guardian and Hecuba’s close friend, 
Polymester, for money and political expediency, despite his pledge to protect and raise the 
boy. Subsequently, Hecuba’s pleas to Agamemnon, the Commander of the Greek army and 
her de facto master, to bring Polymester to justice are ignored, leaving her no choice but to 
exact her own terrible revenge: She enters Polymester’s tent under the false pretence of 
sharing information about a hidden treasure and then proceeds to stab his eyes out and kill his 
children. Early scholars, like Schlegel and Norwood, argued that the tragedy was inconsistent, 
because Hecuba received the death of Polyxena in an almost contrary manner to the death of 
Polydorus.27 While she certainly displayed emotional bewilderment in both cases, her 
response to the death of her son was marked by “power-seeking vengefulness”28 instead of 
the mournful reservation displayed at the death of her daughter. However, rather than argue 
that the play is inconsistent, as these scholars argued, the key to understanding Hecuba’s 
behaviour lies in our willingness to acknowledge that we are dealing with two very different 
events; one is a terrible tragedy, the other an unforgivable crime.29  
 
Kirkwood and Nussbaum remain the two scholars most concerned with the effect of nomos on 
Hecuba’s conduct regarding the two successive tragedies. Kirkwood hypothesizes that 
Hecuba is inherently nomos-less throughout the play.30 The tragedy of her position is that 
there exist several competing nomoi but none of them provide coverage for her position. This 	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interpretation however is fundamentally flawed. When Odysseus takes away Polyxena, 
Hecuba’s daughter, to be sacrificed at the tomb of Achilles, Hecuba does not contest the 
validity of the nomos: “If it is necessary that Peleus’ son be honoured and that you Greeks 
avoid censure, then do not kill this girl, Odysseus, but lead me off instead to Achilles pyre and 
stab me.”31 She pleads but ultimately resigns herself to the fact that the sacrifice must be 
made and that the victim must come from her own ranks. Scholars such as Norwood and 
Schlegel, who argue that the play is inherently inconsistent, stress the fact that Hecuba accepts 
her daughter’s fate with nobility and respect, supporting the notion that she deems the nomos 
as valid and applicable. Despite Kirkwood’s interest in nomos, his overall hypothesis on the 
existence of overlapping and excluding nomoi is weak. If he were correct in arguing that 
Hecuba encountered several nomoi, all of which excluded her, why did she react in such a 
noble and respectful manner to the nomos demanding the sacrifice of her daughter, while 
reacting differently to the alleged exclusion from other nomoi, i.e. the death of her son?  
 
The real problem, as Nussbaum articulates it, lies not in the perception of exclusion but in the 
perception of a breach. Kirkwood argues that Polymester’s nomos of protecting the city leads 
him to the necessity of murdering Hecuba’s son.32 The stress would lie again on Hecuba’s 
frustration of being excluded from nomos; that Polymester’s priorities lay in serving his city, 
as is expected of a king, and not in honouring his bond with Hecuba. But this is incorrect. 
Firstly, Hecuba explores the possibility that Polymester might have acted to protect his city, 
which, we may hypothesize, would have resulted in a subdued reaction in Hecuba. However, 
she states: “For explain this: why, when Troy flourished and still had the protection of her 
circling walls, when Priam was alive and Hector carried all before him in battle, why, if you 
wanted to earn this man’s gratitude, did you not choose that time to kill the boy.” Hecuba 
concludes that Polymester’s true motivation was simple. “If your goodwill towards the 
Greeks were genuine, you should have taken the gold (…) and given it to the men who were 
experiencing hardship and not set eyes on their homeland for many a year (…) Why not even 
now can you bring yourself to let it out of your grasp; you stubbornly keep it in your home.”33 
Polymester’s actions did not serve his city. Hecuba easily uncovers his ploy and shows him to 
be the wicked and greedy deserter he is. Had he acted the way Hecuba outlines, by allying 
early on with the Greeks and donating the gold to the war effort, her reaction would have 	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likely been different; not least because such behaviour would have been risky and showed 
true adherence to nomos. But Polymester proved himself to be self-serving and a liar. When 
the war was over, fearing no reprisal from the Trojans, he killed Hecuba’s son, stole the gold 
and flattered the victor. 
 
In her last confrontation with nomos, but before exacting her revenge on Polymester, she 
approaches Agamemnon, the Commander of the Greek Army. She pleads “be my champion 
against this man, this guest-friend who pollutes hospitality and has perpetrated so unholy 
deed, without fear of the Gods, whether below the earth or in heaven.”34 Agamemnon 
initially shares her outrage but refuses to help her, because in his line of thinking he would be 
aiding the enslaved Queen of Troy against an ally of the Greek Army. “There is a point you 
see, that causes me embarrassment: this man is an ally in the eyes of my troops but the dead 
man is an enemy” he informs Hecuba, effectively denying her any assistance. Hecuba is left 
without the means of obtaining justice and Polymester’s betrayal of nomos is met with 
impunity. Hecuba berates Agamemnon for his refusal to act, but seeks no other punishment 
against him. 
 
Returning one last time to Kirkwood’s idea that Hecuba falls in-between competing nomoi, 
the question arises of why in her three encounters with such alleged exclusive nomoi she only 
reacts violently against Polymester. It is evident that Hecuba accepts Odysseus and 
Agamemnon’s behaviour; it aligns with her understanding of nomos. But she reacts violently 
against Polymester because he betrays nomos, both in his deceitful explanation of serving his 
city and more importantly in his reneging on his promise to protect and raise Polydorus. 
Again Kirkwood concludes the opposite, “Goaded by Odysseus’s inadequate conception of 
Nomos, and by Agamemnon’s disregard of nomos, she has been seduced from her own 
staunch belief in that principle. The appalling result to her personality is the tragedy of 
Hecuba.” Odysseus and Agamemnon both have robust understandings of nomos, contrary to 
what Kirkwood argues; it is Polymester who betrays the concept.  
 
According to Nussbaum, the disregard of nomos, the breach of protocol and of the promise, 
alters Hecuba’s own relation to nomos. Holding the body of her son, she cries: “O child, 
child, now I begin my mourning, the wild newly-learned melody, from the spirit of 
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revenge.”35 This new melody will “prove a solitary song, for which no confidence in 
untrustworthy human things is required,”36 writes Nussbaum. By breaking nomos, Hecuba’s 
worldview is sabotaged. She is unable to situate herself within the increasingly dire situations 
presented to her. Because not even nomos is certain, Hecuba can entertain no hope for the 
future, not least because the plight of war-captives relies heavily on nomos.37 Her new found 
insight is reflected in her cynical response to Agamemnon, when she judges, “In all the world 
no man is free; either he is slave to money or circumstance, or else the majority of his fellow-
citizens or a code of laws prevents him from acting as his better judgment dictates.”38 Nomos 
is no longer divine law, but simply the product of expedience and desire. This sobering 
realization then translates into Hecuba’s revenge against Polymester. Scholars deemed 
Hecuba’s act of blinding Polymester as well as killing his sons excessive and tasteless; 
Nussbaum, however, situates the act of blinding in relation to nomos. She argues that the act 
of blinding stresses Polymester’s failure to see the true value of nomos; he has always been 
blind to the binding nature of nomos and the importance it holds for social conduct. Hecuba 
believes blinding him explicates his failure. Nussbaum calls this mimetic revenge. 
“Untrustworthy, Untrustworthy” cries Hecuba, “new, new are the things I see!” And what she 
sees, according to Nussbaum, is “that the nomoi that structured her world never were, for this 
beloved other party, binding nomoi.”39  
 
Nussbaum and Kirkwood alter the entire meaning of the play. Rather than tell the story of a 
fallen Queen, it stresses the importance of nomos and what happens when this existentially 
informed concept of order is discarded. The danger, which the play explores so masterfully, 
lies in the fact that a failure to honour inter-subjective frameworks, such as agreed-upon 
notions of order and justice, liberates the victim to create a new ontology that serves her 
emotional needs unencumbered by the demands of civilized life. Nussbaum points out that 
Hecuba’s “eyes are said hereafter to shine with the ‘fiery glances’ of a dog, also a four footed 
beast.”40 Similarly, after he is blinded, Polymester emerges like a beast on all fours calling 
out for Hecuba: “I want to grab hold of her, tear her apart, and make her flesh run with blood 
(…) I implore you, let me go. Let me use my raging hands on her.”41 Leaving social 	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40 Ibid., p. 414. 
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convention behind means returning to a carnal stage in human development, void of reason 
and moderation. Both Hecuba, who takes a morbid pleasure in the fact that her resting place 
will read “tomb of the wretched bitch” and Polymester, who immediately gives in to these 
feral desires following his mutilation; “where should I lunge to gorge myself on their flesh 
and bone, as I feast like a wild beast, dealing out wounds in revenge for my own 
mutilation,”42 are reduced to brute beasts lacking social pedigree. The same behaviour is 
found in the descriptions of the dreaded Erinyes. 
 
Arguably Polymester was always this beast, because his respect for nomos was only ever 
politically expedient and superficial; Hecuba merely revealed the beast behind the mask. 
Hecuba on the other hand entertained a fierce respect for nomos. Hence when Polymester 
broke his promise and undermined the validity of nomos, Hecuba was not merely insulted; 
she was threatened by the collapse of her entire worldview. Polymester’s betrayal revealed a 
nightmare where injustice reigned with impunity. Hecuba’s rage addressed this injustice. Her 
“excessive” revenge was tailored to explicate Polymester’s failure and mimetically return the 
lesson she had learned from the ordeal: Without nomos the world is a dark place.  
 
A dismissal of nomos returns actors to a stage of uncivilized bestiality, permitting all kinds of 
excesses and justifications. But this rage needs to be contrasted with the milder experience of 
anger, which relies on a functioning of nomos, not a dismissal. Acts of disrespect remained a 
key driver for anger in Ancient Greece.43 Nowhere is this more evident than in the Iliad. 
However, anger, in contrast to the bestial fits of rage just encountered, remained governed by 
an inter-personal framework. According to Kalimtzis the regulatory mechanism is honour. 
Honour is the reason Greek actors become angry. Kalimtzis writes, “Anger is roused from  
slights that diminish someone’s honour. Honour as measure of worth refers to a socially 
recognized standard; damages to it can be evaluated so that the recompense may be 
proportionate to the offence”.44 Lebow agrees that regulatory mechanisms exist in the desire 
for social esteem but warns that “warriors often break the nomos”45 in fits of rage. While 
anger is contained within nomos and responds to slights, rage responds to woeful breaches of 
nomos. In other words, anger is still civilized while rage is uncivilized. To further stress this 
point between sanctioned anger and unsanctioned rage, we turn to Achilles and his epic 
performance in the Iliad. 	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Rage in Homer’s Iliad 
 
Homer’s Iliad was an extremely stylized poem and more in line with the formalistic approach 
found in Aeschylus and Sophocles. However, despite the use of heroic ideals and the many 
references to gods and other divine imperatives, Achilles’ motivation and rationale behind his 
actions are extremely well documented, even rather modern. The Iliad famously begins with 
an overture expounding the anger of Achilles, which brought unimaginable ill and destruction 
on the Achaeans. Achilles suffers two insults in the Iliad. Agamemnon, the Greek General 
and Achilles’ superior, authors the first: While under the spell of Ate, the goddess of blind 
anger, he takes from Achilles his priced slave Briseis. Achilles reacts to this slight with a 
subdued anger; he takes no revenge, because he knows he cannot act against his military 
commander. But equally he refrains from participating in battle. This fateful decision 
precipitates the second insult: The death of his comrade Patrocles, whom the Trojan warrior 
Hector mistakenly kills after Patrocles dons Achilles’ armour. In response to this second 
insult, Achilles goes on a rampage, defeats his opponent Hector and butchers his body. 
Achilles suffers two mistreatments in the play but reacts differently to both, much like 
Hecuba. While Oliver Taplin argues, “anger displaces anger,”46 this assessment ignores the 
salient feature of difference in behaviour. The first insult leads to a type of withdrawal and 
sulking, while the other kindles feats of awesome destruction, and more importantly the 
carnal rage of the Erinyes, already witnessed in Hecuba. “I’ll hack your flesh away and eat 
you raw;”47 Achilles informs Hector. 
 
The Greeks enjoyed a plethora of words denoting different forms of anger and intuitively this 
would be the first place to investigate to see whether the insults engender different emotional 
reactions. The most common words used to describe Achilles’ emotional state are menis and 
kholos. “The term menis,” writes Konstan, “has a solemn and perhaps religious register, and 
is often associated with divine anger” while kholos is a “violent fury, irrespective of whether 
it is provoked or not.” Kalimtzis slightly differs in his description, stating that menis is a form 
of awesome action-inducing anger, while kholos is a type of “bile, that occurs from 
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humiliation.”48 Although there are evident differences between the two, these scholars seem 
to disagree on what they are; moreover as Konstan admits, kholos and menis are used 
interchangeably throughout the Iliad, making it difficult to align them causally to any of the 
insults. What can be deduced from Achilles’ anger response, the one responsible for the 
awesome destruction and fits of rage, and described as menis, at least in the first lines of the 
play, is that it is possibly divinely inspired. 
 
A better approach is to look at the difference in behaviour and relay these differences back to 
Achilles’ perception of the insults, much like Nussbaum attempts in Euripides’ Hecuba. 
Achilles’ behaviour following Agamemnon’s initial slight is not particularly egregious; 
Achilles neither seeks revenge nor commits any other form of compensatory act; he just 
withdraws from battle. Following Patrocles’ death, Achilles, however, engages in activity that 
comes very close to the bestial portrayal of Hecuba and Polymester, possibly implicating a 
discard of nomos. Before he kills Hector, he exclaims, “I’ll hack your flesh away and eat you 
raw,”49 a clear indicator of the supremacy of carnal desires and the mark of a world without 
nomos. After he kills Hector, he violates nomos even further, denying Hector’s libation rites, 
and instead dragging his corpse through the city. This nomos-voiding behaviour again elicits 
an equal bestial response in Hector’s mother, Hecuba, who laments that the mutilated body of 
her son lies “in the house of that terrible man on whose liver I would fain fasten and 
devour.”50 Even the God Apollo remarks that Achilles is “going his own barbaric way, giving 
in to his power, his brute force and wild pride, as down the swoops on the flocks of men to 
seize his savage feat.”51 There is a strong case to be made that Achilles’ carnal rage begins 
with the death of Patrocles and not the insult suffered at the hands of Agamemnon. 
 
There is a further qualification to be made in the Agamemnon insult. Although Agamemnon 
ultimately regrets his disrespectful treatment of Achilles as Commander in Chief, he remains 
Achilles’ superior and consequently enjoys greater standing than him. Standing is a function 
of honour; however it is not the only one. Achilles’ anger is explained by the fact that, as 
supreme warrior, he has earned immeasurable esteem from friends and foes alike. Esteem, 
then, is another function of honour. The tragedy in the confrontation between Agamemnon 
and Achilles is that both men feel entitled to special treatment due to their honour; 	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unfortunately they are on equal footing but in two separate categories. Agamemnon has high 
standing, while Achilles enjoys high esteem; neither wishes to submit to the other. On 
balance, Achilles’ anger is justified. But critically he refrains from allowing his anger to spill 
over into rage, half-heartedly keeping to nomos. 
 
The consensus on Achilles’ rage – not his anger - is that the menis is divinely inspired, 
brought upon by misalignment of the destructive rage in his thymos (spirit/liver) and the 
thinking element in his phrenes (container of the spirit, rib cage).52 Scholars over the years 
have likened Achilles’ behaviour to uncontrollable “Berserker” rage or divine possession – 
but either way void of logic or rationale.53 Kalimtzis challenges this interpretation and writes, 
“such a divinely righteous anger that functions to fulfil some divine will is not to be found in 
any of the writings during this period.”54 Kalimtzis discounts divine intervention and instead 
opts for a psychological explanation pertaining to the misalignment of the thymos inside the 
phrenes, which is also what Achilles believes.  
 
Oliver Taplin equally discounts the divine intervention and “Berserker" interpretation, but 
instead offers a different explanation, one related to an actual causal motif and echoing the 
Euripidean enterprise: 
 
 “It would be a mistake to regard him as a berserker, or a mindless butcher, or 
even to select a typical description ‘a force of sheer destructive energy’. Far from 
being mindless, there is a kind of terrifying reasoning behind Achilleus’ killing, a 
merciless ‘logic’, which finds its fullest expression in the reply to Lykaon.” 55  
 
In his reply, Achilles indeed offers his rationale:  “No, for all that you will die a vile death, 
until all of you have paid for the killing of Patrocles and the ravage of Achaians you 
slaughtered by the fast ships when I was not with them.”56 Taplin concludes: “These are 
words of terrifying ambition, yet they are not the spewing of an incomprehensible or 
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pathological blood-lust.”57 Achilles’ rage, as he himself states, is caused by the untimely 
death of Patrocles. Critically, this death is unexpected and unsanctioned, because it was 
Achilles who should have been wearing the armour not Patrocles. Achilles’ dismissal of 
nomos is thus explained by the fact that he finds the order of nomos invalidated by the way 
Patrocles dies. 
 
Hecuba explains the same ruthless logic when she blinds and mutilates Polymester: “You 
would have in that son of mine a treasure to reckon with; but, as it is, you have forfeited that 
man’s goodwill, the gain you would have had from his gold is vanished, and this is the reward 
you and your children have reaped.”58 Despite her grotesque act of vengeance, one cannot 
deny that Hecuba operates under clear rationale; she offers a motif and even expounds on her 
thinking behind her distinct act of revenge. Hecuba’s rage is unquestionably caused by a 
breach of nomos. Unfortunately, none of the scholars have made this case about Achilles. 
And indeed Homer, as a playwright, might have been more concerned with the dynamics of 
personal ambition and strife.59 Nevertheless, there are uncanny parallels between Hecuba and 
Achilles in their behaviour following their tragic losses, which are instructive and stress the 
central role of nomos. The most pronounced similarity can be found in what Seaford refers to 
as the “liminality of death.”60 
  
Seaford argues that Achilles pursues a string of activities that amount to a withdrawal from 
social life and ultimately herald his own death. In other words a performative social death, 
captured by a dismissal of nomos, precedes Achilles’ actual death. The death of Patrocles is 
central in bringing about Achilles’ “death like state of mourning.”61 Seaford argues that 
Achilles’ relation to Patrocles is closer than kin and approaches notions of identity. 
Consequently, Patrocles’ death not only precipitates Achilles’ own demise, but also more 
importantly, results in an immediate existential withdrawal and loss of engagement with the 
social world.  As nomos holds existential importance for social identity and notion of the self, 
the death-like mourning is expressed through nomos-voiding behaviour on Achilles’ part. As 
with Hecuba, the relationship to nomos has changed. 	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We have already touched on the excessive, nomos-voiding expression of rage, when Achilles 
maltreats Hector’s body and denies libation rituals. However, other more nuanced behaviour 
makes the same point: When Achilles vows to his mother Thetis that he will kill Hector, she 
responds that his death will follow shortly after. Instead of contesting this prophecy, Achilles 
makes a strong symbolic gesture by cutting off a lock of his hair and placing it in Patrocles’ 
dead hand, reneging on a deal to offer his hair to the goddess Spercheios in exchange for a 
safe journey home. Seaford argues that this symbolic gesture carries even greater weight 
because “in general offerings of parts of the body or of clothes may represent the offerer 
himself.”62 In other words Achilles is placing himself in Patrocles’ tomb, sealing his own fate. 
Achilles then proceeds to withdrawal from social life by abstaining from food, sleep and sex. 
Thus Seaford concluded that Achilles’ liminality to death is expressed by these three key 
elements: (i) participation in the death of Patrocles (ii) carnal desire for flesh and blood (iii) 
and abstention from social practices.63 All of these elements amount to a social death and 
withdrawal from civilized life.  
 
Hecuba’s behaviour follows Seaford’s idea of liminality. First of all she offers herself in 
exchange for her daughter Polyxena to be sacrificed at the tomb of Achilles; however, we 
need to be careful here, because Hecuba still subscribes to nomos and is not yet raging. Only 
after discovering the body of her son Polydorus does she begin to withdraw from the world: 
“Oh no, no! So I see my son dead before my eyes (…) This kills me. Oh what misery” I am 
alive no more, no more!”64 When Agamemnon ignores her pleas, she exclaims “My life has 
ended, Agamemnon; there is nothing left for me to suffer.” Lastly, the mutilated Polymester 
prophesises her death, but she simply responds: “I care nothing for that! Your punishment is 
what I wanted!”65 Hecuba’s liminality is expressed then by the following key elements: (i) 
her lamentation after discovering her son’s corpse (ii) her new solitary song of revenge and 
her act of disrobing before killing (robes are a sign of nomos according to Nussbaum) (iii) and 
her celebration of the prophecy about her tomb reading ‘fiery-eyed dog’. 
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Nomos-voiding behaviour and social deaths, however, can be reversed. Achilles re-enters 
nomos after he makes peace with Hector’s father Priam. Priam, who arrives to claim the dead 
body of his son, shares his sorrow and desperation with Achilles, who in turn is moved 
towards compassion. After breaking bread with Priam, he engages in other social bonds by 
sharing a bed with Briseis. Despite Achilles’ return to nomos, which coincides with a 
diminution of his rage, his death remains sealed. Hecuba, although she puts on her robes and 
rejoins the chorus, understands that her fate, too, is sealed. Both figures are too polluted to 
remain in society. A dismissal of nomos must always carry terrible consequences for the 
transgressor. 
 
The tragedies of Achilles and Hecuba share the following similarities. First, both establish a 
death wish. They exclaim their own death - or in the case of Achilles hear it from others - and 
in no way pursue actions to avoid it. In fact, they actively pursue their fated death, when 
normal social relations and conduct are curtailed or even ceased entirely. The second point is 
that neither Hecuba nor Achilles act without reason. Both suffer injustices with strong 
existential overtones. The third point is related and pertains to the excesses both figures exact 
on their victims. The perceived injustices and punitive excesses are subjectively aligned 
though not objectively. This should not be surprising, because the initial injustice voids any 
sense of a shared justice. According to Nussbaum, the punishment is thus not only retribution 
for the slight, but also much more a response to the dismissal of nomos, which in itself is the 
highest form of injustice imaginable. Unexpected slights warrant unexpected revenge. Lastly, 
each completed act of revenge is accompanied by overtures of re-socialization, which none-
the-less cannot save the subject from the foregone conclusion of their fated death. Without 
any direct reference to the Erinyes, both Hecuba and Achilles subjectively illustrate the 
gradual dissolution of order, lamented by the three sisters. Their desire for revenge based on a 
legitimate injustice turns both figures into blood lusting animals with little or no regard for 
social order. But at the same time their motivation is ironclad and fully articulated. Achilles 
and Hecuba feel entitled to their own sense of justice, because what they suffered belies the 
idea that such a thing as universal justice or order exists. 
 
The fractured Psychology of the Thymos 
 
A desire for personal justice easily becomes rage because the means of obtaining such justice 
are unhinged from shared social norms. This is logical, because the very concept of shared 
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social norms has been proven ineffective and in many ways has led to the sense of betrayal in 
the first place. In Ancient Greece, this dismissal of shared social norms returned the actor to a 
bestial state of passion and desire, undeterred by social norms or propriety - brutes unable to 
think. The rage element is inexplicably linked to the notion of uncivilized bestiality, 
exemplified by an overt dismissal of social etiquette and a wilful disregard for the lives of 
others. In the self-diagnosis offered by Achilles, he states that his thymos (the spirit) is 
misaligned with his phrenes (the rib cage), resulting in a lack of thinking and overabundance 
of passion. The overreaction of the thymos was a natural occurrence in Ancient Greece and 
often heralded disaster and death for those involved. In recent years, Richard Ned Lebow has 
led the resurgence in the interest of thymos as a political concept and helped re-introduce the 
idea of the spirit into discussions on global strategy, warfare and violence.66  
 
In Lebow’s explanation of the tri-partite psychology found in Plato’s Republic, the thymos 
(spirit) shares a precarious balance with logos (reason/fear) and eros (appetite). Eros, the 
desire for material gain, and thymos, the desire for esteem, battle for supremacy. However, 
they are contained by the thinking element of logos, tasked with maintaining a prudent 
strategy of survival and long-term security. For instance when Agamemnon first insults 
Achilles, the young hero almost draws his sword in rage but is assuaged by the sudden 
appearance of Athena, cautioning his passion. Athena, the goddess of wisdom, strategy and 
persuasion, operates in accordance with the logos. The rewarding and indeed life-saving 
relationship between logos and thymos would give rise to Aristotle’s dictum, and now famous 
precursor to Appraisal Theory, that “anger is not aroused by affronts from people who are 
more powerful than we are, because it is unlikely that we gain revenge.”67 
 
Homeric thymos, the prototype so to speak, and reigning psychology in the Iliad, is in many 
ways less refined but paradoxically more flexible than the Platonic version. They both share 
the concept of a fractured psychology. While the Platonic thymos negotiates with logos and 
eros, the Homeric precursor negotiates solely with the phrenes. The relationship between 
thymos and phrenes is said to be one of “contained and container.”68 The phrenes is used to 
ponder over and reign in the thymos, much like when Athena intervenes to assuage Achilles’ 
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rising anger, making the phrenes an “agent of reflection.”69 However, in moments of intense 
passion, the thymos is said to operate outside the phrenes.70 Along with its dualistic nature, 
Homeric psychology departs from its Platonic successor in a more dramatic way. In the words 
of the classicist A.W.H. Adkins “Homeric man, then, not only has a psychology and a 
physiology in which the parts are more evident than the whole: he believes that the gods may 
act directly upon him or some aspect of him to affect his actions for good or ill.”71 
Consequently, the gods play a vital role in the decision-making processes of their subjects 
through a wilful manipulation of the thymos and phrenes. For instance when Agamemnon 
slights Achilles, the young warrior explains that Zeus has taken away Agamemnon’s phrenes. 
And to assert that the gods have taken away one’s phrenes is tantamount to claiming that the 
individual is not thinking clearly, because the thinking element is obstructed, giving free reign 
to the unthinking passions of the thymos.72 
  
Besides obstructing the thinking element of the phrenes and allowing the thymos to go 
unchecked, the Gods can take a more active role in the fate of their subjects by actually 
inhabiting and controlling the thymos. This fundamentally alters the constitution of the thymos 
from a source of personal motivation to a vehicle of outside interference. Koziak believes the 
correct description of Homeric thymos to be “the neutral bearer of emotion,”73 because 
instead of only registering anger and insult, Homeric characters respond to all kinds of 
emotions in their thymos, ranging from sorrow in the case of Priam, fear in the case of 
Odysseus, anger of course in the case of Achilles, as well as a strong sense of compassion as 
in the case of Priam’ and Achilles’ reconciliation.74 But equally, the Gods often personify 
these sensations through their distinct personal characteristics. Specifically, the sensation of 
anger has been associated with Ate, the goddess of blinding anger. Agamemnon directly 
blames Ate for his foolish decision to insult Achilles.  
 
Ate even makes an appearance in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. In Mark Anthony’s epic 
eulogy to Caesar and infamous rallying cry, he warns: “Caesar's spirit, raging for 
revenge, With Ate by his side come hot from hell, Shall in these confines with a monarch's 	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voice Cry 'Havoc,' and let slip the dogs of war.”75 Ate is then a state of mind, unhinged by 
monomania - a specific way of relating to the world, charged by an act of grave injustice. Ate 
places her victim in a precarious position in relation to nomos, because she operates in 
opposition to the phrenes and the ability to control impulse and passion. And so the presence 
of Ate is likened to a state of partial or temporary insanity.76 Ruth Padel explains that, 
historically, Ate’s presence soon gave way to the Goddess Lyssa, the goddess of madness, 
portrayed on vases as having canine features, and urging man to destruction.77 The parallels 
to the canine behaviour of Polymester, Hecuba and Achilles, are evident here and already 
suggest a strong connection to the nomos-voiding actions brought about by uncivilized 
behaviour and unchecked impulses of the thymos. However, the strongest connection between 
thymos and nomos lies in the fact that the raging passions of the thymos, be they menis, ate, 
lyssa or kholos, are administered by the dreaded Erinyes, the self-proclaimed guardians of 
nomos. 
 
Erinyes, Guardians of the Nomos 
 
In Aeschylus’ trilogy of the Oresteia, the Erinyes are established as agents of retaliation and 
vengeance. They are depicted as disgusting creatures with “membraned wings, and shrivelled, 
ugly faces,”78 “they snore with a blast unapproachable, and from their eyes they drip a 
loathsome liquid.”79 The God Apollo explains, “neither gods, nor mortals, nor beasts 
associate with them. They inhabit the darkness of Tartarus beneath earth, objects of hatred to 
mortals and Olympian Gods.” 80 They wear black robes, drink the blood of men and cower in 
the darkness like wretched animals. They are described as either the daughter of Nox, the 
goddess of the night, or of Hades, the guardian of the Greek Underworld; other myths claim 
that they sprang from the blood of the Titan Uranus, murdered by his son, the Titan Cronos.81 
According to Emil Cioran the Erinyes were “held to antedate the Gods, Zeus included.”82 	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They were ancient psychological truths that came to anchor the order of Zeus, borne from the 
desperate need to vanquish their presence from communal life. 
 
Aeschylus utilizes the myth of the Erinyes in his exploration of cyclical revenge and 
communal strife. Unlike Euripides of course, who makes no mention of the Erinyes, 
Aeschylus stresses that injustices and breaches of nomos must always end in bloodshed and 
violence; it is how the universe works. The narrative he sets up begins with Agamemnon’s 
return from Troy. Soon after his homecoming, he is killed by his wife Clytemnestra in 
revenge for the death of their daughter Iphigenia, whom Agamemnon had sacrificed to 
appease the goddess Artemis. After Agamemnon’s death, his son Orestes is commanded by 
Apollo to avenge his father’s death by committing matricide. Orestes initially protests but 
then gives in and commits the murder; soon after, the Erinyes arrive demanding blood in 
revenge for the matricide. The point Aeschylus tackles is that vengeance begets vengeance; 
the Erinyes appear and re-appear with every new act of killing. And each act is expressed as a 
righteous demand for justice. 
 
This has led the scholar A.L. Brown to conclude, “the Erinyes seem to take account of 
unlawful murders of any kind.”83 Their function, however, is much more pronounced than 
that. Rather than operate as a function of bloodshed and murder, they operate as necessary 
punishment for breaches of nomos; it just happens that murder is one of the most egregious 
breaches. Killings in war, for instance, do not trigger the appearance of the Erinyes, because a 
different type of nomos governs warfare. Consequently, in Aeschylus’ Eumenides, the 
Erinyes proclaim “We are honest witness (…) When family strife sheds kindred blood, we 
pursue the killer, however strong he is (…) now the standard of right and wrong shall be 
reversed, if the pernicious justice which this mother-murderer claims, is to prevail.”84 Orestes 
must pay for his breach of moira, the oldest and most sacred form of nomos. The Erinyes 
warn that a breach of moira cannot go unpunished, because it amounts to a sacrilegious 
breach of Zeus’ order, and it is from him they take their authority.85 In their own words: “This 
is justice – omnipotent, I warn you. Bend to the will of Zeus. No oath can match the power of 
the father.”86  
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According to Dodds and Padel, the Erinyes serve an important psychological function.  In 
T.S. Eliot the Erinyes are portrayed as pangs of consciousness or internal daemons.87 
According to Helen Bacon they represent “a universal psychological reality.”88 They emerge 
whenever a citizen commits a terrible crime. According to Ruth Padel “They work punitively 
in the inner world, in the mind of a person who has hurt someone else. They are activated 
from the external inner world, the underworld.”89 This underworld seeps through the cracks 
of communal order once the adhesive agent of nomos begins to dissolve. Their primary 
purpose is not to hunt murderers, but rather to punish those who undermine nomos by giving 
in to personal justice and revenge. And no nomos is as important as the “relationship between 
parent and child,” they claim. In other words, Orestes’ knowing breach of nomos, which 
today might be referred to as guilt, brings about the Erinyes. Even in Euripides’ Hecuba, the 
presence of the Erinyes is implied by the spectre of Hecuba’s son Polydorus at the beginning 
of the play, implying the existence of guilt on behalf of some evildoer.90 In contrast, Oedipus’ 
unknowing fratricide fails to elicit the appearance of the Erinyes, arguably because he is 
unaware of his crime.91 
 
The myth of the Erinyes crystallizes the foregone discussion on nomos. Both Hecuba and 
Achilles shed blood in response to unjust behaviour. They respond to breaches of nomos, but 
in doing so breach nomos in turn; for them at least, nomos no longer holds authority. Their 
behaviour with its strong carnal overtones directly mirrors the depiction of the Erinyes as 
wretched monsters, crawling and hissing, feasting on the flesh of their victims. They are 
personified rage, ostensibly decrying breaches of nomos, but ultimately undermining it 
completely by their unmitigated desire for revenge and justice, plunging the entire community 
into a state of civil war. In Aeschylus’ Oresteia each death is celebrated as a ‘homecoming’ 
and an end to violence, but in fact only portends new violence. Aeschylus’ Oresteia 
challenges this contradiction between justice and revenge cycles and offers a resolution, 
earning its place in the canon of Western foundation myths of justice.92 
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After Apollo confronts the Erinyes and tells them to back off, the goddess Athena emerges to 
settle the dispute. In the ensuing proceedings, Apollo, acting council to Orestes, and the 
Erinyes make their case before Athena. Apollo successfully exculpates Orestes by claiming 
that the order to kill Clytemnestra comes from none other than Zeus, effectively undermining 
the Erinyes’ own claim to authority. Apollo also, rather less successfully, tries to reframe the 
relationship between Orestes and his mother as governed by xenia, the nomos of strangers, 
rather than moira, nomos of kinship. A breach of xenia is viewed as less egregious. The jury 
votes 6-6 and Athena breaks the tie by siding with Apollo. Athena clearly knows the 
consequences of her decision: “if they fail to win their day in court – how it will spread, the 
venom of their pride, plague everlasting blights our land, our future…” And as expected, the 
Erinyes immediately threaten Athens with plague and destruction. “Poison to match my grief 
comes pouring out my heart, cursing the land to burn it sterile (…) – cross the face of the 
earth the bloody tide come hurling, all mankind destroyed.”93 They speak allegorically of 
civil war.  
 
Their desire for revenge is not assuaged by Apollo’s arguments or Athena’s judgement. As 
ancient psychological truths they operate a different mandate and idea of justice that cannot 
be defused by persuasion. And the dismissal of their justice, the Erinyes warn, leads to 
famine, plague and destruction. Without the unquestioned authority of nomos, subjects no 
longer have reason to regard each other as equals or fellow citizens. The dismissal of nomos 
brings an end to civilized life and leads to the reign of phusis, a type of despotic rule and the 
law of the strong. Consequently those who breach nomos, thus everyone from Hecuba and 
Achilles to Antigone, Ajax and Oedipus – but not Orestes – must withdraw from civilized 
life, either through exile or death, before they infect others with their uncivilized lack of faith 
in the rule of nomos.94 Before moving on to describe the psycho-dynamics of pollution, 
Athena’s ingenious strategy to rein in the wrath of the Erinyes will be briefly elaborated. 
 
Fully understanding that the Erinyes have an important function, underlined by the fact that 
the jury’s decision ends in a tie, Athena claims, “From these fearful faces I see great gain for 
these citizens”. Athena offers the Erinyes their own temple and worship in exchange for their 
acquiescence. As Helen Bacon explains, the “establishment of a cult signifies their integration 	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into the sacrificial community of gods and mortals.”95 After they accept Athena’s deal, the 
Erinyes are immediately presented with new robes. They no longer howl and hiss but are said 
to acknowledge the power of speech and persuasion. “Instead of hiding in the Tartarus, they 
will live in a cave under the hill Ares, instead of their cannibalistic feats in darkness, they will 
share their sacrificial feasts of gods and mortals.” They stand erect and “depart according to 
nomos.”96 Nussbaum describes how Euripides inverts this process in Hecuba. Both 
Polymester and Hecuba take on bestial forms at the end of the play, crawling on all fours in 
tattered robes, indicating their descent into madness and rage; the Erinyes however, now 
renamed the Eumenides, the Well-wishers, begin to stand upright and wear clean robes, 
indicating their ascent into civility and reason.  
 
Athena’s deal amounts to a restructuring of the Erinyes’ duties. They still protect nomos but 
act as portent to those who would break it. Athena explains the new role of the Erinyes thus, 
“Never waste our youth, inflaming them with burning wine of strife (…) as for the bird that 
fights at home – my curse on civil war.” Whereas the Erinyes used to actively punish those 
who committed a crime, leading to a cycle of revenge and pollution, they now act as fearful 
deterrent. In accordance with reason, the knowledge of their wrath must suffice. “But he who 
has never felt their weight or known the blows of life and how they fall, the crimes of his 
fathers hale him towards their bar, and there for all his boasts – destruction, silent, majestic 
anger, crushes him to dust.”97 
 
Their potential for destruction is no less, but their acceptance into the polis means that their 
domain is no longer private but public revenge. Athena, as the goddess of state authority, 
acknowledges the power of fear in maintaining social order. The Erinyes have changed their 
status but not their identity; they remain enforcers of the law. Seaford writes, “It is 
paradoxical, but for the polis essential, that the ancient agents of private violent revenge 
become, through public cult, a means of excluding it.”98 What the cult of Eumenides now 
communicates to the “bird that fights at home” is that he will be punished for risking 
pollution, for undermining communal order, and challenging the validity of the nomos oath 
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each citizen makes towards one another. In the words of Seaford, “the furies extended their 
deterrence of violence from kinship group to the whole polis.”99  
 
Risking pollution becomes the ultimate crime. Athena asks of the Erinyes, “Let our wars rage 
on abroad, with all their force, to satisfy our powerful lust for fame.” But at home, the social 
order must never be compromised. Athena believes that fear of the Erinyes’ wrath alone must 
suffice. If successful, this new nomos will change the arithmetic of any crime, because it 
posits the offender against the entire community, rather than only the victim and his kin. As a 
consequence, the entire community seeks revenge and purges the polluting element without 
risking counter-revenge, because the offender has waived his right to kinship through his 
wilful challenge to communal order. However, from a Euripidean angle, the desire for 
revenge is not really resolved. Individuals are coerced by the fear of earning the wrath of the 
entire community; this does not solve the problem of revenge, it merely suppresses it – or 
worse: exports it. The mandate of the courts is to maintain social order at the cost of personal 
and self-righteous claims to justice. This decision comes with considerable cost and will be 
explored throughout this thesis. 
 
Pollution in Ancient Greece 
 
The Erinyes threaten Athens with plague, disasters, famine and drought. Their threats are to 
be understood as socio-economic disasters awaiting a city that has abandoned the rule of 
nomos and has given itself over to personal justice and impulse. The order of Zeus is 
exchanged for the rule of dike, a state of affairs where natural justice reigns over man-made 
laws.100 The difference between a civil war-like state of lawlessness and an actual plague-like 
disease is very small here, because once nomos is shown to be void of authority, the 
realization spreads like a virus. In the words of Helen Bacon, “Miasma (pollution) literally 
infects communities where the laws on which their survival depends have been violated.”101 
A civil war suggests that the shared communal foundation has been poisoned; the community 
is sick. However, scholars disagree about the exact source of the sickness. One group believes 
the source to be found in the breach of nomos. Without recourse to mythical explanations, a 
breach of nomos sets a dangerous precedent and undermines the authority of the polis, such as 
the monopoly on violence. 	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The other group believes the source of pollution to be the anger of the victim. Helen Bacon 
argues, “Pollution is the rage of victims of violations of these most sacred and fundamental 
ties – the rage of defied or disregarded gods, of abused or murdered blood relatives, of hosts 
and guests and accepters of oaths betrayed.”102 According to this group, the source then is not 
the offender but the victim. The desire for vengeance can provoke cycles of revenge that 
unhinge and ultimately destroy the community. The community must give in to these 
demands by sacrificing or exiling the offender; either way the offender becomes persona-non-
grata and his presence sustains the pollution, because the rage of the victim will cause another 
breach of nomos by way of revenge. 
 
According to the victim-orientated view, the community is thus charged with the delicate task 
of appeasing the demands of the victim while also avoiding the creation of cycles through yet 
another discard of nomos. Seaford describes how sacrificial rituals channel the anger of the 
victim away from the city.103 The cult of the Eumenides pits the offender not against the 
victim, but against the entire polis; his crime offends all. Consequently the entire community 
shares the burden of the victim. Not one citizen but the entire community commits the 
revenge; this way the victim avoids a fated visit from the Erinyes. In the victim-orientated 
view, social order is put at risk by the rage of the injured; cycles of revenge and civil war take 
over when the Erinyes demand blood for blood. Back in the Oresteia, they advise: “Appease 
the wrath of the avenging spirits by this man’s death, and so cleanse the whole city.” The 
cleansing is achieved and maintained by severing all communal ties to the criminal, 
effectively leaving no one to avenge his death. 
 
The other view holds that pollution arises not from the rage of the victim but from the breach 
of social order. “Pollution, therefore, is not so much a rationalization as a vehicle through 
which social disruption is expressed,” writes Parker. “Since the disorder is the pollution, any 
action that restores the normal equilibrium of things becomes a purification.”104 The fear of 
pollution was so immense that some believed it could be communicated by touch alone. In 
Euripides’ Orestes, the Barbarian King for instance covers his head when Orestes passes him 
in fear of being infected by an “avenging spirit”. However, Parker finds, “there are, certainly, 
many passages were the pollution of murder is referred to and yet there is no suggestion that 	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the avenging spirits of the victim are at work.”105 Ruth Padel argues that the Erinyes work 
punitively in the mind of the offender and that they “are activated from the external inner 
world, the underworld.”106 This suggests that the crime must be intentional and known. 
However “pollution distinguishes in terms of social order as well as moral intention,”107 
argues Parker. Lack of intentionality is not enough to avoid pollution; even lack of a victim is 
not enough, believes Parker. Pollution is concerned with social disorder, regardless of its 
source. 
 
Oedipus remains one of the most polluted figures in Greek Tragedy and yet, although the 
Erinyes acknowledge his crime, they never pursue him, because Oedipus’ crime lacks 
intention. But despite his ignorance, Oedipus’s crime remains of the highest order. The 
pollution arises without the Erinyes, and without Oedipus knowledge of the crime, arguably 
even without a victim. Rather it is the breach of nomos that creates the pollution, not any 
anger of the victim. Parker maintains, “it is of course, the crucial importance of the father’s 
inviolability that causes the pollution to spill over even on to involuntary cases; the horror is 
even increased by the fact that the violation of fundamental order has occurred at random.”108 
The Erinyes-pollution complex appears less robust than previously argued. And because 
Erinyes are manifestations of unsanctioned anger and pollution, it seems that ? cannot be 
traced exclusively to the victim’s felt injustice. Parker concludes, in disagreement with Bacon 
and Padel, “that pollution derives not from the wrong to the victim, but from the violation of 
the order of the family; there is expressed through it universal shock, not the particular anger 
of the victim and his kin.”109 This returns the Erinyes to their initial role of guardians rather 
than avengers, inducing reverence and fear not anger, exactly what Athena has in mind when 
she establishes their city-cult. Pollution is then related to the breakdown of social order; 
whether this is ultimately caused by anger or accident is irrelevant.110 This is the mainstream 
and deterministic interpretation of the relationship between nomos and revenge, a relationship 
Euripides attempted to question by stressing the personal and tragic choices leading up to 
these events.  
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Pollution is a powerful metaphor, and without doubt captures the infectiousness and dangers 
of disinvesting nomos of authority. But at the same time the use of such a metaphor 
obfuscates the real causes of the strife and literally clouds the issue. A breach of nomos must 
lead to pollution, but rather than discard the polluted, we would be better off to understand 
their motivation and why they risked pollution in the first place. In the case of Hecuba, the 
reader is led to understand that she glimpses something through the fog; the truth that nomos 
is not invested with binding properties but ultimately subject to personal whim and 
expedience. Equally, Antigone understands that nomos can easily lend itself to despotic rule; 
a point Herodotus was keen to stress.111 What these tragedies ultimately teach, however, is 
that the minority report is always swiftly silenced, because once the truth about nomos enters 
the public domain, the less than ideal rule of nomos is replaced by something much worse: A 
state of civil war and disorder; a point the Erinyes, as ancient demons, are always keen to 
make. Athena’s inspired solution notwithstanding, the tension between the need for social 
order and the desire for personal justice remains unresolved. Athena’s solution favours order 
by anchoring it in fear, coercion and displacement. 
 
Modern Use of Disease Metaphors 
 
In more recent times, the use of metaphor sustains the problem of obfuscation. In Susan 
Sontag’s studies (1979, 2009) of the cultural reception of diseases like cancer, tuberculosis 
and AIDS, she writes: 
 
 “Any important disease whose causality is murky, and for which treatment is 
ineffectual, tends to be awash in significance. First, the subjects of deepest dread 
(corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are identified with the disease. 
The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in the name of the disease (that is 
using it as a metaphor), that horror is imposed on other things. The disease 
becomes adjectival. Something is said to be disease-like, meaning that is 
disgusting or ugly. (…) “Illnesses have always been used as metaphors to enliven 
charges that a society was corrupt or unjust.” 112  
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Cancer is this hardening of the body, the stiffening of the mind; it is the sign of depression 
and inaction. Tuberculosis turns the breath of life into mucus and phlegm; blood pours from 
the mouth; it is the sign of too much passion, too little self-control. “A disease of the lung is, 
metaphorically, a disease of the soul,”113 writes Sontag. AIDS stands for immoral and 
secretive behaviour, an affront to nature and perversion of God’s given order. The diseased 
are believed to be deranged or unfit; their foolish behaviour courts their illness; it is an 
outward manifestation of an inner rot. And so Sontag concludes that, for our day and age “the 
melodramatics of the diseases metaphor in modern political discourse assume a punitive 
notion: of the disease not as punishment but as a sign of evil, something to be punished.”114 
Like pollution in Ancient Greece, tuberculosis, cancer and AIDS offer mandates for exclusion 
and chastisement. 
 
And so even in modern descriptions of civil strife the same notions are at work. An inhabitant 
of Sarajevo during a BBC 3 interview in 1992 said of the violent polarization: “it’s a plague; 
that’s all you can call it.”115 Equally, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, opined in 
response to the 2011 London riots: “I’m clear that they are in no way representative of the 
vast majority of young people in our country who despise them, frankly, as much as the rest 
of us do, but there are pockets of our society that are not just broken, but frankly, sick.”116 
These descriptions along with other popular tropes like Bernard Lewis’ “Muslim Rage” or 
Malcolm X’s-inspired “Angry Black Man” all take the rage for granted; instead of looking at 
the causes and possible grievances, they articulate all the myriad dangers to the established 
order, in turn delegitimizing the grievances of individuals and groups.  
 
The emotion of rage of course shares an etymological foundation with rabies. And it is here 
that the Greek notion of pollution and disease resonates most clearly. Wasik and Murphy 
write that the metaphorical properties of rage are 
 
 “Nowhere more present than with rabies, where the name itself in multiple 
languages – lyssa, rabies, rage, rabia – also describes a human emotion of fury, 
with the twinned meaning extending back indefinitely, neither the medical nor the 	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figurative sense taking clear precedence. Rabies was identical, with a visitation of 
animal rage; or, if it was not quite a true identity between the two, the link 
transcended mere metaphor to become intrinsic to both poles of comparison.”117 
 
Thus we come full circle: The bestial behaviour of Polymester and Hecuba, the wretched 
display of the Erinyes with their blood covered faces and seeping eyes, conflate the dreaded 
disease rabies with the nomos-voiding behaviour of rage. Those who act against nomos are 
judged to be as mad as rabid dogs, consumed by animalistic passion and certainly short on 
life. Rage and rabies might enjoy the same etymology, but this should not blind us to the fact 
that one is a virally transmitted neurological disease and the other a human emotion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has in many ways laid the theoretical foundation for the thesis and the 
exploration of rage. In Euripides’ Hecuba, Nussbaum and Kirkwood show how a breach of 
nomos leads Hecuba to commit an act of gruesome revenge that has even managed to alienate 
some Classics scholars. Hecuba’s account of her own motivation leads to invaluable insight 
into the importance of nomos and what portends when nomos is breached. Because, as 
Nussbaum and Sandywell argue, nomos structures the world in a meaningful way, a breach 
leaves the subject uprooted. This sensation, however, is quickly addressed by the construction 
of a new nomos that offers justification for brutal punishment. Hecuba’s “solitary song of 
revenge”, described by Nussbaum as the Nomos of Revenge, offers a new sense of justice. The 
other insight gained from Hecuba, which is equally stressed in Achilles, is that nomos-voiding 
behaviour automatically qualifies subjects as brutes and uncivilized beasts. The Greek 
playwrights continuously stress the connection between nomos-voiding behaviour and 
bestiality, as breaches almost categorically lead to some carnal desire to eat the opponent’s 
flesh. Rage in other words is not characterised by any specific act of violence, the Greek 
heroes never actually feasted on any flesh, but rather how the specific act relates to and 
undermines the communal order of nomos and civilization as a whole. 
 
The myth of the Erinyes directly links the concept of nomos with the bestiality and excessive 
violence characteristically attributed to rage. The main concern of the Erinyes is to protect 	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and guard nomos; any failure to respect the law of Zeus leads to cycles of revenge and civil 
war, expressed in the metaphor of pollution. The solitary songs of justice that are constructed 
against the nomos undermine the reigning social order and threaten the inter-subjective 
framework necessary for healthy social interaction. Consequently those who espouse revenge 
and give in to their passions threaten the stability of the community and are thus punished and 
forced into exile. This leads to the second point about rage: Its inherent moral exclusivity. The 
fact that rage operates outside of nomos means that the subject is undeterred by social 
concerns and articulates a position that can be described as morally exclusive. This in turn 
helps explain the excess and brutality found in rage; there is no need to filter the punitiveness 
and impulse for action through socially sanctioned norms. The result is an unfettered 
violence, brought about by the uncivilized bestiality and unthinking passions of the thymos 
operating outside the phrenes. 
 
The brutality and excess found in the behaviour of Achilles and Hecuba, and personified in 
the myth of the Erinyes, in many ways humanizes rage. As argued above, none of these 
characters act without cause; in fact they are motivated by deep-seated and almost existential 
acts of recognizable mistreatment; their behaviour amounts to extreme justice-seeking and 
after justice is obtained they attempt to rejoin society. Unfortunately, their behaviour, which 
today is chastised purely for its excesses and brutality, was chastised back then for the fact 
that nomos was discarded in favour of personal justice and private concerns. Again, the 
specific form the act takes is not what matters, but the underlining dismissal of nomos and 
willingness to give in to private passion is what courts the presence of the Erinyes. Rage, as 
established in this chapter, is first and foremost concerned with the withdrawal from the 
communal nomos and the establishment of a new private Nomos of Revenge. The possible 
justifications and motivations for this development are silenced or delegitimized. Society will 
not tolerate an attack on its foundational order, and portrays all those who discard nomos as 
dangerous and polluted. Punishment and justice unsanctioned by nomos instantly turns to 
uncivilized and animalistic rage. 
 
Lastly, there is a point to be made about the different intellectual interests of Euripides and 
Aeschylus in their respective exploration of revenge in society. While Aeschylus portrays a 
relentless determinism, where breaches of nomos lead to cycles, Euripides is much more 
concerned with motivation; his characters are no longer wooden and stylized props and plot 
movers, but real human beings endowed with agency, social concerns and human emotions. 
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These are modern human portrayals that still resonate today. Aeschylus shows how revenge 
will undo order and proposes a solution that ignores the human element in all of this. The 
human element in turn is Euripides’ primary concern; specifically the question of what drives 
humans to kill other humans. Euripides admonishes his audience not to mistake man-made 
laws for natural laws, and challenges us to show compassion even for those who are forced to 
eschew nomos. It is beyond ironic that one of the myths surrounding Euripides’ death tells of 
how the king requested Euripides’ counsel as to the fate of some Thracian thieves. These 
thieves had killed and eaten one of the king’s hunting wolves. Euripides counselled the king 
to spare the thieves, because they were starving and acted out of desperation. As the myth 
goes, Euripides was later mauled to death by the offspring of the very wolf whom he had 
denied justice.118 With such a telling end in mind, this thesis continues the Euripidean 
enterprise of understanding the causes and consequences of rage and revenge. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Rage as Social Emotion 
 
 
The last chapter approached rage through a reading of the Greek concept of nomos. Rage was 
uniquely characterized by its willingness to act against the social order. The myth of the 
Erinyes captured the Greeks’ fear about the consequences of a wholesale rejection of nomos 
and how the polis would succumb to plague and civil war. It was ultimately the inability to 
care about the survival of the polis that earned subjects the attributes of uncivilized bestiality 
and unthinking brutishness; they never actually committed cannibalistic acts, but regardless, 
their intentions were uncivil. Rage gave rise to an inside/outside dichotomy, where both sides 
enjoyed absolute moral certainty predicated on a disjointed sense of justice. The other known 
attributes of rage such as excess and limitlessness arose naturally from the Nomos of Revenge 
that demanded more punishment than social order could afford without risking counter-
revenge. This chapter leaves Ancient Greece behind and approaches rage from a modern 
psychological angle. The Greeks readily equated rage with righteous and power-seeking 
vengefulness; however the highly formalized approach of the Greek tragedies makes it 
difficult to approach rage as an emotion. It is more of a stylistic device. This chapter avoids 
overly stylistic methods and attempts to construct rage as an emotion with specific causes. 
 
 
Emotions have gained increasing importance in the field of International Relations. Early 
resistance based on the Cartesian distinction between emotion and reason has faded. 
Philosophical intuitions, such as David Hume’s quip that ‘reason is a slave to passion’ are 
now vindicated by relatively new insights gained from research in the neurosciences; the 
famous medical case of Phineas Gage paved the way for a new understanding of emotions. 
Gage lost the use of his prefrontal cortex - an area of the brain associated with emotional 
processing - in a freak accident and was left without the ability to make rational decisions, or 
any type of decisions for that matter. Building on this famous medical case, the neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio’s seminal study Descartes’ Error showed how emotions are integral to the 
varied processes in decision-making such as information selection, risk-assessment, and 
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cognitive dissonance.119 This overhauled the idea that emotions were nothing but unthinking 
and irrational impulses that forced subjects to make decisions or engage in actions that would 
be later regretted, a view that is reminiscent of Achilles, and all the time his thymos overruled 
his phrenes. 
 
Emotions in International Relations scholarship 
 	  
Emotions have always played a role in the study of politics and International Relations. In the 
works of the Greeks, prevalent emotions such as fear and anger were prime political motifs. 
Thucydides spoke of fear as a shared disposition that could increase concerns for security and 
defence, while Homer’s epic the Iliad described in manifold ways all possible dimensions of 
anger, and how rulers would plunge their nations into wars for the pettiest of insults. A 
considerable break in this tradition of viewing emotions as integral to interstate conduct came 
about in the Enlightenment, where emotions were relegated to the ranks of primitive nuisance. 
With the dismissal of emotions arose the age of reason as a separate and superior mode of 
cognition that would improve humanity and lead to limitless progress. This familiar celebrity 
of reason still resonates through much of economic theory today; as the thought goes, 
emotions are irrational and lead to bad decisions and impinge on the sublime functioning of 
reason. In the words of Daniel Kahneman, emotions are not suited for slow thinking. 120 
 
The inherent hierarchical outlook concerning the hot, motivational realm of emotions and her 
cold, cerebral counterpart of reason naturally gave rise to an endless tug-of-war. Are emotions 
in control of reason, or vice versa? For the Greeks there was of course a natural balance to 
things, and anger arising from the thymos could be reined in by the cool deliberation of the 
logos. In Homer’s Iliad, Achilles almost raises his sword against Agamemnon in violent rage 
but before he acts upon his impulse, Athena appears, cautioning his thymos and allowing 
cooler heads to prevail. Despite the stylistic portrayal of this psychological mechanism, these 
processes were uniform. The idea that passion and reason fought for supremacy or were 
indeed physiologically distinct from each other was an Enlightenment fiction -- just as much 
as it was used as a fictional device in the Greek myths. But nonetheless, what the 	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Enlightenment thinkers feared and indeed tried to tame with reason was the short sightedness, 
inherent to emotions like fear and anger. 
 
In more modern times, neuroscientists, with the help of MRI scans, have resolved many of the 
misunderstandings underlining these various takes on emotion. The view that emotions and 
reason are somehow separate has been debunked. Reason and emotion occur in tandem, with 
many neuroscientists arguing that they are in fact inseparable from one another. Moreover, 
according to the insightful work of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, rational deliberation 
and cognition, which Enlightenment scholars would refer to as reason, was shown to be 
totally inept and useless without the emotional impulse. Without the Orbito-frontal Cortex, 
the mainstay of emotions, Damasio argued, all other parts of the brain were worse off and 
failed to function properly. In International Relations, the use of emotions has undergone a 
considerable evolution. Gone are the days of Realist formulations of interest-based politics 
where emotions had no part to play, or worse, were viewed as irrational and counter-
productive. 
 
Today, International Relations scholars engaged in the study of emotion are moving towards a 
neuro-scientifically informed view of emotions that merges both the traditional motivational 
aspect of emotion with a new cognitive element.  Along these lines, scholars such as Ned 
Lebow and Rose McDermott have explored specific emotions and their cognitive 
components, i.e. the interplay between emotion and reason. I will briefly elaborate on their 
approaches and situate my own research amongst them, while stressing the contribution I 
wish to make. However, at the same time it is necessary to state clearly that a considerable set 
of scholars working on emotions largely ignore the cognitive element and continue to stress 
the motivational element of emotion, by putting forth rigid causalities of action tendencies for 
specific emotions. These approaches build on the social psychology and group dynamics 
found in research of the 1970s and are likely liable for considerable overhaul. Amongst these 
scholars are Harkavy, Lindner, Scheff and Saurette; they all single out a specific emotion 
(usually a negative one) and construct a rigid causal mechanism, whereby rage leads to 
revenge, humiliation and slights to counter-humiliation, and shame to lashing-out.121 These 	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contributions are important, especially viewed within the wider field of International 
Relations where emotions are still somewhat of a new event; at the same time, however, they 
are limited by the scientific framework of the 1970s, which viewed emotions as endogenous 
stimuli for specific “action tendencies”, rather than central cognitive processes. 
 
The cognitive aspect of emotion gained real traction once International Relations scholars 
began looking at modern science, specifically the neurosciences. The earliest serious 
treatment of how emotions inform cognition came by way of William Connolly’s 
Neuropolitics. Connolly lobbied for an understanding of perception that centred on the 
emotional processes. He explains how cognition of any sort rests on emotionally informed 
“somatic markers”, which he describes thusly: 
 
“A culturally mobilized, corporeal disposition through which affect-imbued, 
preliminary orientations to perceptions and judgements scale-down the material 
factored into cost-benefit analysis, principled judgements, and reflective 
experiments.”122 
 
Connolly’s 2001 contribution aimed at our understanding of perception and how events 
are emotionally tinged and framed by existing memory and prejudices, and – more 
importantly – he stressed that this tends to be the norm, because that is how brains work. 
Connolly’s work illustrated how processes beyond our rational control influenced our 
basic cognitions. But Connolly had not yet approached the study of separate emotions; he 
simply restated the Humean dictum, already fully established in the post-Freudian 
literature, that passion, memory and the gut have more influence on our conduct than we 
care to admit.  
 
A much more disciplined use of the neuro-scientific literature, and fiercely illuminating, 
could be found in Neta Crawford’s publication The Passion of World Politics. Not only 
did Crawford incorporate the same neuro-scientific literature as Connolly, but for the first 
time distinct emotions took center stage in the political arena. In this sense, Crawford 
pushed further than Connolly, sidestepping the dusty shelves of post-Freudian literature; 
instead, Crawford showed persuasively that the reigning political outlooks, namely Neo-
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Liberalism and Neo-Realism, rested on specific emotions that did not necessarily lead to 
action tendencies but rather to different perceptions and cognitive frames. The liberal 
outlook for instance, Crawford argued, rested on the emotional modality of trust and 
friendship, where alliances could easily be forged for some shared sense of a greater 
good. Realism, on the other hand, rested on the emotional modality of fear and insecurity, 
where suspicion and posturing were the norm. In a single flash Crawford’s analysis 
captured the long emotional shadow chasing these “rational” schools of political thought. 
The existence of fear was no longer aligned with the action tendency of flight or 
surrender, but rather with cognition, i.e. preferences, values and judgements that could go 
far beyond any perceivable act: Fearful actors behaved differently from trusting actors, 
because critically they saw the world in an entirely different light, perceiving the same 
stimuli but with different results. Crawford’s contribution turned specific emotions into 
starting points for vast analytical enterprises traversing fields as diverse as the Neuro-
Sciences, Social Biology, Social Psychology and Genetics. Leading lights of recent years 
have focussed more and more on the cognitive element of emotions, paying mere lip 
service to the concept of action tendency. Before moving into the cognitive aspect of rage 
and revenge, I want to briefly discuss the research of two leading scholars in reference to 
two specific emotions, namely fear and anger, and their respective cognitive dimension 
and explanatory power for International Relations. 
 
Richard Ned Lebow bases his Cultural Theory of International Relations on Platonic 
Psychology and its tripartite system, whereby the psyche is divided into thymos, logos 
and eros. Within this structure the eros and thymos battle for supremacy, while the logos 
reins in their excesses and provides moderation and long-sightedness. Both the eros and 
thymos thrive for different types of desires; the former seeks wealth and territory, while 
the latter requires standing and even supremacy vis-à-vis others. The emotional modality 
of the eros may be described as a mixture of greed, insecurity and gluttony, while the 
emotional modality of the thymos may be described as jealousy, anger and revenge. With 
the help of modern science, Lebow aligned the emotional modalities of the eros and 
thymos with prospect theory, allowing us to understand how the prevalence of either 
could lead to changes in the construction of risk perception. Groups defined by the 
thymos would be highly risk-accepting, often engaging in warfare against much stronger 
and blatantly superior enemies, while eros-defined groups would be risk averse, cutting 
their losses and consolidating their position. For instance, the United States was 
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extremely risk accepting after 9/11, easily stumbling into strategically ill-advised wars 
against largely unknown enemies. Lebow reasoned that the United States’ leadership felt 
humiliated by the spectacle of the 9/11 attacks. Washington’s standing and clear 
hegemonic position in the post-Cold War world was blatantly ignored and even ridiculed 
by these attacks.123 Consequently, the reaction was thymotic and the leadership prepared 
for a large-scale military engagement, largely ignoring prophetic and repeated warnings 
about the success of long-term military engagements in the Middle East.  
 
Indeed, historically speaking, hegemonies and great powers have a strong tendency to 
react thymotically to challenges of their supremacy; they engage in high risk 
undertakings, both strategically short-sighted and economically unsound, leading to the 
fated “imperial overstretch”.124 However, returning to the issue of cognition, the fact that 
the United States’ leadership desired to punish those responsible becomes less interesting 
than the fact that unsound policy suddenly became sound policy almost overnight. The 
ability to discount known and agreed-upon risks in light of a suffered humiliation 
undoubtedly makes the case for the study of emotions, because they readily predict 
changes in cognition. In terms of anger, Lebow showed that this specific emotion will, 
amongst other things, introduce a propensity to favour short-term reward, i.e. seeing the 
culprit suffer, over long-term success and even survival. Returning to the Platonic 
foundation, the overwhelming passions of the thymos eclipse the moderating forces of the 
strategic logos - back in Athens as today in Washington, and eventually in Beijing. 
 
What Lebow has done for anger and prospect theory, Rose McDermott has done for fear 
and out-group derogation. While Lebow seeks a classical foundation as the starting point 
for his enquiry, McDermott takes a more modern approach, framing fear as a genetic 
disposition with distinct cognitive characteristics. She calls fear a “genetically informed, 
stable, but malleable trait-based disposition” and judges that fearful groups and 
individuals are “more prone to being anxious of new people and novel situations that 
might threaten those relationships.”125 McDermott makes two important points in her 	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recent research. The first is that fearful groups have a heightened propensity for in- and 
out-group differentiations; fear makes out-groups appear increasingly suspicious and 
threatening, and in turn increases in-group cohesion. Similar to Crawford’s earlier 
findings, fear dissolves any sense of trust and shared values between groups, and places 
everyone on guard. Even seemingly selfless or charitable acts are viewed with suspicion 
and discarded as chicanery. 
 
By way of illustration, when Gorbachev introduced glasnost and perestroika, Reagan 
welcomed and recognized these efforts as earnest, despite clashing with decades of 
established Cold War dogma. His successor George W. H. Bush, on the other hand, 
distrusted Gorbachev, even after the evident success in negotiations, and felt compelled 
to reverse all the processes made under Reagan, instead standing by his conviction that 
Moscow was playing games and should not be trusted. Fear in other words makes groups 
discard evidence for change, especially if such change undermines preconceived ideas 
necessary for ontological security. But McDermott goes even further, arguing that such 
fear can be a type of permanent trait, and that base anxiety can help explain different 
political outlooks: she infers that conservatives are more fearful due to their propensity to 
blame outsiders and enemies in times of ontological upheaval and change. Pushing such 
simplification to the extreme, Reagan might have been a closeted democrat - at least in 
terms of his emotional disposition – evidenced by his willingness to embrace 
fundamental change and weather any potential ontological upheaval. He was not 
threatened by the winds of change but welcomed them. More research is obviously 
needed, but McDermott illustrates that the emotion of fear introduces a particular set of 
cognitive changes, such as increased out-group derogation and increased need for 
ontological stability; signals that should lead to changes in behaviour are muted by fear 
and outsiders that are non-threatening are invested with suspicion and prejudice. 
 
In this thesis, I attempt to explore the cognitive element of rage, as well as allude to its 
action tendency of punishment, or revenge. I draw on both the Ancient Greeks and 
Nietzsche’s own existentialism in creating the intellectual foundation for this 
undertaking. Rage is of course closely aligned with anger, more so than with fear, so 
Lebow’s input is constructive, but at the same time I wish to show how rage differs from 
anger, and why the two must not be confused. The key component I wish to stress is how 
rage affects morality. The hitherto unexplored nexus between emotion and morality in 
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International Relations is perfectly suited for the emotion of rage, because the often 
grotesque and merciless violence exacted in rage necessitates an absolute and exclusive 
morality that robs the target of any sense of worth, and even frames the act of revenge as 
a moral imperative, i.e. a moral good. In other words, I am interested in how the emotion 
of rage affects the moral constitution of the subject and allows heinous acts to be 
committed with utter conviction and moral certainty. In order to begin, I will go back to 
the foundation of emotions, constructing a theory from first principle, in order to illustrate 
how morality comes into play, before setting out to describe the peculiar dynamics 
between the specific emotion of rage and moral extremism. 
 
 
Theories of Emotions 
 
This section will act as a build up towards the construction of an emotional paradigm for rage. 
The point is to understand how emotions rely on cognitive appraisals, which are gained by 
knowledge of social rules and implicit expectations. Therefore even the emotion of rage must 
rely on a distinct set of social cues that incorporate knowledge of social practices and 
expectations similar to those incorporated in the Ancient Greek concept of nomos. But in 
order to understand this, I wish to go back to the foundations of modern theories of emotions 
and show how scholars have tried to understand emotions and more importantly how these 
understandings have evolved to resemble the emotional economy of Ancient Greece. 
 
“Emotions,” writes the neuroscientist Elaine Fox, “are discrete and consistent responses to an 
internal and external event which has a particular significance for the organism”.126 Emotions 
are caused by perceived changes in the environment with direct impact on our social and 
material wellbeing; emotions, in other words, help to confront and manage change. The noted 
neuroscientist Antonio Damasio refers to emotions as bio-regulatory devices, always 
“promoting the maintenance of life, and always poised to avoid the loss of integrity that is a 
harbinger of death or death itself.”127 These perceived changes to our social and material 
environment may arise from external events, like the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear, or 
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from internal representations through the triggered elicitation of a memory.128 There exist 
roughly three interpretations on how emotions arise in relation to perceived changes to the 
environment, and although these interpretations are not inherently mutually exclusive, they 
make different claims on the salience of the emotional process.129 
 
Biological Theory 
 
The American psychologist William James offered the first explanation for the genesis of 
emotion as early as the 1880s. James believed that emotions are biologically determined and 
inherited from generation to generation to maximise the possibility of gene selection. 
Consequently, emotions, rather than explain human feelings, are equated with so-called 
“action tendencies;” primed physiological reactions elicited by a biologically determined 
stimulus. In James’s famous example, the sudden appearance of a grizzly bear will lead to 
perceived physiological changes such as sweaty palms, beating heart and adrenaline rushes, 
gearing the body up for the action tendency of flight. The conscious perception of these 
physiological changes will register as fear. In other words, ”we do not run because we are 
afraid, but rather we are afraid because we run.”130 Because the James-Lange theory pertains 
to all animals, the idea of innate emotional processes finds further support in zoological 
studies. For instance, young monkeys will fear snakes after a single display of fear by an adult 
monkey, while a similar single display of fear by an adult monkey at a flower will not elicit 
the same fear response in young monkeys. Equally, rats bred in laboratory settings without 
any experience of the dangers of the outside world immediately show signs of distress when 
cat urine is introduced to their habitat.131 The James-Lange theory, that emotional primers are 
inherited along with their respective action tendencies in humans has, however, come under 
severe scrutiny. By way of an illustration, the sight of a grizzly bear will not elicit the same 
emotion if the subject is heavily armed and trained to cope with the possibility of a grizzly 
bear; this is an example of cognition modulating the emotional response and altering the 
action tendency. 	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However, the psychologist Paul Ekman has shown somewhat conclusively that so-called base 
emotions such as joy, disgust, contempt, anger and surprise, have automatic and instant action 
tendencies expressed through facial cues, and that these cues are recognized across all 
cultures.132 The notion of biologically inherited primers leading to universal action tendencies 
still remains limited to so-called micro-expressions, which register as very short-lived facial 
distortions, and arguably soon dissipate through cognitive appraisal processing.133 While 
Ekman acknowledges the role of cognitive appraisal, Jesse Prinz, another proponent of the 
biological account, denies the need for cognitive appraisal altogether, and instead argues that 
emotional appraisal can function through biological input alone.134 Prinz succeeds in proving 
that emotions and moral judgements can alone justify punitive desires without recourse to 
social rules and practices; in fact they overrule them. Positive emotions give rise to positive 
moral judgements, and negative emotions give rise to negative moral judgements. By way of 
illustration, when someone is slapped in the face, this event alone suffices to create anger and 
moral justification for punishment because we feel harmed.135 The Biological Theory, 
however, fails to account for higher social emotions such as indignation, jealousy, resentment, 
hatred or hope, not to mention their social cues and origins. When people feel angry, for 
instance at being politically disenfranchised, there must be cognition and knowledge of the 
concept of a “vote”. Biological stimuli fail to extend into social practices. Consequently, the 
issue is not so much whether social practices and rules inhibit emotional reactions, but how 
they can trigger them. 
 
Social Constructivist Theory 
 
Against this shortcoming in the Biological Theory arose the idea that emotions are socially 
constructed.  According to this theory, “Emotions are learned behaviour that can only be 
acquired if people are exposed to them within a particular culture.”136 Anthropologists like 
Clifford Geertz believe that emotions are “social artefacts.” According to this view, cultural 	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values and practices, rather than innate biological processes, determine them.137 Because 
emotions are expressed differently from culture to culture, it should stand to reason that they 
are the product of social learning rather than universal processes. Social constructivists like to 
point out that certain emotional practices can be entirely unique to one culture. For instance, 
the Japanese emotion of Amae is a feeling of happiness, arising from a sense of togetherness 
and dependence; the Russian feeling of Toska, according to Vladimir Nabokov, is the deepest 
and most painful sensation of spiritual anguish; Litost, a personal favourite of the Czech 
author Milan Kundera, describes the torment and anguish created by the sudden sight of one’s 
own misery; Wabi Sabi in Japanese is the sensation of finding beauty in the world’s 
imperfections; Fremdschämen occurs when Germans are forced to watch others humiliate 
themselves. Another example is the ‘state of being a wild pig’ experienced by the Gururamba 
people of New Guinea. This sensation, typically befalling young men aged 25-35, leads to 
reckless financial and social behaviour.138 
 
The problem with all these fascinating cultural practices is that even as emotionally subdued 
Westerners, we know more or less what they are talking about. Social Constructivists argue 
that we fail to experience the Japanese sense of togetherness or the abyss of the Russian soul, 
because our own cultural machine values things like social autonomy and enlightened 
rationality. And indeed culture plays a role in triggering emotions. But as Damasio writes, 
“the fact that culture plays a role in the shaping of some inducers of the emotions, does not 
deny their fundamental stereotypicity, automaticity, and regulatory purpose.”139 In other 
words, culture can manipulate the objects of emotion, but culture cannot create new emotions 
out of thin air. And even though the role of culture is vital in determining emotional triggers, 
Social Constructivists cannot show that emotions themselves vary significantly from culture 
to culture; only social practices do.140 This, however, creates another problem, which offers a 
clear contrast to Ekman’s research on universal micro-expression. Emotional practices can be 
heavily culturally encoded and misinterpreted. By way of example, a culture may express 
anger by avoiding eye contact with the offender, while another culture may express anger by 
direct staring. Although Ekman’s research shows that anger can be universally recognized 
through facial cues such as poised lips and downward-sloping eyebrows, such micro-	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expressions are extremely short-lived and tell us little about sustained practices. Without 
precise knowledge of the culturally encoded practice, confusion can easily arise. This is why I 
propose to establish the existence of rage as predicated on an objective attitude, which makes 
no claim on the specific activity in rage but rather on the underlining desire for 
instrumentalization and exclusion. 
 
Appraisal Theory 
 
In contrast to the biological and social constructivist theories, psychologists have returned to 
the Greeks. Aristotle believed that emotions are not primarily caused by external events per 
se, but rather by the relation between event and subject. Emotions always have a “double 
reference; first to the object or situation being evaluated and second to the person 
experiencing the object or situation.”141 This understanding has given rise to the third, and 
presently reigning, theory of emotion, known as Cognitive Appraisal Theory. The 
introduction of a cognitive element was sought to explain how the same event could elicit 
different emotional responses; for instance the destruction of the Twin Towers caused global 
displays of grievance and sorrow, save for those pockets of inflamed radical Anti-
Americanism where the reigning emotion was joy and Rachelust. As Aristotle already knew, 
events are appraised in accordance with personal factors, and as such lend themselves to 
different emotional responses. The psychologist Richard Lazarus explains the process thus: 
“The appraisal task for the person is to evaluate perceived circumstances in terms of a 
relatively small number of categories of adaptational significance, corresponding to different 
types of benefit or harm, each with different implications for coping.”142 An event becomes 
relevant because it is deemed to be important for the subject’s sense of flourishing and 
wellbeing, other minor strategic goals notwithstanding. 
 
Cognitive Appraisal Theory leans more heavily on the biological theory of emotion than on 
the constructivist, in part because the latter has failed to construct a theory of its own. Antonio 
Damasio, a leading proponent of Appraisal Theory, bases his own theory of somatic markers 
on James-Lange’s theory of physiological change. However, while James thought that 
emotions register underlining physiological processes, like sweaty palms and racing hearts, 
Damasio widens the roster of perceptions beyond James’ physiological changes to take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Damasio, Everitt, and Bishop, “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the 
Prefrontal Cortex [and Discussion].” p. 1415 
142 Lazarus, Richard – Emotion and Adaptation (1994), p.  617 
	   64	  
account of other non-biological factors.143 The cognition element is portrayed as inseparable 
from the overall emotional experience. The neuroscientist Richard Davidson has studied the 
neural imaging of emotions and concludes in agreement, “It is simply not possible to identify 
regions of the brain devoted exclusively to affect or exclusively to cognition. This fact should 
dispel claims about their independence.”144 The somatic marker takes into account all kinds of 
factors, including issues like culture, memory, social rules and personal preferences, and 
tallies the emotional response to offer the best understanding of the eliciting event and the 
relevant action tendency.  
 
Prinz remains an outspoken critic of Damasio and Cognitive Appraisal Theory and maintains 
that cognition is irrelevant and that emotions can operate in accordance with what he terms 
“embedded appraisals”, which is a re-reading of the James-Lange theory. According to Prinz 
emotions are “change detectors”; an emotion like sadness searches for the sensation of loss, 
while an emotion like anger searches for the sensation of insult. These experiences, according 
to Prinz, are naturally given and do not rely on appraisal, but rather fall under the domain of 
moral awareness.145 It follows that individuals are naturally aware of the specific meaning of 
changes to their environment. Even if a slap to the face is not socially prohibited, the 
experience of the slap will still cause anger, regardless of the existence of a social taboo; 
instead the social taboo arises because of the ensuing anger. As in Ancient Greece, the 
vindictive and retaliatory urges of the Erinyes were believed to predate the existence of laws 
and social order, and it was precisely the need to banish these ancient demons that urged the 
creation of civil order and custom. Prinz’s arguments are valid but Damasio and other 
cognitive appraisal theorists are more concerned with how the brain relates to and appraises 
emotional triggers and cues. Again, Prinz cannot explain any type of anger that arises from 
the denial of certain social rights or non-biological cues, like the “vote”. Such a non-
biological trigger requires detailed knowledge of social practices, rules and expectations, i.e. 
embedded cognition. 
 
Concerning the physiological aspect of emotional genesis, the information processing 
necessary for cognitive appraisals occurs in the neocortex, part of the brain unique in size to 	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humans. Known for its wrinkly demeanour, the neocortex exploded in size as humans began 
their unique evolutionary trajectory; it houses functions vital for social survival, like memory, 
language and imagination.146 While the basic emotions are still housed in the subcortex, part 
of the brain proportionate in size to other animals, scientists believe that the gravity of 
emotional processing has shifted upwards towards the neocortex in humans.147 In other 
words, the introduction of cognitive appraisal, with its vital centres housed in the neocortex, 
makes human emotions unique from other animals. Emotions are no longer simply governed 
by external biological stimuli but much more by social awareness and cultural knowledge. 
 
This notion is further supported by the findings that the neocortex can be successfully 
removed in rats without impeding normal emotional reactions like fear or anger, while the 
same removal, famously chronicled in the life of Phineas Gage, inhibits normal social 
relations in humans.148 This has led scientists to conclude that the human neocortex, 
specifically the pre-frontal region, is vital in processing emotional responses, especially social 
ones, like indignation, jealousy, resentment, hatred or hope. This view suggests then, 
simplistically, that emotions are first registered in the subcortex and travel up through the 
neocortex, where they are refined through processes of cognitive appraisals. However, all this 
happens in a split second or may even occur simultaneously. MRI scans still grapple with a 
considerable time lag in representation; all relevant regions light up at once.149 Phineas Gage, 
lacking a large chunk of the neocortex, was prone to fits of mercurial rage; his judgements of 
life-important events and decisions proved very ineffective, leading him to live a socially 
impoverished life.150 I now turn to the neurological findings on human aggression and discuss 
what MRI scans can tell us about the emotion of anger, or possibly even rage.  
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Neurology of Human Aggression 
 
The picture we have of the phenomenon of human aggression and indeed negative emotions 
as a whole are extremely fragmented. There is nothing close to a consensus on how 
aggression and violence operate in the brain. Nevertheless, neurologists have arrived at many 
– and indeed sometimes instructively overlapping – findings. Some of these findings indeed 
pose interesting questions for the study of aggression and violence in the social sciences, 
while also stressing that the social sciences are ultimately much better equipped to handle 
these issues because they can explain the causes. I will highlight some of the most interesting 
findings here, while also pressing forward to arrive at a motivational understanding of 
violence and human aggression in the next section. 
 
Following the medical case of Phineas Gage, scientists have concluded that aggression and 
hostility are processed in the Ventromedial and Orbitofrontal Cortices of the brain; i.e. the 
neocortex. According to neuroscientists Stemmler and Potegal these areas may “mediate the 
effect of anger on the calculation of the potential payoffs and punishment for aggressive 
responding.”151 In normal social relations the OFC may regulate aggressive behaviour in 
accordance with learned rules of social conduct.152 The OFC may even inhibit aggression 
altogether by communicating with other parts of the brain to select non-aggressive solutions 
to anger-inducing problems.153 In accordance with Aristotle’s intuition, Potegal and Stemmler 
conclude that the “OFC may guide angry individuals to approach and confront an offender 
who is subordinate to them, but to retreat from and avoid an offender who is superior.”154 
Aggression in other words relies on a strategic appraisal, stressing the connection between 
emotion and violence and punitiveness. 
 
According to Harmon-Jones, human aggression registers in the same part of the brain as 
reward and hope. This is a dramatic departure from the political and philosophical 
interpretation of anger, which insists that that anger is a sign of discomfort and pain. Harmon-
Jones claims that anger motivates us to engage the object rather than flee from it. Following 
this insight, neuroscientists have made a crucial distinction between defensive and offensive 
aggression. According to Bushman and Anderson, offensive aggression is instrumental and 	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seeks to address affronts that are social in nature.155 This is of course fundamentally different 
to defensive anger found primarily in animal behaviour when the animal flees to avoid further 
harm. Offensive aggression discounts the fear of further harm against the possibility of 
resolution. Research by Litvak and Lerner has found that “the experience of anger (…) 
involves a sense of certainty and control of or responsibility for a negative event (…) And 
because anger has unique associations with certainty, control, and responsibility, its effects on 
judgements relevant to the dimensions will be distinct from other negative emotions.”156 
Anger blocks out contravening signals and arguably maintains a stance of absolute moral 
certainty. This is the same moral certainty and absoluteness the Erinyes portrayed in their 
relentless pursuit of their victim, or Achilles and Hecuba in theirs.  
 
Offensive aggression is registered in the left frontal lobe. According to Richard Davidson 
right frontal activity is associated with withdrawal or fear, while left frontal activity registers 
reward and motivation.157 Building on this insight, Harmon-Jones shows that individuals able 
to address an anger-arousing problem presented to them by removing the source of 
discomfort, evidenced greater left frontal activity than individuals unable to remove the 
source of discomfort.158 Incidentally those reporting greater anger also showed greater left-
frontal activity. Harmon-Jones concludes, “When individuals believed that there was 
something they could do to resolve the anger-arousing situation, they responded with 
increased left frontal activity. In contrast, when they believed there was nothing they could do 
to resolve the situation, they did not respond with increased left frontal activity.”159 This had 
led researchers to further hypothesize that an initial appraisal of the anger-inducing event 
decides whether the event elicits left-frontal activity (reward) or right frontal activity 
(withdrawal); the activation of the left-frontal area suggests an evolutionary association with 
anger, hope and reward stimuli. A right-frontal activation, on the other hand, hypothesized in 
subjects faced with an inability to resolve the anger-inducing stimuli, leads to emotional 
perceptions of sadness, defeat and depression, suggesting another evolutionary co-association. 
In other words, human aggression already indicates a willingness to act and an action 
tendency towards some type of engagement-based resolution, such as punishment. 	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Neuroscientists De Quervain and Stroblet have further researched the connection between 
punishment and reward sensations. They find that punishment of a crime triggers activation of 
the reward center of the brain, and the closer the punisher feels to the crime, the greater the 
activation.160 In this sense, punishment is not only viewed as a plausible solution to anger-
inducing events, but leads to a sense of reward and satisfaction as well. This has led to further 
hypotheses that anger is necessarily linked to concepts like justice and morality, as the act of 
punishment and removal of discomfort leads to the feeling of satisfaction and vindication in 
the administration of suffering in offenders.161 
 
Other research shows that angry people find angry messages more convincing than non-angry 
people; MRI scans reveal that already angry individuals react more strongly to anger-inducing 
stimuli than to non anger-inducing stimuli, in effect sustaining their anger through signal 
selection.162 Already suffering from an injustice, individuals will be more acutely aware of 
other slights and insults and filter out contravening information. Under the influence of anger, 
individuals reduce their estimates of risk and are more willing to engage in dangerous and 
reckless behaviour. Individuals become less sensitive to life threatening situations. This 
insight has led to the formulation of a theory of affective associate network. This theory 
suggests that an elicitation of anger can trigger the activation of dormant sets of memories of 
past injuries and injustices that exist in the cultural memory of a people. Strong emotionally 
resonant memories are stored close to each other in the brain; consequently nodes of appraisal 
may be interlinked with each other. “Mood-congruent attention, priming, and retrieval 
effects”, write Litvak and Lerner, “should occur not just between an emotional state and 
stimuli connected to that emotional state, but between an emotional state and stimuli 
connected to its central appraisal.”163 This offers a useful explanation for the persistence of 
extreme violence as experienced intermittently over a long time period; as an injury or 
injustice is incurred, the emotional reaction of anger immediately triggers other anger primed 
memories, leading to larger-than emotional reactions and further entrenchment of anger-prone 
moods. 
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In Out of Control Anger (OOC) witnessed in some cultures in South America, finds Michael 
Potegal, individuals give themselves to uncontrollable bouts of crying, screaming, trembling 
and aggression, triggered by the experience of huge personal loss.164 This emotional state is 
described as coming from “within”. The activation of a network of cognitive appraisals 
elicited by the loss of a central figure in the lives of the subject shifts the mind into “automatic 
processing.”165 In road rage, subjects, even in the exact moment of succumbing to the rage, 
believe it is in their interest to attack the other driver. In both cases, the individual is not 
operating normally but subject to “automatic processing”; insulated from new or contravening 
information. Because such behaviour is usually the sum of different memories all activated at 
once, the response to the eliciting event seems excessive and disproportionate – almost 
possessed. But technically this is simply a combination of different processes in the brain 
occurring at once. 
 
These neurological insights stress that human aggression ultimately favours an action 
tendency. As the emotion of anger is linked with the activation of the reward center of the 
brain, engaging the target offers relief and satisfaction. Critically, the brain makes no 
distinction between social anger and anti-social rage. However, the issue of trigger remains 
problematic; affective associate networks help illustrate how aggression can seem 
disproportionate and even possessed, but even here there needs to be an initial trigger, which 
returns the exploration back to the social sciences. Neuro-scientific insights can help explain 
cognitive processes within action tendencies, but only the social sciences can explain their 
triggers. 
 
Moral Foundation of Negative Emotions 
 
We know from appraisal theory that emotions arise not from an event per se, but more 
specifically from how the event impacts us. As Nussbaum writes: “Emotions view the world 
from the point of view of my own scheme of goals and projects, the things to which I attach 
value in a conception of what it is for me to live well.”166 Implicit in Nussbaum’s assessment 
is the assumption that all people feel a sense of entitlement towards a good life, or at least one 
free of pain and discomfort. Consequently every human being is imbued with a sense of moral 	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worth, which engenders a basic entitlement towards just and fair treatment.167 This is why 
most scholars refer to justice not as a set of rules and regulations, but as a sense of emotional 
awareness or feeling. Jon Mercer explains to this end that justice “is more than an abstract set 
of principles about how one should organize society; justice involves a perspective that 
depends on emotion. What one cares about, what is a concern to an actor, is part of one's 
understanding of justice.”168 Justice, in other words, is freedom from mistreatment, and 
requires the recognition of moral worth and all the myriad ways this worth is expressed in 
social practices. Emotions, because they promote “the maintenance of life, always poised to 
avoid the loss of integrity” 169 operate as important warning signs, that moral entitlements are 
being compromised. 
 
It is logical to assume, as Robert C. Solomon does, that knowledge of justice and correct 
treatment only comes about through the sensation of injustice and mistreatment. The 
knowledge of just treatment is borne from the experience of unwarranted and undeserved 
discomfort and pain. Solomon explains, “The heart of justice may be compassion for others, 
but its origins and its passion are to be found in the more violent, even hostile emotions.”170 
These hostile emotions occur because the fundamental sense of entitlement towards 
recognition of one’s moral worth is compromised. This sense of moral worth can become 
invested in all kinds of material and social expectations. For instance, a person might feel 
angry at not having the “vote” because her moral worth is experienced through social 
comparison and the desire to be treated equally and no less than others. The ability to tick a 
box on a piece of paper is instantly invested with existential meaning. Disenfranchisement 
leads to the assessment that one’s intrinsic worth is discarded or compromised. 
 
Because negative emotions depend on a “complex set of social expectations in which 
judgment plays a crucial role,”171 failure to comply with these social expectations may give 
rise to anger, like in Aristotle’s theory. However, because moral worth is dependent on so 
many social and material expectations being fulfilled at any moment, any failure of these 
various expectations can translate into a failure of entitlement. The slightest act of disrespect, 	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such as a wrong look, an unacknowledged act of covetousness or a failure to acknowledge a 
local custom of any sort, can snowball into violence and even lead to death, depending on 
how the offended deals with the situation and frames the act. Consequently, extreme acts of 
violence need not necessarily be caused by corresponding and preceding acts of violence; the 
trigger can be minuscule in comparison and still lead to extreme violence because the specific 
mistreatment somehow threatens the subject’s sense of moral worth. It all comes down to 
appraisal. In Euripides’s Hecuba, the death of her children inspires different reactions, 
because Hecuba appraises each death differently; only the death of her son directly challenges 
her sense of worth because of the inscribed breach of nomos. 
 
Appraisal in Negative Emotions 
 
There exist countless processes in any appraisal; they range from knowledge of social rules 
and expectations, inter-personal comparisons and personal histories, to religious imperatives 
like forgiveness and mercy, among countless others.172 The overriding appraisal I want to 
stress, however, is the appraisal of perceived intentionality: Whether an act is believed to have 
been intentionally committed to undermine the moral worth of the subject. Because any act, 
even a minuscule one, can potentially undermine our sense of moral worth, the overriding 
appraisal must be predicated on whether the offender actually intends to offend, and whether 
the subject indeed considers her sense of entitlement to be compromised. Although other 
types of appraisal are vital for negative emotions, they can be overruled by the idea that the 
mistreatment, even a minuscule one, suggests a moral disregard and act of deep disrespect. A 
focus on this single appraisal can re-frame existing attempts at emotional rosters, and 
strengthen the case for political rage. Existing attempts usually argue for rigid causal 
alignments of specific social cues with specific emotional reactions. However, by focusing on 
the appraisal of intended challenges to moral worth and entitlement, rage can be clearly 
distinguished from other negative emotions. In order to substantiate the importance of 
perceived intentionality as appraisal factor, I turn to the theoretical writings on emotions of 
P.F. Strawson. 
 
The British philosopher P.F. Strawson, a logician and pioneer in analytical philosophy, wrote 
a seminal essay on Freedom and Resentment, in which he made a critical distinction between 
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negative emotions as either predicated on moral attitudes or objective attitudes towards the 
offender. These attitudes work as implicit appraisals. On the moral attitude, Strawson writes:  
 
“The partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes entail, the modification 
they entail of the general demand that another should, if possible, be spared 
suffering, is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view him as a member of 
the moral community; only as one who has offended against its demands.”173 
 
Here negative emotions are contained by the assessment that the transgressor will atone for 
and continue to respect the moral worth of the offended; the offender’s intentions are not to 
undermine the moral worth of the victim. However, the objective attitude, explains Strawson,  
 
“Cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to the 
involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships; it 
cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, or anger.”174 
 
In the objective attitude, the offender is no longer held to enjoy moral equality with the 
victim. A withdrawal of the moral attitude comes about because the offender intentionally 
mistreats the victim, and in doing so dissolves the basis of inter-personal human 
relationships. The objective attitude, in other words, lends itself to emotions that are 
unencumbered by any type of moral recognition towards the offender.  
 
I choose this approach because it best mirrors the stylistic role of nomos in the emotional 
economy of Ancient Greece. Within nomos, all kinds of emotions can be experienced without 
sacrificing the order of the community; however, if a citizen gives into passion and reckless 
impulse and breaches nomos, for instance by committing revenge, the offender forfeits his 
membership in the community and earns either death or exile; furthermore he is believed to 
be polluted by the vengeful and raging spirits of the Erinyes. Without referring too much to 
Ancient Greece, it suffices to say that some emotions can be experienced without sacrificing 
the implicit norm of mutual moral recognition and entitlement, and these emotions are 
experienced through Strawson’s moral attitude. The other set of emotions, however, which in 
Ancient Greece are the domain of the Erinyes, are predicated on a breach of nomos, and these 	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emotions are experienced through Strawson’s objective attitude; the relevant appraisal 
generates the belief that the moral worth of the subject is intentionally violated. Naturally, 
there is an implicit assessment here that moral recognition is the natural state of relations 
between subjects, borne from the simple fact that subjects need to be mistreated first before 
they register any challenge to their felt entitlement. Individuals, in other words, are not 
naturally in a state of potentially murderous rage towards others. 
 
Emotions operating within the moral attitude set limits on how much punishment or 
misgiving can be levied against the transgressor. Rage is unique because it is predicated on an 
objective attitude towards the offender, meaning that inflicted suffering is unbound by moral 
concerns. This is an important point because each attitude requires an implicit appraisal of 
whether the transgressor seems willing to atone for their crime and remain part of the “moral 
community” and whether the offense constituted a grave mistreatment or a mild one. In rage 
the result is absolute, suggesting in turn that the mistreatment is more severe if not absolute. 
This is then the crux; rage not only responds to a set of social triggers, but more importantly 
to an implied moral disregard, something the moral attitude emotions by definition do not. 
 
Another way of explaining this would be to argue that the moral attitude contains and limits 
action tendencies, while the objective attitude gives them full rein. In Nussbaum’s exploration 
of emotions, which relies heavily on a reading of classical philosophy, she stresses the two-
faced nature in anger.175 Anger can be constructive but equally destructive. “In circumstances 
where evil prevails,” she writes, “anger is an assertion of concern for human well-being and 
human dignity; and the failure to become angry seems at best “slavish” (as Aristotle put it), at 
worst a collaboration with evil.”176 However, anger also creates dehumanizing impulses and 
creates moral distance between subjects, which brings it closer to our understanding of rage: 
“Seeing others as anger sees them – as people who ought to suffer – is a way of distancing 
oneself from their humanity.”177 In many ways rage can be described as the objective attitude 
counterpart to anger, distinguished simply by whether there exists any moral recognition 
between subjects. Nussbaum refers to this moderating force in anger as compassion, which 
sets strong limits on how we treat others and whether we can forgive them or not. 
Consequently Nussbaum’s notion of compassion informs Strawson’s moral attitude.  	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The catastrophic consequences of the objective attitude resonate clearly in Thomas Scheff’s 
sociological study of European continental wars in the late 19th and 20th century in Bloody 
Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War. Scheff argues that people who understand each 
other are “emotionally and cognitively attuned.”178 Even in conflict and competitions 
attunement sets clear limits and boundaries on violence. This is essentially comparable to the 
moral attitude. However, unlimited destruction, as witnessed in the 20th century, Scheff 
argues, was the product of “broken bonds”. He quotes the German sociologist Georg Simmel: 
“The deepest hatred grows out of broken love… Here separation does not follow from 
conflict, but, on the contrary, conflict from separation.”179 Scheff believes that emotional 
alienation is the reason why leaders failed to comprehend the Kaiser’s paranoia or Hitler’s 
ambition. When existing attunement is damaged, individuals and groups risk not only leading 
others to feel wronged but – more importantly – lack the necessary emotional and moral 
understanding to comprehend what others are doing and why. In the worst-case scenario, 
there is no sense of shared values and perception of events, leading to a disjointed sense of 
justice and cycles of violence.  
 
Relationships that move from the moral attitude into the objective attitude lose their sense of 
attunement, their sense of communality and mutuality, which the Ancient Greeks of course 
referred to as nomos. The loss of this inter-subjective framework means that actions are no 
longer filtered through communal concerns, and that appraisals are no longer predicated on a 
communal “us”, but rather on a “we” versus “them”. This is the inherent moral exclusion that 
makes rage possible. It aligns with the Ancient Greek understanding of rage, when Greek 
heroes took on bestial and dog-like forms as soon as they engaged in brutality and vengeance, 
indicating that they had veered off the path of nomos and into the domain of the feral and 
uncivilized Erinyes. But critically, the objective attitude only arises from a perceived act of 
mistreatment that undermines the moral worth of the subject. 
 
Typology of Negative Emotions 
 
The distinction between an objective attitude and a moral attitude can give rise to a typology 
of three/four ideal-type emotions: Resentment, anger and rage. I will also make a brief 	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mention of Ressentiment to make the picture more complete and somewhat symmetrical. I 
have chosen these three/four ideal type emotions to stress two elements in negative emotions: 
the first is the distinction between moral attitude and objective attitude appraisal; the other is 
the distinction between the action tendencies of action-based punishment and non-action 
based judgements. This, I believe, is the most economical way of covering negative emotions, 
by streamlining according to categorical differences in action tendency and appraisal of moral 
regard. Of course within the categories, many more, finer distinctions of emotions can be 
made.180 
 
Resentment and anger differ primarily because resentment does not demand punishment, 
while anger does; similarly Ressentiment and rage differ because rage exacts extreme 
punishment, while Ressentiment is unable to do so. The apparent asymmetry in the 
motivations of non-action emotions makes it easy to confuse the attitude in Ressentiment, 
which will be explored at length in this thesis. The point is that resentment chooses not to act, 
while Ressentiment would ideally lead to action-based rage but cannot because it is unable to 
act. However, I want to stress that the emotional responses are not sequential; resentment does 
not lead to anger and Ressentiment does not lead to rage. Instead they are self-contained 
emotions committed to very different trajectories because of different appraisals. The two 
trajectories operating within the objective attitude, i.e. rage and Ressentiment, in turn inform 
the Rage Binary explored later on in this thesis. 
 
In the table below, we have the moral attitude emotions of resentment and anger on one side, 
and the objective attitude emotions of rage and Ressentiment on the other. Another 
contextualization could construct the pro-action responses of anger and rage on one side, and 
non-action responses of resentment and Ressentiment on the other. There is no given 
preference in aligning the responses in accordance with either a “moral/objective attitude 
matrix” or an “action/non-action matrix.”  
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 Moral Attitude Objective Attitude 
(Rage Binary) 
Non-
Action 
based 
 
Resentment 
 
Ressentiment 
 
Action 
based 
 
Anger 
 
Rage 
 
 
What follows is a description of the social cues and respective action tendencies, with the 
notion of intentionality held as implicit. In the moral attitude, both offender and offended 
acknowledge that the moral worth is never questioned. Such typology of emotions has been 
attempted before in International Relations. Roger D. Petersen offers a roster distinguishing 
between a large array of emotions, as varied as anger, fear, resentment, contempt, hatred and 
rage.181 Another roster can be found in Jon Elster’s contribution on transitional justice in 
Closing the Books.182 Elster refers to hatred, contempt, anger and two types of indignation in 
his formulation. I will briefly expound these rosters and their respective emotions, before 
streamlining them into the new roster shown above.  
 
Jon Elster’s typology offers an analysis on the cues and action tendencies of negative 
emotions. Anger, writes Elster, is a second-party response that A feels towards B, for having 
caused A harm for no good reason; the action tendency is to make B suffer. Cartesian 
Indignation is a third-party emotion, according to Elster, that A feels toward B because he 
believes B has harmed C for no good reason; the action tendency is to make B suffer, though 
it is much weaker than in the second-party emotion. Hatred is the emotion that A feels toward 
B if he believes B has an evil character; the action tendency is to cause B to cease to exist or 
otherwise be rendered harmless by permanent expulsion. Contempt is the emotion that A feels 	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towards B when B has a weak or inferior character; the action tendency is avoidance or 
ostracism. Aristotelian Indignation is the emotion that A feels towards B when A believes B 
enjoys “undeserved good fortune;” the action tendency is to confiscate that fortune.183 
Following the distinction between moral attitude and objective attitude emotions, we can 
streamline Elster responses: Cartesian Indignation and Aristotelian Indignation are based on 
the moral attitude, while hatred and contempt are clearly based on the objective attitude; 
anger can go either way. 
 
In Petersen’s roster, he distinguishes his emotions as event-based, object-based or without 
cognition. Event-based emotions are anger, fear and resentment. Anger is the cognition that 
that an individual or group has committed a bad action against one’s self or one’s group with 
an action tendency towards punishment. Fear is the cognition of a situation of danger caused 
by indiscriminate violence with an action tendency towards fight or flight. Resentment is the 
cognition that one’s group is located in an unwarranted subordinate position in a status 
hierarchy; the action tendency is to reduce the status differential.  
 
Object-based emotions are contempt and hatred. Contempt is the cognition that a group or 
object is inherently inferior or defective; the action tendency is towards avoidance. Contempt 
is usually expressed through racial or cultural stigmas. Hatred, on the other hand, is the 
cognition that a group is both inherently defective and dangerous; the action tendency is to 
physically eliminate the presence of that group. Such perceptions are usually historically 
informed via cultural schemas, such as schemas of hatred. Petersen holds that “the innate 
negative features of a group may persist within a cultural schema, but the emotive force of 
that schema is only seldom activated.”184 In other words hatred can lay dormant and take on 
the form of contempt. 
 
An emotion without a cognitive appraisal is rage, according to Petersen. Rage is cognition 
without precedent. This makes it non-instrumental, according to Petersen. The action 
tendency of rage is to lash out indiscriminately, because “if the group that is the source of the 
frustration is unavailable for attack, another group will be found to substitute for it.”185 This 
effectively means that stimulus and action tendencies are misaligned. All other emotions 
follow a social logic; the event-stimulus caused by B creates an action tendency in A. In rage 	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however the event-stimulus caused by B creates an action tendency in A directed at C, or D, 
or E… Petersen concludes that what matters in rage is:  
 
“People’s wish to lash out, and elites shape the direction of that desire towards 
specific targets of the groups. Because rage generates powerful distortions in 
belief formation, political elites may help to employ the emotional flexibly 
towards different ends and various targets.”186  
 
Petersen’s distinction between event- and object-based emotions is an interesting one, and 
representative of Strawson’s distinctions. Event-based cognitions can be represented as 
operating moral attitudes, because the offender has done something that registers as violation 
but the overall cognition remains one of moral reverence, as the incident is singular and does 
not make any claims in relation to a changing moral regard between offender and victim. 
Object-based emotions, however, are different and operate according to the objective attitude. 
The transgressor’s character is seen as evil or harmful, reflected in the fact that the offender 
constantly seeks to eradicate or harm the victim. Although Petersen argues that rage is 
different, in part because he argues that rage is a displacement, it too operates an objective 
attitude because it seeks to lash out and destroy. Petersen does not offer a cause for rage, 
which underlines his point that the emotion is illegitimate, as it fails to follow a social logic. 
This view is incorrect however. I now proceed to construct my own typology, beginning with 
resentment, before briefly moving on to Ressentiment, then anger and finally rage. There is no 
such thing as an illegitimate emotion. Emotions do not lie, in the sense that they always 
require a corresponding trigger event. 
 
Resentment 
 
Resentment operates within the social framework; it sets limits on punishment and most, if 
not all, moral privileges of the transgressor are retained. Strawson’s moral attitude still makes 
excuses for the offender. However, a repeat offense or lack of atonement can lead to a 
withdrawal of the moral attitude. In this case, the transgressor would no longer enjoy the 
limitation on punishment privileged to recognizable moral equals. He becomes a threat and 
possibly a traitor and his acts are no longer filtered through appraisal networks tempered by 
recognition of his intrinsic worth. According to Petersen, “Resentment stems from the 	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perception that one’s group is located in an unwarranted subordinate position on a status 
hierarchy.”187 Petersen correctly points out that such mistreatment can turn to violence, but 
this equally implies that resentment no longer adequately describes the emotional reaction. 
 
According to the moral philosopher Jean Hampton, “Resentment is an emotion which reflects 
their judgement that the harmful treatment they experienced should not have been 
intentionally inflicted on them by their assailants insofar as it is not appropriate given their 
value and rank.”188 Margaret Walker qualifies this assessment by inserting that “Resentment 
is an accusing anger, it registers a violation that might threaten the authority of norms.”189 
Resentment operates like a warning signal; a specific mistreatment is registered as violation 
of shared social norms viewed to be the foundation of mutual moral recognition. In healthy 
communal relations, each member can make demands on the behaviour of other members, 
leading to a shared sense of values and expectations. Similar to the Greek concept of nomos, 
healthy social relations indicate a sense of communal reverence for the social order. When 
one member, however, mistreats another member, the offender violates this order and 
communicates that the prevailing norms are no longer applicable. All members might resent 
this attack on shared norms, leading to indignation.190 The emergence of resentment and 
indignation communicates to the transgressor that his actions are perceived as unjust and 
wrong, and if he desires to continue to be a member of the moral community, he must recant 
and re-invest in the correct treatment of others.  
 
When Petersen talks of violent resentment he is probably referring to a conflict that began as a 
minor transgression against shared values and norms but soon spiralled out of control, giving 
rise to brutal violence. The examples he lists, such as colonial violence in India in the early 
20th century, or North American colonial violence centuries earlier, or the civil strife erupting 
from sudden status reversal, as in post-war Iraq or possibly Syria, have little to do with 
resentment. Members of opposing communities charge each other with homicidal intent - the 
greater the suffering of the others, the greater the triumph of one’s own community. Petersen 
is certainly correct in establishing resentment as mistreatment of rank but he ignores that 	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resentment indicates that the mistreatment is felt as benign and does not merit punishment. 
The fact that mistreatment of rank engenders acts of violence must shift the focus towards the 
breakdown of shared moral recognition and the emergence of harmful intentions. In these 
cases the mistreatment of rank indeed communicates an intentional attack on the group’s 
sense of worth. 
 
Examples of real resentment in International Relations are far more benign. For instance, 
German resentment over NSA phone spying is a valid example, because as German 
newspapers asked rhetorically: Is this how one treats one’s friends?191 The recent quarrel over 
visa issues for Indian diplomats entering the US is another example.192 A more instructive 
example can be found in the decision of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to visit the 
WWII War shrine in 2014, commemorating, amongst others, Japanese war criminals. Abe’s 
visit seriously questions his commitment to good relations with his Chinese and South Korean 
neighbours.193 Along with the territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea, such 
disrespect may easily give rise to other emotions if the lack of commitment in the survival of 
this fragile moral community continues. 
 
Resentment is an important emotion and ubiquitous in international affairs; however it 
remains a community-driven emotion because the stimulus remains the perceived 
mistreatment or violation of an established norm, such as the agreed-upon recognition of 
moral worth. Resentment occurs when normative expectations have not been met. When 
normative expectations are consistently shown to be void, another emotion takes over, as we 
saw in Euripides’ Hecuba, or might see in the future of East-Asian relations. The point in 
resentment, however, is that it constitutes an appraisal of a mild form of mistreatment, which 
is either brushed off as inconsequential or contained through a quick and sincere act of 
atonement on behalf of the offender. I have referred to resentment as a judgement-based or 
non-action based emotion, because the offended deems the mistreatment too mild to be 
worthy of punishment, and instead opts for a publicly or privately communicated judgement 
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that the treatment was wrong and should not be repeated. In resentment the offender chooses 
not to act. 
 
Ressentiment 
 
As mentioned earlier, Ressentiment will be treated at length in Chapter 5; however for the 
sake of consistency, a brief outline is necessary. Nietzsche stresses that Ressentiment is borne 
from an inability to react adequately against grave and existential mistreatment. Compared to 
resentment, however, the inaction is predicated not on choice but on weakness. It follows the 
objective attitude by constructing a value system predicated on absolute moral derogation and 
exclusion of the offender. Unlike resentment, however, Ressentiment responds to an 
existential injury and not some banal mistreatment; there is no appraisal that the offender will 
atone or admit wrongdoing. But at the same, Ressentiment differs from its actionable 
counterpart of rage because the victim is unable to act and must therefore invest her rage in 
moral debasement instead. Ressentiment and resentment have the same action tendency of 
judgement, but Ressentiment’s judgement makes no excuses for the offender and maintains 
that the mistreatment disqualifies the offender as a member of the moral community and 
removes any claim to moral worth. In Nietzsche’s analysis, Ressentiment ultimately gives rise 
to revenge fantasies like the concept of hell, where offenders are damned to eternal suffering. 
Examples of Ressentiment would be identities or ideologies predicated on “anti”, such as 
Anti-Americanism, Anti-Modernism or Anti-Enlightenment. 
 
Anger 
 
Anger, writes Petersen, is “the cognition that an individual or group has committed a bad 
action against one’s self or group; action tendency toward punishing that group.”194 Anger is 
a step up from resentment but differs from the excluding competence of rage. Nussbaum 
writes that anger arises from the belief, “that some damage has occurred to me or to 
something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was 
done by someone; probably, that is done willingly.”195 The difference to resentment is that the 
mistreatment has actually caused severe damage or a sense of grave mistreatment or loss, 
rather than simply a perceived sense of rank displacement or confusion about expectations. 	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Resentment only demands that a certain mistreatment not be repeated and that recognition of 
standing and worth be respected. Anger, however, demands payment for a perceived loss. 
Consequently anger engenders the desire for punishment and retribution. 
 
Retribution is markedly different from revenge or reprisals, and this will be covered in 
Chapter 4. While retribution is the domain of the courts and serves a social function, revenge 
and reprisals are types of personal justice that are not sanctioned by the court or any shared 
community. We already witnessed the same distinction in Aeschylus’ Oresteia. Athena, 
sensing the destructive potential of revenge cycles, domesticates the Erinyes and places their 
punishment in the service of the greater good, turning all justice over to the courts, effectively 
exchanging revenge for retribution and enforcing communal limits on the extent of suffering. 
 
In anger, the desire to punish the offender is filtered through the moral attitude. The sense of 
loss is assuaged by communally administered punishment in the form of penalties like a loss 
of liberties or material possession. This punishment symbolically equals the crime and thus 
re-establishes a sense of balance and equality. As with resentment, both parties retain their 
sense of moral worth and equality. But equally, anger can swiftly turn to rage if the subject 
dismisses sanctioned justice and instead opts for revenge, disregarding the moral worth of the 
offender and illustrating a switch to the objective attitude. On the other hand, the social cue 
for anger might in some cases be the same as in resentment; it depends on how far the victim 
feels aggrieved and to what extent they begin to harbour punitive impulses. In some cases a 
mistreatment of rank might engender anger, if the subject feels that she has genuinely suffered 
a loss and deserves compensation. 
 
In International Relations the desire to penalize the conduct of other states is ever-present. For 
instance, Putin’s territorial assimilation of Crimea has angered many Western leaders and 
resulted in penalties such as sanctions, travel restrictions and an expulsion from the G8.196 It 
remains to be seen whether these punishments suffice and whether Putin remains bound by 
the demands of the international community. Further transgression on Putin’s behalf may 
indicate normative expectations to be unfounded, splitting Putin and his agenda from that of 
the West. Divergent agendas then lead to the spectre of opposing notions of order. Another 
famous example that fits this paradigm follows the political manoeuvring after the 	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assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Austria-Hungary’s increasingly demanding 
ultimatums, designed to punish and ultimately humiliate Serbia, were finally rebuked. Serbia 
and her backers were unwilling to give in any further, dissolving the basis of any shared sense 
of justice and setting the stage for World War I. Although there were of course underlying 
dynamics at play, World War I began with Austria-Hungary’s desire to punish Serbia. The 
Serbs initially accepted the punishment, but further demands indicated that Austria-Hungary 
was less interested in repairing the broken bonds than making Serbia suffer, which indicated a 
desire for revenge rather than restitution, the mark of an objective attitude and a loss of what 
Scheff calls “attunement.” 
 
Rage 
 
According to Petersen, rage is a “non-instrumental emotion” and serves no social function; it 
lashes out indiscriminately. “The target of rage can be somewhat of a living inkblot,” explains 
Petersen, “the rage emotion can usually generate a reason for attacking or discriminating 
against the target.”197	  Andrew Ross writes in agreement, “the description of rage underscores 
the illegitimacy of the emotion by revealing its failure to sustain a coherent object. Precisely 
because the emotion is so erratic.”198 Both Petersen and Ross have in mind a violent and 
undisciplined mob, fitting the description in Elias Canetti’s Crowds and Power, when the 
sting of authority suddenly awakens a dormant mass of violent and irate followers. There 
exists considerable research on the manipulation of public sentiment in the field of social 
psychology. Theories like “Displaced Aggression”199 or “Elite Persuasion”200 support the 
idea that political elites whip their people into a frenzy by channelling their legitimate 
frustrations towards politically calculated targets. Targets, previously agreed upon in existing 
schemas of hatred, become victims, even though they are completely unrelated to the cause of 
suffering. 
 
Ruthless manipulators like Adolf Hitler, Stalin, Mao Ze-Dong, or Pol Pot, armed with the 
promise of progress and purity, convinced their people that mass killings of these moral 	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outsiders were necessary.201 These outsiders were not only political outliers, but specifically 
moral ones as well; in many cases they were described as sub-human. Objective attitudes 
based on existing schemas of hatred provide the moral certainty necessary to eradicate these 
scapegoats, already beset by moral disregard. But activation in turn requires what Staub refers 
to as a fertile “affective background,” able to align a sense of existential threat with the 
proposed solution. This sense of felt hardship and mistreatment always needs to be real.	   202 
This hardship can come from multiple sources, including a loss of collective esteem, 
economic upheaval, or natural disaster. They all challenge the inherent sense entitlement of 
the group towards freedom from mistreatment and suffering, and consequently appear as 
unjust and undeserved.  
 
An inherent desire to control events and gain a sense of comprehension places subjects in a 
position where a culprit is worth more than a rational explanation. “A cause is found, and life 
problems become comprehensible,” explains Staub, “finding a scapegoat makes people 
believe their problems can be predicted and controlled; and it eliminates one’s own 
responsibility, thereby diminishing guilt and enhancing esteem.”203 The ability to deal with 
hard times is then predicated on the successful creation of a responsible out-group, regardless 
of culpability. However, even schemas of hatred refer to some unresolved ancient 
mistreatment and injustice.204 
 
Rage certainly suffers from the problem of displacement, but there is another side to rage that 
needs to be stressed. Even in the case of displacement the sense of suffering is real and 
subjects respond emotionally to a set of grievances and problems that threaten their sense of 
moral worth and entitlement towards a life free of mistreatment and suffering. Despite the 
existence of elite manipulation, the emotional register cannot be simulated. In this sense, the 
notion of righteous rage, the ideal-type so to speak, deserves to be fully explored. Even if 
manipulation occurs, the legitimacy of the rage trigger stands apart from the illegitimate 
manipulation of the action tendency. 	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The connection between serious mistreatment and the objective attitude I believe is always 
causal. Even strangers are regarded initially in a moral attitude and with a modicum of human 
compassion.205 As argued before, even minuscule acts of disrespect can lead to an objective 
attitude, but can be easily contained if the offender communicates his guilt and atones, or 
refrains from a repeat offense. In this way the moral attitude of mutual moral recognition is 
maintained. However, acts like a terrorist bombing, territorial annexation or overt aggression 
leave little room for interpretation; should the offender wish to atone or apologize, it would be 
satirical. These acts are unequivocal signs of a moral disregard and trigger righteous rage. 
 
In the mind of the raging subject, the connection between the action tendency of extreme 
punishment and sense of suffered injustice is always real. A prototypical example of such 
righteous rage can be found in Jean Paul-Sartre’s introduction to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of 
the Earth. Sartre writes, 
 
“Irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage 
instincts, nor even the effect of resentment: it is man re-creating himself. I think 
we understood this truth at one time, but we have forgotten it – that no 
gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy 
them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out to the settler 
through force of arms. When his rage boils over, he discovers his lost innocence 
and he comes to known himself in that he creates his self.”206 
 
One might dislike the display of violence, for all its excesses and brutality, but for those 
acting, the rationale is clear. In the case of Fanon’s anti-colonialism, rage liberates the subject 
not only from material oppression but existential oppression; the act of violent rebellion not 
only removes the oppressor but also gives rise to a new sense of identity unencumbered by the 
demands of colonial vestige. In the words of the French sociologist Michel Wievorka, “The 
negation of the subjectivity of the other becomes a form of self-assertion”.207 Rage in that 
sense is the only emotion that can provide subjects with enough moral certainty to treat others 
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as mere things, but at the same time rage responds to a mistreatment that mirrors this exact act 
of dehumanization. 
 
This substantially shifts the focus away from what Petersen and Ross believe to be the 
indiscriminate and erratic nature of rage. Achilles’ behaviour was neither erratic nor divinely 
inspired; there was a merciless logic and ritualistic importance to his activity. Euripides’ 
Hecuba or Medea illuminate the subjectivity of these tragic Greek heroes and stress how little 
choice they have in eschewing nomos and embracing revenge. And although the political 
manipulation of rage is real, much more so is the underlining sense of mistreatment and 
injustice. The key difference to resentment and anger is the lack of social bonds to contain the 
action tendency; there is no shared sense of values or any compassion or mercy - no limits to 
be imposed. Even if they once existed, the sensation of existential injustice and overt moral 
disregard instantly dissolves them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Ancient Greek understanding of rage was highly formalized and stylized. This chapter 
attempted to make rage accessible as a social emotion. Current understanding postulates that 
emotions require cognition, i.e. informed appraisal of how an event affects our specific way 
of life and our desires. Cognitive appraisals constantly evaluate the meaningfulness and 
impact of events. Debates on emotional genesis are far from settled. However, there is a 
growing consensus that knowledge of social rules and legitimate expectations, all predicated 
on an entitlement toward moral recognition, are key to understanding emotions in a social 
setting. Disenfranchised people for instance require knowledge of the “vote” and its socio-
political meaning, before they can get angry about not having it. Scholars like Solomon and 
Nussbaum argue that emotions are basically types of felt cognition that something is not right. 
 
Violations of these social expectations, experienced inherently as an injustice, manifest 
emotionally. With the help of the philosophical intuitions of P.F. Strawson, I introduced two 
streams of emotional cognition with very different moral stances towards the offender. 
Strawson believed that people respond to offenses and transgressions through either of two 
moral modalities. In the moral attitude, the transgressor is treated compassionately, 
punishment is mild and the moral worth of both offender and victim is never questioned. Both 
subjects make concessions to remain within the moral community. In the objective attitude, 
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however, offenders enjoy no special privileges and punishment remains unbound by 
communal concerns; here offenders can be totally mistreated and mercilessly punished. 
 
Within these two modalities, I positioned four ideal-type emotional reactions; two action-
based emotions and two non action-based emotions, which in turn could also be listed as two 
moral attitude emotions and two objective attitude emotions. Resentment and anger respond 
to very different triggers; while resentment responds to mistreatment of rank and a possible 
violation of norms, the emotional reaction remains mild and hedges on the belief that the 
moral worth of the victim is never questioned. Anger responds to a different appraisal; here 
the offender causes the victim some great loss or personal damage. The victim demands 
retribution from the offender, but critically there is a limit to the suffering and payment that 
can be imposed. Both parties are encumbered by demands to maintain moral equality and 
reverence towards each other, and thus retributive anger cannot undermine the offender’s 
entitlement to just and moral treatment. 
 
Objective attitude emotions, I argue, depend on a social trigger that implicitly communicates 
a total moral disregard towards the victim. Ressentiment and rage respond to offenses that 
undermine the moral worth of the subject. While resentment and anger could be described as 
sequential, responding to differing severities of mistreatment within the confines of moral 
recognition. Both Ressentiment and rage respond to the same offense, however Ressentiment 
internalizes the rage due to an inability to adequately confront the offender. What makes 
Ressentiment and rage excessive and brutal is the fact that the offender lacks any moral worth. 
However, in order to stress the righteous aspect in Ressentiment and rage, it must be shown 
that the initial offense communicates this very notion of moral disregard. Fanon’s 
emancipatory violence remains an excellent example of righteous rage, where sustained 
oppression engenders a brutal response designed to instrumentalize the offender for the very 
purpose of re-instating the victim’s lost moral worth. 
 
In the cult of the Erinyes, their noble calling as guardians of nomos is somewhat offset by 
their cannibalistic and feral appearance and behaviour. They function like a necessary evil 
that guards against breaches but at the same time places a mirror in front of the face of the 
offender, revealing an uncivilized and impulsive animal, governed by the desire for revenge. 
Strawson’s insight into objective and moral attitudes mirrors the dichotomy represented in the 
myth of the Erinyes, but at the same time makes the dichotomy more accessible. Those 
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eschewing the moral attitude are no longer uncivilized and bestial but respond to an offense 
that makes such strong statements on the relationship between offender and victim that 
mutual moral recognition is impossible. This insight flows naturally from the Euripidean 
enterprise to explore subjectivities and understand why actors engage in brutal aggression and 
violence and discard the value and worth of others. The objective attitude translates the 
domain of the Erinyes into an emotional cognition of a felt sense of severe mistreatment and 
moral disregard. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Dynamics of Group Rage 
 
 
The last chapter continued the exploration that began in Ancient Greece; however following 
the ideas of P.F. Strawson, the domain of the blood-lusting Erinyes was slightly reconfigured. 
Instead of portraying carnal and animalistic impulses, rage was shown to operate in 
accordance with an objective attitude, which disinvested targets of any moral worth. Critically 
though, the objective attitude depends on some mistreatment or injustice that communicates 
this very moral disregard in the first place; even if these experiences are born from accident or 
circumstance, targets are found, and usually in accordance with pre-existing stigmas and 
cultural narratives, known as schemas of hatred. However, none of these insights matter for 
International Relations as long as these dynamics cannot be shown to operate on the 
international level, where states and groups are the relevant actors and not individuals. 
 
The practice of emotionalizing International Relations must contend with some obvious and 
very basic questions. The last chapter explored definitive causes of specific emotions but 
focussed predominantly on the appraisal processes in individuals. Emotions in individuals are 
self-evident and increasingly understood, but how do emotions factor in International 
Relations? The basic contention arises from the fact that International Relations is primarily 
concerned with state behaviour and motivation. Questions of order and interest do not easily 
lend themselves to questions of emotion, let alone rage. In its very basic formulation still 
echoed in Realpolitik today, states are concerned with their calculated self-interest, and 
negotiate outcomes with others in accordance with power relations predicated on military and 
economic strength. Emotions, even if they are accepted as integral to decision-making and 
belief structures, only feed into the bottom-line of interest formulation and pursuit.208 Even 
Wendt’s important intervention about the constructivist genesis of Realpolitik can only stress 
that once the institution of self-help is accepted as valid, behaviour arises accordingly.209  
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Lebow’s introduction of Platonic notions of the spirit naturally widened the scope to 
incorporate non-material concerns such as honour and esteem into state pursuits. Relying on 
findings in Social Psychology as well as earlier intuitions from Plato’s Republic, Lebow 
dissolves the state into a collection of individuals, who of course feel, desire and fear. This 
deconstruction of the state goes hand in hand with a new mandate to explore group 
psychology and sociology to understand how groups operate in relation to each other and to 
the demands of their members. Axel Honneth’s work on disrespect and grammars of 
recognition places the individual center stage and stresseshow group leaders and elites are 
often encumbered by the emotional needs of their democratic constituency.210  
 
Against this bottom up approach, Wendt questions the propensity in International Relations to 
refer to states as unitary beings. Wendt states, “We often refer casually to states 'as if they 
have emotions and are therefore conscious. States are routinely characterised as angry, 
greedy, guilty, humiliated, and so on - all conditions that, in individuals at least, are associated 
with subjective experience.”211 Wendt’s exploration of these “as if” persons yields interesting 
results but ultimately fails to locate a center of feeling and reflective state consciousness 
without referring back to the subjective capacities of individuals. Wendt concludes that states 
protect their self-styled narratives but that ultimately individuals who are invested in these 
narratives register the failures.212 Consequently the state can be a source of emotion but 
cannot experience emotion itself. 
 
What this means is that emotions in International Relations can only be located at the micro-
level in individuals. This solves one problem then; emotions are real and they are located 
within the individual. The next problem concerns how they are elicited in a manner relevant 
for International Relations. An individual might be aggrieved at losing a loved one, or be 
angry at some undue harm, but this hardly resonates on the international level. The strength of 
resonance then lies in harmony. By creating a stimulus that affects all members of a group 
equally, group emotions are ensured to resonate harmoniously. Nationalism for instance is a 
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type of pride that exists only on a group level.213 Group membership creates side pockets for 
emotional experience in individuals that only register state-level events and produce joint 
emotional responses such as anger or pride. Such emotions exist purely on the group level and 
may be described as sui generis. Friendly inter-state competitions such as the World Cup 
explicate this process, as individuals experience the sensations of a victory or defeat through 
their sense of national membership. 
 
However, in order to ensure an equal emotional resonance within the group – some people 
obviously do not care about soccer and how their 11 compatriots perform – the event stimulus 
must target the foundation of the individual’s existential investment in the group. Individuals, 
in other words, must implicitly agree on the severity of the event and share the relevant 
cognitive appraisal to engender the same emotional response. An event like 9/11 was so 
encompassing that all members of the in-group felt aggrieved and angry at the mistreatment. 
Lebow has used sociological concepts like Terror Management Theory (TMT) and Mortality 
Salience Theory (MST), which can explain how such collective events occur, and why group 
members react the way they do. The basic premise of TMT is that individuals join groups for 
specific existential demands. These demands are part of the human condition. It follows that 
when group existence is threatened, these existential demands are threatened, and give rise to 
all kinds of defensive processes that can include violence, punitiveness and extreme 
“othering.”214 And it is within this process that I want to position the Greek-inspired reading 
of rage and explore how groups behave following an existential act mistreatment or injustice. 
Following the previous chapter’s typology, rage reacts to a mistreatment that threatens the 
subject’s entitlement towards moral recognition, which is both cause of the emotional 
response as well as the implicit acknowledgment that the moral attitude no longer applies.215 
 
This chapter will first explore the individual existential demands towards group membership 
and establish why individuals join groups and how these groups must perform in order to 
satisfy these existential demands. Second, group threats will be elaborated. Building on 
Marilynn Brewer’s Optimal Distinction Theory, specific ideal threats will be explored to 	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illustrate how group existence can be threatened.	   216 Last, following the perception of such 
threats, groups undergo processes of identity hardening and moral certification, which provide 
the necessary justification for violence. These so-called “moral mandates” will be explored 
from a subjective angle to understand how groups channel their sense of mistreatment into 
justifications for violence. It will be shown that the study of moral mandates is not yet aligned 
with studies on group emotions. The key is to show that the Erinyes/rage complex of Ancient 
Greece still applies, but is now supplemented by an explicit reference to the previously held 
implicit moral certainties operating in the Nomos of Revenge. 
 
Social Identity and the Need for Community 
 
 
“Man is a creature that can get used to anything and I think that is the best definition of him”, 
writes Dostoyevsky in House of the Dead, a semi-biographical take on 19th century prison life 
in Siberia. Dostoyevsky describes how even in the harshest environment, human interaction 
would flourish and take on a semblance of normality. Emotions such as kindness and honour 
existed even at near-death subsistence. The microcosm of the gulag afforded its inmates all 
the specificities needed to sustain human interactions and establish their own identities, which 
were partly imported from outside and partly forged anew by the demands of gulag life. These 
identities, as they became invested with expectations and acknowledgments from other 
inmates, took on existential significance. Although all of the inmates were de facto prisoners 
and equally worthless to the society that had abandoned them, within the prison, the 
perception of mistreatment, injustice and insults, and even the desire for revenge, became 
predicated on hierarchies, based on intrinsic notions of worth and distinction.  
 
Identity formation depends on the acknowledgment and actions of others. Alexander Wendt 
writes in his seminal article on Anarchy that “the principle of identity-formation is captured 
by the symbolic interactionist notion of the ‘looking-glass self’ which asserts that the self is a 
reflection of an actor’s socialization.”217 Social identity becomes impossible without the 
consideration of others. The concept of Identitätsproblematik captures the growing interest in 
International Relations of the importance and problems of identity. In a fitting metaphor, Erik 
Ringmar writes that identity formation is akin to a theatrical process; the audience accepts and 	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applauds the self-styled narrative or hisses and boos. “To be denied recognition is a traumatic 
experience” writes Ringmar; “we feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, 
we have lost our status and our face.”218 The stress lies on the audience, without which the 
notion of self cannot be articulated. Identity formation becomes a communal experience and 
necessitates the existence of others. Identity routinization is performative, and as in 
Dostoyevsky’s House of the Dead, provides individuals with a sense of worth and distinction.  
 
In joining groups, individuals express fundamental existential desires which inform their 
sense of moral worth. These existential desires amount to a creation of a recognized social 
identity, expressing a sense of self. Honneth argues that such social recognition remains an 
inter-subjective phenomenon, which relies on group solidarity for its existence. He argues that 
“the self is gained through continuous approval and acceptance of others” and a failure to 
recognize the other “robs the subject in question of every opportunity to attribute social value 
to his or her own abilities.”219 However, Lebow also stresses how individuals, in order to 
create a social identity, require esteem and standing.220 He argues that esteem is granted and 
recognized only if the subject adheres to social rules, curbing excesses. Honneth and Lebow 
complement each other in their analyses, as much as Honneth describes the responsibility of 
society towards the subject, while Lebow covers the opposite angle, illustrating the obligation 
of the subject toward her society. Merging both angles shows that esteem and recognition are 
born from the acceptance of certain demands which both society and subject make towards 
each other. Society sets certain qualifications for recognition of the social self and the subject 
fulfils them. In Ancient Greece, this was the implicit oath citizens made in joining nomos. 
 
Consequently once these qualifications are met, group solidarity is ensured and recognition is 
established as a social value. Individuals are thus motivated to honour the social obligations in 
order to ensure that their existential demands are met. This was touched upon in Chapter 1 in 
the discussion on pollution. According to the cult of the Erinyes, those who undermine group 
solidarity by pursuing revenge court the rage of the entire community because the spectre of 
pollution, expressed in the breakdown of nomos, threatens all community members equally; it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Lindemann and Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition. P. 7 
219 Honneth, Axel - Struggle for Recognition: (1994), p. 131, 134 
220 For more on the individual desire for esteem, see, Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honor Code: How 
Moral Revolutions Happen, Reprint (W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); Frank Henderson Stewart, 
Honor, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (Free Press, 2006). All of these writers stress the difference between, and equal importance 
of, recognition of equality and recognition of distinction in human nature. 
	   94	  
threatens their ability to maintain a social identity. This explains why the idea of rage and 
revenge was so castigated; it selfishly risked destroying the social bonds (nomos) everyone 
else relied upon. As a result polluted individuals were chastised and exiled by their 
community. The role of the individual in the breakdown of social order is no longer regarded 
as relevant and indeed strong in-group biases make such conduct as portrayed in the plays of 
Ancient Greece unlikely.221 Today sociologists and social psychologists have taken the route 
of predicating such a breakdown on exogenous factors.222 Groups are now threatened by the 
conduct of other groups, or by acts of nature. 
 
The importance of group membership for individuals can be described as the following: 
Individuals need other individuals to generate what Wendt called “mirroring;” Ringmar 
describes the process as a theatre play where the audience validates the subject’s identity 
performance. Within society individuals demand recognition from others for their self-styled 
identity, hence members must agree that recognition is a social value, which in itself creates a 
basic norm strong enough to support group existence. Once group membership is established, 
individuals gain new appraisal mechanisms. “When social identity is salient, group members 
perceive themselves as exemplars of the group, rather than unique individuals (…) they 
experience emotions because their group may be helped or hurt by it.”223 This means 
individuals literally lose themselves in their in-group, filtering key events entirely through 
group appraisal.  
 
The correct position of individuals in International Relations is thus ensured; they demand 
group existence in order to satisfy their basic human demands for social recognition. The 
existential importance of group membership for the individual aligns group existence with 
individual existence, as individuals base their moral worth on whether they are functioning 
social actors within their community. Within the group the moral attitude becomes encased in 
norms, as members need to respect and recognize each other’s accomplishments and by 
extension moral worth. However, once the group is elevated into inter-state existence, the 	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question of attitude becomes more pressing. Intuitively, there is no reason why groups should 
regard each other in the moral attitude, and indeed for a long time hostility and moral 
disregard was believed to be the norm. 
 
Inter-Group Dynamics 
 
Earliest research on inter-group relations by William Sumner, author of Folkways: A study of 
Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals, hypothesized that groups always stand in Manichean 
opposition to each other:  
 
“A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and 
everybody else, or the others-group, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in 
relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their 
relation to all outsiders, to other-group, is one of war and plunder (…) Loyalty to 
the in-group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood 
within, warlikeness without – all group together, common products of the same 
situation.”224 
 
This assumption found further support in the works of the political philosopher Carl Schmitt, 
who argued that all politics – whether group or individual based - is inherently predicated on 
friend-enemy distinctions. Sumner’s early assumption that the in-group always stands in 
Manichean opposition to the out-group, as could be expected in extreme cases of violence and 
bloodshed, has been rejected.225 Brewer writes, “Any relationship between in group 
identification and out group hostility is progressive and contingent rather than necessary or 
inevitable.”226 
 
In the previous chapter, it was proposed that strangers have no reason not to regard each other 
in the moral attitude, as long as they have not suffered a mistreatment. On the group level this 
can be expanded. Instead of being laden with negative connotation, out-groups may become 	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integral to the in-group’s wellbeing and enjoy preferential treatment. This creates a symbiotic 
relationship where differences are maintained and respected. This plays into theories that 
postulate that groups need each other for inter-group comparisons and the elaboration of 
distinction, but do so in a friendly and constructive manner.227 However, as Allport and 
Neumann argue, in-group identity formation can occur even without any reference, negative 
or positive, to out-group existence.228 Consequently, the exact role of strangers or out-groups 
in identity formations remains unclear. Still, there is a growing consensus that previous 
beliefs about the inherent negative reception of out-groups is false and that negative views of 
out-groups, along with moral pronouncements of evil, are contingent and rely on the 
experience of mistreatment. 
 
Nussbaum and Sen have independently researched the impact of nationalism and group 
identity on inter-group relations, and arrive at the same conclusion: that compassion and 
moral regard remain the overruling condition between groups, as long as these groups do not 
feel threatened.229 Following Nussbaum’s arguments on compassion, moral regard for others 
instantly dissolves when groups and individuals experience negative emotions such as 
jealousy, fear or contempt - and of course rage. These emotions easily lend themselves to the 
objective attitude. However, because they are emotions, they require a preceding trigger 
event. In order for groups to regard each other in the moral attitude, they must not only 
refrain from mistreating one another but also from falling prey to natural disasters or systemic 
upheavals. The ensuing emotions of fear and jealousy can lead to a withdrawal of compassion 
and mercy and enable displacement. Echoing Athena’s solution to the problems posed by the 
Erinyes, in-group biases strongly lend themselves to the prospect of displacing grievances and 
aggression outwards. 
 
It is important to stress that such displacement can overrule the judicial mandate of laws and 
legal conventions; in fact they easily dissolve them. The sense of existential mistreatment, 
informing the objective attitude, makes the validity of laws and treatises irrelevant, because 
they in turn rely on mutual recognition. Consequently, laws and treatises are ill placed to 
guard against violence, because strong negative emotions, predicated on an objective attitude, 
operate overruling mandates. “Relationships between people that are mediated only by rule 	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and not by empathy frequently prove more fragile in time of hostility, more prone to a 
dehumanizing type of brutality,” warns Nussbaum.230 In the end individuals do not require 
the existence of out-groups for their own existential needs and indeed favour the survival of 
their in-group over all else. There is little incentive to act compassionately towards others in 
the face of injustice and threat, a point stressed in TMT and MST. When push comes to 
shove, individuals will defend the moral worth of their in-group members over that of out-
group members. 
 
Still, in times of peace the moral attitude can be argued to naturally extend beyond the 
borders of the in-group. Sumner’s and Schmidt’s initial belief in a given hostile inter-group 
morality seems premature. The withdrawal of compassion and the moral attitude depends on 
the experience of mistreatment or the perception of threat. But at the same time these threats 
are not simply given but arise from appraisals; out-groups are not per se a source of 
discomfort or hostility.231 Sumner was of course not entirely off the mark when he concluded 
that out-groups are invested with negative traits; however, this remains a result of cultural 
stigmas from pre-existing schemas, rather than something naturally given to in-group 
identities. In order to introduce the concept of moral disregard and the possibility of violence 
into inter-group relations, without referring back to some innate properties as proposed by 
Sumner, the appraisal of threat must be fully articulated, and in a way that directly affects the 
emotional economy of group members. 
 
According to Optimal Distinction Theory, humans join groups because they seek both a sense 
of inclusion and belonging, but also an available source of greatness and esteem.232 These two 
fundamental drives, if frustrated, threaten the individual’s existential investment in the group 
and by extension their own moral worth. Within the group these drives are guaranteed by a 
sense of mutual obligation. In-built mechanisms dissuade the manifestation of violence; no 
such mechanism, however, inherently exists in inter-group relations. And even norms and 
values that exist can be justifiably discarded in times of “supreme emergency” according to 
Just War theorists.233 In order for group members to feel threatened on behalf of their in-
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group, the sense of threat must be predicated on challenges aimed right at the heart of group 
existence. Once a threat is registered, the sense of existential emergency arises naturally. 
Building on Brewer’s Optimal Distinction Theory group threats arise in three ways: threat to 
group inclusion, threat to group integrity, and threat to group esteem.234 
 
Existential Group Threats 
 
The first threat has to do with internal dynamics and refers to a loss of inclusion suffered by 
some members of the group. This is not technically dependent on the existence of a 
threatening out-group; however, because groups operate strong in-group biases and 
favouritism, they quickly repackage the internal threat as outward projection. The second 
threat occurs through a direct attack on the in-group’s integrity and esteem. This occurs in two 
ways: the first is a straightforward invasion, either perceived materialistically or ideationally – 
or both. The second is more complicated and depends on an attack of a group’s sense of 
esteem and distinction which, however, equally leads to a perception of grave injustice. We 
will run through each of these threats before moving on to establish how groups respond. 
 
Threat of Group Inclusion 
 
Members of a group may experience a loss of inclusion: Their connection to the in-group’s 
core values becomes terse, and they experience a sense of isolation; their ability to perform 
their social identity is compromised. According to Brewer, the subject counters this by 
reaffirming her connection to the in-group by way of inflated out-group differentiation. As a 
consequence of this hyper-valuation of the in-group, the distance between the isolated 
member and her in-group is artificially compressed. Brewer suggests that a persistent 
derogation of the out-group acts as compensation; it increases the contrast between in-group 
and out-group and thus the similarity between the self and the in-group are reaffirmed.235 In 
other words the derogation of the out-group is used to reconnect the self to the in-group. 
“Threats to inclusion,” writes Brewer, “are predicated to heighten feelings of moral 
superiority, intolerance of difference, and concomitant emotions of contempt and disgust 
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toward relevant out groups.”236 Brewer argues that the emotional component arises from the 
disgust and contempt registered towards the out-group. 
 
The sense of threat from marginalization is not technically an out-group threat, but rather 
appropriated as one. Marginalization creates mortality salience and qualifies as an existential 
threat; however, because members are unable - or unwilling - to leave their in-group, the 
threat is repackaged and rechanneled towards a non-descript out-group. Brewer locates the 
emotional component in the derogation of the out-group, yet it seems more appropriate to 
refer to such derogation as displacement, and return the emotional genesis to its source, i.e. 
the failure of group solidarity. The member’s inability to address her failing sense of group 
membership - and here the Erinyes’ fearful faces do their duty - creates the need for a targeted 
out-group. The out-group on the other hand, will view this derogation as irrational and 
inexplicable. They become proto-typical scapegoats, sacrificed for the greater good of in-
group cohesion. 
 
According to Social Psychology, there exist strong forces within the group to favour out-
group derogation over in-group distancing. Dechesne et al. argue, “whether one engages in 
derogation or distancing depends on the willingness or necessity to maintain the 
identification. Maintenance is associated with derogation, and neglect is associated with 
distancing.”237 Provided that maintenance of social identity is paramount, the in-group bias 
leads to a construction of threat that is entirely predicated on the desire to maintain 
membership. The purification rituals in Ancient Greece served a similar function; internal 
strife was externalized through the spontaneous creation of a non-insider or scapegoat and 
burdened with all the responsibility and felt anger before being sacrificed in a communal act 
of purification. 
 
A more applicable example of Brewer’s idea can be found in Snyder’s concept of elite 
persuasion.238 Snyder argues that newly emerging democracies often exact violence against 
ethnic minorities under the guise of strong nationalistic fervour. Snyder explains that elites, 
fearing a loss of power and influence based on uncontested leadership, will try to ward off 
democratic developments by creating threats and instigating violence against helpless 	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scapegoats which are intentionally excluded from the national dialogue via inflated ethnic 
differences. This out-group derogation ultimately prevents the feeling of marginalization felt 
by elites whose foundation of power cannot survive democratization. Staub, however, 
highlights how such elite persuasion also necessitates a “psychology hard times”, i.e. some 
extreme hardship felt by the population that can provide the “affective background” for the 
displaced out-group aggression.239 In all of these examples the breakdown of group solidarity 
informs the need for out-group derogation while the out-group, ignoring the possibility of 
historically informed animosities, must be considered innocent in all of this. 
 
Threat to Group Integrity 
 
The second scenario Brewer identifies is a direct attack on an in-group’s sense of integrity. 
This occurs largely through physical invasion. Historically, this has been the clearest 
articulation of group threat. The right to sovereignty and non-intervention remains the 
intellectual foundation for international law and concepts like just war theory.240 However, 
because Brewer recognizes groups over states, there is an added complexity here, as many 
political groups fail to qualify as states, but still operate with the same mentality and sense of 
entitlement. Cosmopolitan arguments attempt to extend abstract benefits of statehood to 
individual groups, such as terrorist groups or NGOs.241 Viewed from a social identity theory 
stance, such attempts are long overdue as these groups, by nature, readily operate like 
internationally sanctioned states; seeing that their influence is much greater now, however, 
these actors are of course given greater attention.  
 
This point notwithstanding, groups, whether they are states or other entities, feel a sense of 
threat when their territorial entitlements are compromised. Terrorism scholars like Salter and 
Crenshaw stress that religious terrorist groups – as well as their previous three ideological 
manifestations according to Rapoport – are always motivated by demands for national 
sovereignty and national self-determination.242 Regardless of their employed tactics, they all 
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react to a continued sense of injustice predicated on territorial oppression or displacement, or 
foreign meddling in internal affairs. This has provided the strongest incentive for violence and 
the clearest sense of threat. In the words of Frank Salter, “threats to group identity and 
autonomy make the work of preparing terrorists, and soldiers, so much easier than 
indoctrination from a cold start. Indeed when the homeland is in peril people, especially 
young men seek indoctrination into fighting units.243 Vamik Volkan writes in a similar vein 
“any break in physical border may translate into a break in the whole group’s psychological 
“border” of identity.”244 The sense of territorial integrity and historically informed notions of 
Heimat provides groups with a sense of timelessness and consistency invaluable to their 
members’ ability to ward off fears of vulnerability and meaninglessness. Imagined 
Communities demand physical anchoring.245 When this anchor comes under attack, group 
members feel a sense of existential threat. The desire for Heimat is universal but can easily be 
derailed into tragedy, such as in the case of Palestinian and Israeli claims on Jerusalem, or 
Indian and Pakistani claims on the Kashmir. 
 
Threat to Group Esteem 
 
Against this clearly articulated attack on territorial integrity comes the second, more abstract 
attack on a group’s sense of esteem and distinction. Lebow has taken the concept of standing 
and shown how, historically, states and nations have gone to war as much for material reasons 
as for reasons of honour and esteem.246 Groups seek distinction and glory for their members; 
or rather members demand such feats for their own psychological need of esteem and 
mortality defiance.247 Athena asks of the Erinyes, after they are given a home underneath 
Athens, to help wage war against other cities “to satisfy our powerful lust for fame”; the 
displacement of anger serves a clear and important purpose. The need for greatness is 
inscribed in the genome of the group, exactly because it is inscribed in the existential makeup 	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of the individual. The need for some groups to be greater, better, stronger can produce zero 
sum scenarios and lead to inevitable clashes between groups with uncompromising 
entitlements. 
 
The increasing focus in International Relations scholarship on the importance of humiliation 
as a motivator for violence indicates that the concept of esteem is gaining greater attention. 
An innate sense of superiority as based on ethnographic properties can be universal and 
groups can be extremely sensitive towards issues like slights and insults. According to Paul 
Saurette’s research on humiliation cycles, the West and some parts of the Middle East are 
locked in “a deadly serious duel of humiliation and counter-humiliation”248 The importance 
of answering slights takes precedence over other strategic imperatives, according to Saurette. 
In agreement, Lindner finds that globalization and the unceasing march of modernity has left 
large parts of the Middle East without a sense of cultural heritage and utterly humiliated, 
seeking either to ignore globalization or attack those held responsible.249  
 
According to social psychologists, “an uncritical endorsement of the cultural value of high 
self-esteem may therefore be counterproductive and even dangerous. In principle it might 
become possible to inflate everyone’s self-esteem, but it will almost certainly be impossible to 
insulate everyone against ego threats.”250 However, such uncritical pursuit of high self-esteem 
seems to be the norm, and indeed inscribed by Optimal Distinction Theory. In Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia, the problem is ostensibly resolved by retrenching the importance of nomos and 
allowing personal strife and ambition to be channelled outward. Unfortunately, this solution 
leads to the current predicament in international affairs. The order of nomos is the sine qua 
non for honour societies; without the limitations and rules inscribed there can be no 
established hierarchy based on distinction and performance.251 The key then is to reproduce 
nomos on the international stage, which is difficult because individuals entertain existential 
expectations towards their own group, not towards others. Consequently nomos is not as vital 
at the inter-group level as it is at the inter-personal one.252 More damaging, however, is the 	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fact that groups often believe that they are operating according to some accepted nomos, 
when really they are not. This simple misunderstanding can ignore the existence of an 
objective attitude, and mistake a lack of violence as acquiescence and tacit submission to an 
imposed order, or even worse, delegitimize aggression as irrational and criminal. So although 
esteem is the most complex source of threat it is equally the source most easily mired in 
misunderstanding and false assumptions. 
 
False Legitimacy in Inter-Group Relations 
 
One of the benefits of group membership is that subjects are attuned to each other. Group 
members cultivate a shared cultural repertoire of language, symbols and values.253 Groups 
cultivate these tools to ensure in-group cohesion and a sense of mortality-voiding 
permanence. However, when such symbols are used uncritically, it can lead to confusion and 
dangerous misunderstandings between groups, with direct consequences for concepts like 
esteem and hierarchy-based order. To highlight this point I want to introduce the works of 
Gustav Ichheiser, a phenomenologist and International Relations scholar, and forgotten 
influence on early Chicago School theorists, notably Hans Morgenthau in his earlier, pre-
Realist thinking found in Scientific Man versus Power Politics.254 Ichheiser was obsessed 
with the problem of misunderstandings inherent in inter-group relations and how groups and 
nations interpret “social facts.” In his book, Appearances and Reality, Ichheiser argues that 
nations suffer from illusions in that they believe other groups and nations share their 
interpretation of social reality. He explains: 
 
“We can, of course, communicate adequately only with those people whose 
symbols, that is, whose “language,” in the broadest meaning of this term, we 
understand (…) This state of affairs is aggravated by the fact that, in order to 
overcome their perplexity, people who are confronted by disagreements arising 
from misunderstandings tend to develop certain forms of pseudo-understanding in 
order to maintain the belief that it is the others and not they themselves who are 
responsible for all those disagreements, irritations, and disappointments.”255  
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Ichheiser distinguishes between conscious and unconscious nationalism. The conscious 
nationalist fights for his country, his values and his justice; he is clear about the supremacy of 
his culture and disavows those opposed. The unconscious nationalist, however, “remains 
completely blinded to the fact that the way he defines these ideas and ideals is determined by 
his unconscious nationalistic frame of reference.”256 Consequently, the unconscious 
nationalist believes he fights for “humanity”, “justice” or the “good”, unable to understand 
that he operates an inherent bias and that those opposed to his quest, oppose not those very 
concepts, but the way they are misconstrued in accordance with the in-group bias.  
 
From the point of esteem and ethnographic distinction, Ichheiser’s arguments are extremely 
relevant. Superiority and distinction based on comparison are social facts; consequently the 
frame of reference necessary for such comparison must be warped. Scholars working within 
the sociological tradition in International Relations have taken up the issue of false 
legitimacy. Mervyn Davies in her genealogical exploration of Western racism describes how 
confrontations between the West and the rest of the world were predicated on “loaded” 
comparisons, which enabled the West to support their inherent and ethnographic sense of 
superiority against those who were inherently different. Davies explains: 
 
“It was self-identity that generated the essential points of comparison, the points 
at which variety becomes something other, not us. The very techniques of 
comparison, as they have been used by Western scholars since Columbus, are a 
process of translation, with all the potential of distortion that this includes (…) the 
beliefs and manners of Other people become comprehensible when read off 
against the practices of the describing civilization, the very civilization that does 
not share them.”257  
 
In a similar vein, Erik Ringmar argues that the West, historically, kept a trademark on what it 
meant to be civilized and developed.258 Non-Western states were forced to develop according 
to Western lines and adopt Western positions, especially in regard to governance and trade. 
Imposing Western ideals of progress readily introduced the notion of superiority and a 
mandate to control and chastise; non-Western countries were absorbed into the Western in-	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group because it guaranteed that they were in a position of much lower standing. This practice 
masked a deeper unwillingness to recognize non-Western people as equal and afford them the 
moral regard to which they sooner or later felt entitled. According to the humiliation scholar 
Evelyn Linder the same practice is still in existence; she argues that the West’s double 
standard in regard to Human Rights and arms proliferation has infuriated non-Western 
countries, leading to a rejection of these very norms.259 Fanon’s point on the need for extreme 
violence to overturn not only the physical oppression but also the underlining normative one 
explicates the issue. 
 
This urgent intervention in the legitimacy of hierarchies, based on uncritically accepted 
notions of superiority, remains heavily understudied. G. John Ikenberry’s After Victory: 
Institutions, Strategic Restrains, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars is the classic 
account of Liberal hegemony and makes the same implicit assumption about hegemonic 
legitimacy. Ikenberry argues that if hegemonies restrain their military power, they are entitled 
to preferential treatment. He explains the success of post war order through the implicit 
contract between the US and her “allies”, exchanging protection for economic benefits in a 
bottom-line mutually beneficial arrangement. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, published 
in May of 2014, Ikenberry has reiterated his point and argues that not even China, Iran or 
Russia are willing to overturn the current global order, because they remain too heavily 
invested in its profitable arrangement. Current turmoil in the South China Sea, Ukraine and 
the Levant are to be dismissed as noise.260  
 
Against Ikenberry’s arguments, Ichheiser answers, “it is factual as well as moral illusion to 
exaggerate the evil of using one particular type of power, namely, military force, in 
international relations as compared with the evil of using other, nonviolent types of power, 
such as political, economic, or psychological means of pressure.”261 Ikenberry forgets that 
coercion not only arises from the use of force, but other implicit and non-violent sources as 
well, which can all compromise a group’s demand for esteem and integrity, and a desire to be 
free from meddling and coercion. Oden Löwenheim and his take on Persistent Agents of 
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Transnational Harm (PATH) further challenge the illusion in Ikenberry’s formulation.262 
Löwenheim writes: 
 
“Realists contend that hegemonic power bestows preferential rights on its bearers, 
but they also acknowledge this power is bound to be contested and envied by 
other aspiring states. Thus, despite the physical security of their superior power 
and status, hegemonies may fear losing their special status and thus develop a 
mistrustful worldview and a strong emotional insecurity.” 263  
 
If the Realist formulation were true and accepted by all sides, envy and resentment should not 
occur, and yet they do. Löwenheim distinguishes between two types of PATHs that challenge 
hegemonic power based on implicit coercion; he calls these two types parasites and 
predators.  
 
Parasites offer security predicaments to Great Powers. They seek to obtain some denied rights 
through socially un-sanctioned channels, which make them criminal. However, they do not 
seek to overthrow the overall order. In other words their violence is motivated by denied 
recognition rather than hegemonic ambition. Once they gain their denied rights the violence 
ceases. Predators, on the other hand, offer authority predicaments. They reject the entire 
order. Like Parasites they ignore sanctioned channels of resistance and protest, but they 
become more than simple criminals, because, unlike Parasites, they also defy the legitimacy 
of the Great Power’s position. Predators actively undermine and challenge the Great Power’s 
position. According to Ikenberry then, China, Iran and Russia are parasites that attempt to 
gain some leverage or fulfil some irredentist ambitions without undermining the entire 
system.264  
 
Löwenheim’s distinctions are indeed important and helpful, but fail to explain how 
hegemonies decide whether a threat constitutes a parasitic or predatory one. Whereas Great 
Powers often punish, humiliate and shame Parasites, the punishment for predators, writes 	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Löwenheim “goes beyond the preventive/incapacitating/deterring considerations: it also 
provides a theatrical setting in which authority roles are acted out (…) it projects spectacular 
images of authority, deviance, and cost for deviance.”265 9/11 was clearly acknowledged as a 
predatory attack; not only did the terrorists defy the United States’ military supremacy but 
also launched an attack aimed right at the heart of the American Heimat. However, other 
instances are less clear and could theoretically be interpreted either way. The stubborn 
resistance of the Benghazi trope is a case in point.266 While the White House frames the issue 
as a parasitic attack, a mixture of grievances brought to boiling point by a video tape, the 
opposition remains convinced that the Benghazi attack was predatory in nature and that the 
White House made a strategic mistake by refusing to “provide a theatrical setting in which 
authority roles are acted out.” 
 
Löwenheim brings the problem of perception back to some inherent hegemonic bias; the 
hegemony decides whether an attack is predatory in nature or parasitic but without actually 
referring to the PATHS’ own motivations or intentions. Ichheiser’s own explanation is more 
encapsulating and levels the playing field by shifting the focus away from the hegemony:   
 
“It is utterly naïve to assume that what we (whoever “we” are) define as 
aggression will be always considered likewise as aggression by those who, 
according to our definition, are committing it. Very often, from their point of view 
their action does not constitute any act of aggression but let us say self-defence or 
revolt.”267  
 
There is undoubtedly a tragic component present, in that inter-group aggression suffers from 
an inherent translation problem. While Löwenheim argues that hegemonies or Great Powers 
become inherently jealous of their security and status, and punish those who challenge them, 
the specific act of defiance is not per se constitutive of a relative or absolute challenge; the 
hegemony decides arbitrarily whether to make a spectacle of the offender or not. This makes 
Ichheiser’s point much more urgent. Predators and parasites share the same motivation and 
operate with the same legitimacy and righteousness as the hegemony; there is no distinction in 
motivation between predators, parasites or even hegemony. Returning to Optimal Distinction 	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Theory, groups share universal aspirations; violence and aggression respond to a denial of 
these aspirations. Ichheiser writes presciently, “wars, as a rule, do not result from certain 
people “wanting war,” but from different people, who are in conflict with each other, wanting 
different kinds of peace which are incompatible.”268 It is certainly useful to understand how 
order can be challenged, and Löwenheim’s theory is instructive; however, in the end the 
distinction between parasites and predators is arbitrary and informed solely by the 
hegemony’s social reality. Whether the hegemony decides to label the violent aggressor as 
predator or parasite depends on her own reading of the social facts. The willingness to 
accommodate and even excuse violence is in itself a function of the uncompromising desire 
for esteem and distinction, which allows groups to delegitimize and downplay the serious 
concerns and grievances of others – like in the plays of Ancient Greece where nomos-voiding 
behaviour instantly leads to uncivilized bestiality and pollution. 
 
Out-group derogation in Inter-group Violence 
 
Predators and Parasites are clearly defamatory labels that portray groups as illegitimate 
vermin or uncompromising attackers; these labels are designed to delegitimize a group’s 
cause. From the viewpoint of the victim group, their basic sense of entitlement towards 
integrity and esteem automatically means that the attacker, violating these fundamental 
aspirations, must hold the group in moral disregard. There has been considerable research 
done on the labels found in inter-group violence, and scholars differ on the reasoning and 
importance of these labels. Bar-Tal finds that in prolonged conflict warring sides foster 
delegitimizing beliefs towards each other, in that they undermine and reject claims of 
mistreatment and injustice and righteous calls for redress.269 Leyens finds that groups infra-
humanize or dehumanize each other, using labels like sub-human, animal, uncivilized or 
parasites, in order to sanction and legitimize behaviour and treatment that cannot be morally 
justified in regard to human beings.270 In a similar vein, Bandura coined the term “moral 
disengagement” to describe how terrorists shield themselves from any information about their 
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targets before committing acts of extreme violence.271 The consensus is that extreme violence 
goes hand in hand with practices of moral derogation and exclusion. These practices describe 
precisely the inner workings of the objective attitude. 
 
The implicit assumption in these findings, however, is that acts of violence are a priori unjust 
and wrong. These moral valuations, enabling extreme violence and aggression, are understood 
as psychological practices necessary to exonerate subjects, who are indoctrinated into 
committing acts of aggression against others. Giner-Sorrola and Leidner refer to this practice 
as morality shifting and write, “along with de-sensitization and habituation, morality shifting 
may be an important mechanism to indoctrinate those who are to commit violence against 
out-group members.”272 This assessment finds support in battlefield psychology, where 
soldiers often begin harbouring fellow feelings towards their fellow (enemy) soldiers, or 
indeed find it impossible to fire a gun at other soldiers.273 However, such assessment imports 
an unwarranted moral vantage point into the equation. This is not to say that the phenomenon 
described is not real and urgent, but that there is a fine line between exonerating practices and 
self-generated moral imperatives. When groups generate an objective attitude towards an 
offender, they do not require exoneration to justify reactive violence; such violence comes in 
response to a severe injustice and mistreatment, like in the case of Fanon. Consequently, this 
unwarranted moral viewpoint, stressing the aspect of exoneration, must occur either from 
viewing any act of aggression as inherently unnatural, which is a point stressed in some of the 
literature;274 or rather from decontextualizing acts of aggression, i.e. viewing them as 
insulated events without causal precedent.  
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In Chapter 2, I argued that the objective attitude arose from mistreatment that undermined the 
victim’s sense of moral worth and equality; the action tendency responded to this moral 
disregard by in turn exacting punishment that no longer corresponded to moral restraint or 
compassion found to operate in the moral attitude. Rage is therefore a unique emotion 
because it is inseparable from moral exclusion. While the moral attitude emotions 
communicate a normative wrong, rage communicates a moral and existential disregard. This 
was most clearly evidenced in Fanon’s emancipatory violence. Consequently, the moral issue, 
which informs much of the social psychologists’ research, can be resolved by an emotional 
reading of violence. When we feel anger, we also feel that we should not give in to our 
punitive desires, because it would be wrong. In righteous rage however, we feel absolute 
certainty in our belief that the reaction is just and necessary. 
 
The point is that rage operates a mandate of total moral exclusion, mirrored in the very act of 
the experienced mistreatment and injustice. The implicit moral exclusion, also found in the 
various practices described by the social psychologists, is not built around the need to avoid 
the moral reality of the wrongdoing, because the moral compass has shifted in response to the 
injustice. The raging group is entirely committed to the righteousness of her reaction, because 
the emotional appraisal is predicated on the belief that the aggressor desires to wipe out or 
severely damage the group in question. In fighting for group survival and existence, all 
actions become morally right and necessary, because the group bases her sense of right and 
wrong on her moral right to exist and flourish and honour the existential demands of her 
members. 
 
The connection between emotions and moral judgement is increasingly seen as robust.275 
According to Jonathan Haidt and Social Intuitionist Theory, moral beliefs “come from 
sentiments which give us an immediate feeling of right and wrong.”276 Haidt further explains 
that “moral judgements are therefore defined as evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or 
character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a 
culture or subculture.” These signals reach our brain so quickly, argues Haidt, that we are 
aware of whether we like something even before we know what it is. This leads to the 	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conclusion of an “affective primacy” embedded in all moral judgements; “the brain has a kind 
of gauge (sometimes called a “like-ometer”) that is constantly moving back and forth, and 
these movements, these quick judgements, influence whatever comes next.”277 
 
In other words, once we feel rage and a desire to brutally punish an offender, we already 
make an implicit moral judgement about our conduct and the target’s conduct.278 We operate 
under the sentiment that what we are doing is just and necessary. This is precisely the 
problem portrayed in the cult of the Erinyes; once rage and revenge are introduced into 
communal life, the supporting moral certainty is absolute and overrules any concern for social 
order. The ensuing Nomos of Revenge is as legitimate as any other nomos. Linda J. Skitka, 
who has coined the term “moral mandates” and describes moral certainty in violence but 
without recourse to notions of exoneration, makes the same point: “People at times judge 
moral and immoral, right and wrong, on the basis of deeply visceral and intuitive, rather than 
deliberate, cognitive processes that they support with post hoc rather than a priori 
reasoning.”279 It follows, however, that such emotional appraisal, like any other emotion, 
must respond to some preceding trigger event.280 
 
Moral exoneration and moral indoctrination play an important role in violence, but the 
existence of righteous rage as a response to legitimate mistreatment and injustice is equally 
valid and instructive in explaining moral judgements enabling violence. This point is nowhere 
made clearer than in Nietzsche’s treatment of morality, which will be covered at length in the 
remaining chapters. Nietzsche explains the existence of moral certainty without recourse to 
violence, severely undermining the position that moral exclusion exists primarily to exonerate 
violent and aggressive behaviour. On the contrary, Nietzsche argues that a suffered 
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mistreatment and injustice provides the impetus for a change in morality and the espousal of 
moral certainty precisely because of lack of violence. 
 
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that ideas of good and evil are not imposed or 
designed to assuage guilt (at least not yet), but instead are fluid and functional and directly 
predicated on the perception of a threat to either esteem (in the example of the Priests) or 
directly to group material survival (in the example of the lambs). Because both lambs and 
priests are made to suffer deeply through the actions of the knights and birds of prey, they 
respond by immediately investing their offenders with evil properties and constructing a 
morality based on punitiveness and exclusion. In Nietzsche’s account the connection between 
threat and moral derogation is as linear as could be, and avoids conflating motivation with 
exoneration. In fact, as a reader one may even sympathize with the plight of the lambs and 
priests. 
 
Nietzsche’s point about moral convictions occurring in lieu of action raises another important 
point. By keeping moral judgements separate from emotions, as the social psychologists do, 
they make it difficult to explain the actionability behind these moral judgements. Emotions 
come equipped with clear action tendencies, and these tendencies in turn demand a moral 
judgement that the action is just and possibly life saving. Unfortunately, social psychologists 
and sociologists have laboured to uncouple moral judgements from their emotional vehicle, 
save for the efforts of Haidt, Greene and Nussbaum described above. Problematically, this has 
left moral judgements detached from actionability, and not in the Nietzschean sense, because 
he explains the lack of action through weakness and strategic incompetence. To account for 
the action element, Skitka has developed the idea that moral mandates entail a strong “action 
potential.”281 Because they are “nonnegotiable, terminal, and fundamental psychological 
truths,”282 subjects feel a sense of righteousness, possibly even duty, to pursue these 
mandates. This ad hoc amendment to moral judgement is unnecessary. Arguing for the 
traditional route of positing emotions at the root of moral judgement makes more sense, as 
emotions already come equipped with an action tendency.  
 
It appears entirely reasonable to argue that moral mandates allow groups to rationalize their 
rage into a respectable cause, even if this constitutes a displacement. But it seems more 	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cumbersome to argue that strong moral convictions lead to action. In this regard the role of 
emotion, specifically rage, seems unnecessarily sidelined, not least because rage and moral 
certainty coincide and can be described as constitutive of each other. However, in order to 
substantiate this point, close attention must be paid to the specific mandate of moral 
exclusion. Moral exclusion based on a suffered injustice looks different from moral exclusion 
predicated on exonerating impulses, as diagnosed by the social psychologists. The difference 
is important, because it raises questions about the concept of righteous rage and the notion of 
displaced aggression or illegitimate rage. There exist two primary moral mandates operating 
in extreme violence: demonization and dehumanization. The former describes the Nietzschean 
judgment of evil borne from suffering and injustice, while the latter describes a different 
moral mechanism, which indeed will be shown to align with a need for exoneration for the 
simple fact that there is no genuine injustice suffered, and that the violence cannot be justified 
in moral terms, necessitating the need to turn the target into a non-human. Nevertheless, each 
mandate has an emotional foundation; it is only dehumanization that indicates a displacement. 
 
Moral Certainty in Violence: Demonization versus Dehumanization 
 
Demonization responds to a grave injustice where the offender is deemed evil and malicious; 
he has proven his willingness to harm and morally discard the victim. This corresponds to the 
previous chapter’s description of the objective attitude as caused by a preceding mistreatment, 
and provides the moral certainty necessary to exact punishment unbound by compassion and 
moral regard. Giner-Sorrola and Leidner point out that demonization allows for punishment 
that is often disproportionate to the offense, seemingly ridiculing the very notion of justice. 
“The ideal punishment of demons knows no restrictions, either practical or moral, and in fact 
is a positive moral good.”283 This is precisely the point made by the Erinyes, who hunt those 
who have embraced their vengeance and operate a new Nomos of Revenge. The offender is 
imbued with full mental and rational capabilities and has chosen to harm the in-group; the 
intentionality is clear. Responding to such behaviour is an act of justice and born of the 
existential desire to survive. 
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Demonization creates in-group legitimacy for extreme punishment, but as Grossman stresses, 
“the enemy is still a human, and killing him is an act of justice.”284 The evocation of a label 
such as evil can often be substituted by importing historically informed labels like fascist, 
infidel or communist, which all imply that the struggle at hand is a clear-cut battle between 
good and evil, right and wrong, just and unjust. In the current conflict in Ukraine, the 
separatists believe to be fighting the “Fascist” forces of Kiev, lending legitimacy and historic 
mission to their cause.285 In a literary sense the subject is confronting a big evil, proven to be 
powerful and merciless, an archetypal spirit. Groups operating the mandate of demonization 
invariably believe themselves to be good and righteous; they believe to be operating a 
timeless and universal morality. The fact that demonization cannot exist without explicit 
mention of some preceding injustice or mistreatment as qualification suggests that there is 
indeed a recognizable justice at work. 
 
Against the properties of demonization arises the second type of mandate, referred to as either 
infra-humanization or dehumanization. According to Castano and Giner-Sorrolla, “infra-
humanization refers to the denial to individual or group of some of the characteristics that 
make us human, rendering the target less than human, if not wholly non human.”286 Labels 
such as cockroaches, rats, vermin or parasites are used to describe members of the out-group. 
This returns us to the debate on exoneration. Bandura explains, “Dehumanization fosters 
different self-exonerative patterns of thought. People seldom condemn punitive conduct – in 
fact, they create justification for it – when they are directing their aggression at persons who 
have been divested of their humanness.”287 Dehumanization occurs mainly in acts of 
terrorism and state-organized violence, such as genocides.288 
 
Dehumanization, unlike demonization, gives rise to an emotion that was already alluded to by 
Bartov and Grossman in their studies of battlefield violence. Dehumanization arises from the 
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same consideration that gives rise to guilt.289 The mandate of dehumanization exonerates 
perpetrators by tackling the guilt arising from the suppression of compassion and the moral 
attitude. These are signs that the administered treatment is considered immoral. The German 
sociologist Gisela Schwan stresses the connection between guilt and the dehumanizing 
process in her study of Germans involved in the Nazi concentration camps. Among other 
things, she chronicles the staggering levels of depression, suicide and alcoholism of Germans 
who operated these camps. Dehumanization becomes less of a mandate than a psychological 
prophylactic. One of the guards recalled: “I rarely saw them as individuals. It was always a 
huge mass. I sometimes stood on the wall and saw them in the tube. But how can I explain it – 
they were spanked, packed together, running, being driven with whips like…”290 Cattle are 
not held in the same regard as humans. “Evil” humans may be mistreated because they have 
forfeited their right to compassion and moral regard; they deserve the punishment. But this 
mandate should be enough. The reason for dehumanization is that these mistreated subjects 
are not regarded as “evil”; they have not committed a grave mistreatment or injustice, and 
they do not deserve the treatment they suffer, and so they must become non-humans to 
resolve the underlying moral dilemma. Two more accounts explicate Schwan’s findings.  
 
Bartov explains that dehumanization in warfare occurs because soldiers are suppressing 
fellow feelings for their enemy, “if the foreign enemy had become one’s comrade in suffering, 
if the glorious war for which one had sacrificed so much had been in vain, and if patriotism 
had been whipped up by a lying propaganda machine run by gutless intellectuals safely 
closeted n the rear, then how was one to make sense of it all.”291 The tension is resolved by 
suppressing the human qualities of the enemy. Consequently, acts of extreme violence and 
merciless killing evoke the spectre of dehumanization precisely because they cannot be 
justified. The need to treat the victim like cattle illustrates that the moral mandate can only 
support justifiable violence; once demonization no longer applies, the violence is mandated 
by dehumanization, which, along with the sensation of guilt, indicates a lack of moral 
certainty. In other words, there appears to be a self-regulating mechanism in rage to 
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distinguish between righteous moral acts of violence and wrongful immoral ones, without the 
need to refer back to some objective external standard. 
 
The Auschwitz survivor and philosopher Primo Levi explores the notion of “senseless 
violence” and offers invaluable and costly insight into the psychological underpinnings in 
dehumanization. Levi already understood the connection between guilt and the need for 
dehumanization. “Before dying the victim must be degraded, so that the murderer will be less 
burdened by guilt. This is an explanation not devoid of logic but which shouts to heaven: it is 
the sole usefulness of useless violence,”292 he writes. Levi’s harrowing descriptions of life in 
the concentration camps portrayed a daily struggle to resist German acts of dehumanization. 
Fundamental things like clothes or even a spoon became weapons to oppose German acts of 
dehumanization. They were recognizable tokens of civility and humanness, which conflicted 
with the underlying psychological need to see the inmates as animals and non-human. 
 
Wieviorka, building on Levi’s insight, explains that dehumanized out-groups become anti-
subjects. Out-groups “must be treated inhumanely in order to make the violence acceptable 
(…) Cruelty makes it possible to see oneself as part of humanity by making the other non or 
anti human - violence only works when the aggressor makes the victim up to be from a 
different species.”293 Senseless violence and cruelty predicated on dehumanization mutes the 
growing sensation of guilt and immorality by turning the out-group into non-humans. These 
qualifications would be unnecessary if the in-group truly felt herself mistreated or threatened. 
Dehumanization must therefore be argued to compensate for a lack of moral certainty and the 
failure to articulate a clear and present danger emanating from the target. 
 
At first glance, it would appear inconsequential whether extreme violence is exacted against 
animals or “fascists”. The end result is often the same: prolonged bloodshed, warfare and 
death. However, there is a difference, and it relays back to moral certainty necessary for 
violence and aggression. If the international community intervene to end violence, which they 
invariably do, the existence of demonization suggests a scenario where the group has actually 
suffered a real injustice and that this injustice has not been addressed. This desire for justice, 
kept alive by the memory of the mistreatment, will bleed into the present and stain all further 
conduct. However, in the case of dehumanization, the scenario is markedly different and the 	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group is indeed creating exonerating patterns of psychological shielding, because there is no 
injustice that can support the rage necessary to induce moral certainty. Demonization, as a 
moral mandate, is the stuff of righteous rage and the domain of the Erinyes. Dehumanization, 
on the other hand, no longer relates to this basic mechanism. 
 
The occurrence of guilt suggests that the mechanism is broken. Because the objective attitude, 
as explained in Chapter 2, is predicated on a sense of threat and grave mistreatment, the 
emergence of guilt and uncertainty strongly suggests that even from the standpoint of the in-
group the threat is inflated or simply false. Assuming this is correct, it is possible to carefully 
dislodge dehumanization from the other moral mandate and argue that the excesses are not 
predicated on a justifiable sense of threat but indeed form some gross act of unqualified 
mistreatment. This is not to suggest that violence predicated on demonization is permissible, 
only that intervention might led to an antagonism encased in group identity; a type of arrested 
development and permanent demonization that can easily give rise to so-called schemas of 
hatred.294  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter introduced rage into inter-group dynamics. The emotional processes described in 
Chapter 2 were elevated to group level by ensuring that individuals perceived a joint 
emotional trigger. The fact that individuals join groups for the basic psychological drives of 
belonging and esteem, as outlined in Brewer’s Optimal Distinction Theory, means that 
existential threats can be jointly experienced through events that threaten the existence of the 
group. Following this insight, threats were elaborated and analysed; of these threats the 
concept of esteem was the most interesting because it relied on inter-group comparison and 
order, which were shown to suffer from strong unconscious biases and even illusions, 
according to the International Relations scholar Gustav Ichheiser. Groups still tend to justify 
their status through implicit coercion, which only feeds the rage of those groups denied their 
claims to territorial and ideational freedom and self-expression. In turn, groups that revolt are 
immediately seen as evil and not playing by the rules, necessitating harsh and 
uncompromising punishment, and dramatically widening the moral chasm between groups. 
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Mirroring the practices found in the plays of Ancient Greece, once threatened, groups engage 
in out-group derogation and labelling intended to delegitimize the offender’s cause and 
possibly even right to existence. In the plays of Ancient Greece criminals and offenders take 
on bestial forms after they begin undermining the social order of nomos, on which the social 
identity of citizenship depends. However, social psychologists engaged in this field of study 
ignore that such labels can be produced naturally through an emotional appraisal that 
responds to grave acts of mistreatment and moral disregard. Instead, they opt to portray such 
labels as necessary psychological mechanisms to sustain in-group righteousness and cultivate 
“exonerating patterns”. However, following the scholarship engaged in the nexus on emotion 
and moral judgements, it is evident that emotions and moral judgements are mutually 
constitutive. This questions the overall idea, implicit in the works of the social psychologists, 
that groups somehow need to be tricked or indoctrinated into violence. Negative Emotions, 
especially rage, create natural action tendency to punish those who have harmed us. The 
moral certainty is, as it was in Ancient Greece, implicit. 
 
The final segment of the chapter probed deeply into the inner workings of two primary moral 
mandates utilized in violence. Demonization and dehumanization, which are usually 
combined, largely uncritically, were shown to operate very different scenarios. While 
demonization aligns with the idea of the Nietzschean punitive morality, and remains in tune 
with the concept of righteous rage explained in the last chapter, dehumanization is shown to 
operate when natural compassion and moral concerns are pushing back. In righteous rage, the 
emotion inoculates and indeed compels groups to punish; dehumanization however attempts 
to strangle the guilt by making the target out to be part of a different species and void of any 
human concern. Dehumanization is found to operate especially in genocidal processes, where 
targets are systematically killed off without any motivation or urgency arising from a suffered 
act of injustice or mistreatment. The idea that inter-group and intra-group violence must be 
stopped, and that third-party interventions can always be justified on some humanitarian 
grounds, can now carefully be supplemented by the fact that groups engaged in 
dehumanization register moral uncertainty; an uncertainty that should not exist if the violence 
is in response to a genuine injustice or mistreatment.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Justice in Revenge 
 
 
Groups that feel threatened or mistreated desire to punish those held responsible.295 In 
Chapter 2, I distinguished between two emotional modalities, the objective attitude and the 
moral attitude. Within these modalities, I distinguished further between action-based 
emotions and non-action-based emotions. Anger operates within the moral attitude, in that 
overarching moral concerns and a willingness to repair and maintain social bonds with the 
offender modulate the extent and severity of punishment. The objective attitude counterpart to 
anger is rage. In the case of rage, the moral worth of the offender is discarded and punishment 
follows a frame of reference that instrumentalizes the offender and ignores the extent of 
suffering. The same distinction that works in the differentiation between rage and anger, 
applies equally to the administration of punishment in the name of justice. Moral attitude 
punishment is described as retribution, while the objective attitude counterpart is described as 
revenge. Both types of punishment stem from the same concern for justice, but of course 
because the injustice suffered differs, the punishment follows different rationales. 
 
Today, the idea that violence and even warfare is framed as a response to a wrongdoing or an 
injustice is increasingly regarded as fact.296 However, few scholars openly refer to such 
violence as revenge; revenge and justice, according to every literary tradition, are in fact 
synonymous. The language used to describe acts of violence is crouched in legal and 
humanitarian terms that provide a façade of control, limitation, and procedure. The ongoing 
debate on what constitutes a supreme emergency and how to reckon with the countless acts of 
unsanctioned immoral acts of violence pushes the question of motivation to the forefront. 
Why do groups continue to act “immorally”, especially if there is no sense of imminent 
danger? The Dresden Bombing or the dropping of the nuclear bombs all occurred after the 
war had been decided. These acts are deemed immoral according to Just War theory because 
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they breach established rules of conduct permissible in war.297 There was little strategic 
advantage in committing these acts. The need for condemnation is understood; however, it 
would be far more interesting to understand why such acts happen in the first place, especially 
if the concern is to ensure they are not repeated. In order for this to happen, such acts need to 
be presumed as moral and just from the view of the perpetrator, if only to ensure that the 
perpetrator is regarded as possessing full mental and rational capabilities, rather than being 
deemed evil, possessed or irrational. The next step is to understand the inner workings of this 
morality. Approaching violence through the prism of some established moral compass and 
condemning the excesses, I posit, is less analytically sound than establishing the subjective 
morality and then viewing the “excesses” as internally consistent. The former method, 
moreover, would likely attribute a false morality to the perpetrator’s motivation, especially 
when there is no discernible act of excess. The key to understanding revenge hinges on 
whether the subject harbours any moral regard for the target. Acts of revenge can often be 
inconspicuous or, following the next chapter on Ressentiment, entirely manifest in subjective 
valuations and cultural fantasy. 
 
The concept of revenge is gaining increasing prominence in International Relations. Heimann 
and Löwenheim, in an essay published in 2008, write, 
 
“it is not easy to rule out the role of revenge in several notable cases of 
international wars and conflicts during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—
World War II, the Balkans conflict, the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the 1973 
October/Yom Kippur War, the 1980– 88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1998 Eritrean-
Ethiopian War, and the 2003 Iraq War.”298  
 
The political scientist Robert E. Harkavy agrees that revenge is an extremely relevant and 
understudied theme in International Relations; Harkavy offers a set of causes for revenge and 
argues that it responds to a narcissistic injury. Harkavy bases much of his analysis on out-
dated psychological research, mainly Heinz Kohut’s study on narcissistic rage, published in 
the early 1970’s.299 Ned Lebow’s Cultural Theory understands revenge as a response to an 	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insult and the violation of a nation’s sense of standing and esteem.300 The Sociologist Thomas 
Scheff, in his study Bloody Revenge, uses the concept of revenge to describe the quick 
succession of increasingly devastating wars witnessed in the first half of the 20th century. 
According to Scheff, European powers suffered from emotional alienation and a loss of 
attunement from 1870 onwards.301 European powers and their elite decision-makers regarded 
each other as moral enemies and gained enjoyment from exacting punishment unbound by 
any regard for the entitlements and needs of others.302  
 
However, there exists considerable confusion about the exact nature of revenge, and for this 
purpose I want to briefly run through some basic misunderstandings. The first 
misunderstanding concerns the notion of reciprocity. Scholars refer to revenge as a type of 
“negative reciprocity.”303 Unfortunately, the term negative reciprocity can also describe 
“retribution”, “retaliation” and even “deterrence”, relevant concepts in International Relations 
that need to be contrasted and distinguished from revenge. The key to understanding revenge 
begins with the distinctions made in Chapter 2 between moral attitudes and objective 
attitudes; revenge operates within objective attitude and capitalizes on the rage of the victim. 
Because the preceding injustice undermines the moral worth of the victim, the revenge is 
unbound by communal restraint. In Euripides’ Hecuba, Agamemnon lectured Hecuba, before 
her act of revenge against Polymester, that only strangers, i.e. people unbound by nomos, 
commit acts of revenge. Consequently, the concept of revenge must grapple with the loss of 
recognition of moral equality. Reciprocity suggests that there is some balance to be regained 
between parties. Revenge, however, only entrenches the objective attitude and leads to cycles, 
seriously questioning whether parties can ever regain a sense of mutual moral regard; this is 
the exact reason why vengeful individuals were banished from the polis in Ancient Greece, 
and why revenge remains such a taboo today. The second misunderstanding concerns the 
notion of satisfaction. 
 
Heimann and Löwenheim specifically argue that revenge is primarily informed by the 
emotional satisfaction at seeing others suffer.304 Borrowing a phrase from Nietzsche, they 	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write, “the emotional suffering of the target is for the revenger a ‘true feast’”.305 In a series of 
experiments, neuroscientists have indeed discovered that administering punishment activates 
the reward centre of the brain. De Quervain et al. also find that the closer the subject feels to 
the crime, the greater the reward gained by administering punishment.306 However, these 
findings do not establish such a reward sensation as predicated on a feeling of revenge, but 
rather on a feeling of administered justice. In other words, any type of punishment, following 
a mistreatment or mistake, no matter how severe, leads to a reward sensation. These findings 
consequently problematize the attempt to single out revenge as constituted by emotional 
satisfaction alone. Such an interpretation cannot offer sufficient distinction from other types 
of negative reciprocity. Punishment of any sort, even administered within communal sanction, 
can lead to an emotional reward. The key issue in revenge is not satisfaction – any type of 
punishment satisfies - but the fact the punishment leads to excessive and undue suffering. 
Punishments administered by the community towards a member are limited by the 
underlining desire to keep the community healthy and to regard each member as a moral 
equal. Revenge operates differently, and corresponds to Strawson’s objective attitude, in that 
the offender is held in no moral regard and thus punishment suffers from no communal 
restraint and operates an exclusive sense of justice. The question of revenge is not why is 
there such satisfaction from punishment but rather why is there such suffering from 
punishment. The enjoyment or reward variable is independent, and occurs in all 
administration of justice. 
 
The third issue is concerned with the idea that revenge somehow serves some forward-
looking strategy. There is still a propensity to rationalize revenge and bring it under the aegis 
of measure and strategy. Löwenheim and Heimann write, “One could argue that revenge 
nonetheless serves a forward-looking and utilitarian goal of creating a reputation for brutality 
and toughness that will dissuade the original harm-doer or other actors from inflicting further 
injuries on the revenger.”307 This is incorrect and falsifies the motivation and outlook in 
revenge. The key characteristic in revenge – and this will be thoroughly explained in this 
chapter – is its past-orientation. Consequently, the point I wish to stress takes on an existential 
mantel: revenge is not only preoccupied with an injustice, but with the past as a whole. It does 
not allow the subject to move on – arguably even if they exact punishment. This throws up 
important questions about the durability of the objective attitude and whether groups that 	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commit grave injustices can even be readmitted into the moral attitude. This point is 
implicitly made in the Greek tragedies, because subjects that act against nomos are deemed 
polluted and exiled; they cannot be readmitted into society. The same point is made in more 
modern revenge dramas, where revenge plots always end in someone’s demise.308 
 
Along with this past-orientation, revenge must be described as suffering from a type of moral 
parallax. Following the discussion in Chapter 3 on moral mandates, revenge can be said to co-
opt concepts like “justice”, “fairness” or “universal” and biases them in accordance with 
Ichheiser’s notions of unconscious nationalism. The desire to punish can lead to insular and 
private notions of justice in accordance with in-group values and symbols. The frame of 
reference for punishment is fiercely subjective and exclusive, so treatments that might appear 
necessary and just are viewed as excessive and brutal from the vantage point of an outsider, 
including the target. In revenge, the moral coordinates of the in-group are dislodged from the 
communal norm. This leads to two problems, which have resonated throughout time. The first 
is the problem of cycles already lamented at the time of the Greek playwrights. Because each 
act of revenge leads to excess, the revenge act in itself provides the foundation for yet another 
act of counter-revenge. The objective attitude leads to a spiralling of ever more creative 
violence. 
 
This then leads to the second problem; goal satisfaction no longer follows some long-term 
strategic rationale but in fact boils down to seeing the other suffer and be humiliated. Once 
rage is introduced into inter-group dynamics, judgements are skewered towards exacting 
punishment. Löwenheim and Heimann stress how nations discount material costs in their 
pursuit of revenge.309 In line with this, Paul Saurette argues that the West and Terrorist 
Groups are locked in “a deadly serious duel of humiliation and counter-humiliation.”310 
Saurette frames events like the Abu Ghraib torture incidents not as blunders and missteps but 
as motivated actions designed to humiliate the other side. Saurette argues that long-term 
strategic imperatives in the region, such as stability and good relations, are less important than 
enacting counter-humiliation. Revenge introduces a strategic short sightedness by ignoring 
the fact that emotional satisfaction through instrumentalization carries heavy long-term 
consequences, not least because it makes counter-revenge extremely likely and entrenches the 	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objective attitude. In many ways once revenge becomes desirable, the suffered injustice gains 
paramount importance in the self-narrative of the group. 
 
This chapter will begin by aligning revenge with a notion of justice that may be private and 
exclusive but which still functions like any other type of justice. Second, this chapter will 
explain how exactly revenge differs from its moral attitude counterpart, retribution, and how 
this means that revenge harbours an entirely different moral regard towards the victim. Third, 
the objective of revenge will be analysed to understand exactly what it is the avenger seeks 
from her act. Fourth, the experience of revenge will be questioned along the lines of the 
Nietzschean intervention on the temporal nature of a perceived injustice, introducing key 
ideas on existentialist philosophy into the debate. Lastly, I will continue my analysis of the 
two moral mandates from Chapter 3, and align them with respective revenge strategies. 
 
Justifying Revenge or Avenging Justice 
 
The desire for revenge is the desire for justice. Robert C. Solomon calls vengeance the 
“original passion for justice.”311 The dreaded Erinyes and their calls for vengeance, according 
to Cioran, predated the justice of Zeus, and necessitated a political order built around the need 
to vanquish these ancient demons.312 Following the discussion in Chapter 2 on the embedded 
appraisal of moral entitlement, the knowledge of justice demands the felt cognition that one 
lacks it. Engaging in violence is about setting things right. In the Old Testament, as well as in 
Greek tragedies, justice virtually always refers to the idea of ‘getting even’, rather than 
seeking the equitable distribution of goods and service. Seeing that the emotional cognition of 
injustice is borne from the feeling that one deserves to be treated in accordance with one’s 
sense of just entitlement, there is little point in arguing that revenge and a feeling of obtained 
justice are different; the level of felt mistreatment precisely determines the correct action 
tendency and level of punishment. From an outside view the revenge act might appear 
excessive, but equally from an outside view the suffered injustice is not experienced and thus 
neither is the emotional register. Hecuba and Achilles executed acts of personal justice, but 
these acts were referred to as revenge because they portrayed a misalignment to communal 
justice and the order of nomos. Revenge, in other words, is a discouraged form of justice 
because it undermines community and shared ideals. But a justice it is, nonetheless. 	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In Individuals, the desire for revenge originates in the feeling of being mistreated to such an 
extent that the possibility of social identity becomes threatened and the feeling of moral worth 
is undermined. The French-German philosopher Jean Amery writes how he lost faith in a just 
and moral world, when an SS officer slapped him in the face solely for being Jewish.313 
Bloom explains, “in the mind of the vengeful person who believes he or she has been abused, 
disrespected, or treated unfairly, the world is unjust and the punishment he or she receives is, 
therefore, undeserved.”314 This is why punishment sought in revenge is always just; it reacts 
to an undeserved mistreatment. In other words, the target has earned the right to be punished 
and is demonized. But at the same time, the ensuing sense of justice is unrecognizable to all 
those who have not suffered this mistreatment. 
 
The cult of the Erinyes warns against the boycott of nomos because the result is dike, a type of 
natural justice where man-made customs are ignored. Against this, Euripides explores the 
inner workings and motivations of the topic and finds that revenge is predicated on a rejection 
of life and important social rules and follows an unmitigated and highly personal impulse for 
justice, but only once communal forms of justice are shown to be inept.315 In Euripides’ 
Hecuba, the Trojan Queen begs Agamemnon for help, and it is here that Euripides locates his 
critique; revenge is the consequence of human failure to show compassion when it is most 
needed. Tragically determined, the ensuing Nomos of Revenge is exclusive and incompatible 
with social order, paving the way for cycles of violence. The act of injustice changes the 
moral co-ordinates of right and wrong, because a suffered mistreatment is always experienced 
as morally wrong, and addressing such mistreatment is consequently always experienced as 
morally right. If communal forms of justice fail to absorb this sensation, then private forms of 
justice must arise naturally, and such justice must necessarily oppose or at least undermine the 
communal order that fails to condemn the injustice. 
 
It is part of human nature to oppose acts of mistreatment and injustice and feel empathy 
towards those treated unjustly. The ability to align revenge with justice is not limited to those 
who have suffered an injustice. Critically, the same mechanism functions in those individuals 
who cultivate emotional attachments or empathy towards the victim, and thus come to view 	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the victim as member of their moral community. This is in part guaranteed by viewing the act 
of revenge as the avenger does, i.e. as a type of just response to an unwarranted act of 
aggression or disrespect. In her study of English Revenge Drama Linda Woodbridge writes: 
“Many revengers are disempowered people, unjustly treated, who step up and take control. 
Such figures suffer “malice, injustice, treachery, grief, unstable values, and deprivations of 
power or status.”316 Fascinations with popular revenge stories in film and literature like The 
Count of Monte Cristo, The Godfather or House of Cards are in part so pleasing because they 
are framed as stories about an underdog coming up and beating the odds. Revenge is not 
castigated but is seen as just and in response to unfair treatment or undue injustice. 
Woodbridge, however, asks poignantly: “But once victims turn vengeful, do they (the 
audience) forfeit sympathy, as many assert? Some do become monsters of cruelty. But even if 
audiences condemn vengefulness, they are led to recognize it as a victim’s response.“317  
 
We as the audience, whether at the movies or back in the Greek theatre, are in a perfect 
position to be judge and jury, but we still end up cheering for the underdog and hero, to whom 
we have cultivated an emotional attachment or “understanding”. Even after revenge has 
shown its ugly side, we still create excuses and align revenge with the notion of a just 
response.318 Euripides’ critique of this mechanism is relentless; even if we harbour emotional 
attachment, we must at the same time show compassion towards the evildoer. His fateful 
decision to pardon the thieves in his council to the king stresses the need to overcome this 
bias and see the motivation and suffering that exists on all sides. Concerning Euripides’ 
Trojan Women, Nussbaum writes, “A spectator who had seen Euripides’ Trojan Women, right 
at the time of the decision to kill all of the male citizens of Melos and enslave all of the 
women and children, would become less likely to support such a policy – for she would see 
the revenge from the point of view of those suffering.”319 Euripides stresses the 
compassionate element in avoiding revenge, rather than the coercive structural one stressed in 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia; a much more informed position, because it aims right at the heart of the 
problem of the objective attitude, which by definition is devoid of compassion.320 As the 
audience we experience first-hand the lure of viewing acts of revenge as just and necessary, 
especially after we have cultivated an emotional attachment to the avenger and must regard 	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the wrongdoer in the objective attitude. Overcoming such bias necessarily means siding with 
both sides and transcending any notion of justice and moral certainty, a difficult position in 
light of the odious nature of most of these acts. In the end, all this leads to the uncomfortable 
realization that our sense of justice is nothing but a dangerous and easily manipulated passion. 
 
The lack of compassion inscribed in objective attitude stresses another more urgent problem: 
the lack of shared evaluative frameworks. In revenge, the punishment is reason for counter-
punishment, which gives rise to inexorable cycles. The problem, then, is that the punishment 
sought by aggrieved victims seldom fits the crime. Stillwell, Baumeister and Del Prior find,  
 
“In numerous instances of revenge, the victim’s suffering as a result of the initial 
transgression pales by comparison to the suffering inflicted when he or she seeks 
revenge. The enactment of revenge and the calculations of equity can be severely 
compromised by the biases inherent in the interpersonal roles of the avenger (the 
initial victim who then sought revenge) and the recipient of revenge (the initial 
perpetrator and now victim).” 321  
 
The legal scholar Martha Minow writes in agreement, arguing that, “Recompense, getting 
satisfaction, matching like with like, giving what’s coming to the wrongdoer, equalizing 
crime and punishment, an eye for an eye; each of these synonyms for revenge implies the 
proportionality of the scales of justice.”322 However, the scales of justice are unhinged; they 
act like an increasingly uneven see-saw, where each turn adds more weight to the other side. 
And while revenge might be about “getting even”, there is no return to pre-injustice relations; 
each act only entrenches the moral disregard felt. Hence, the act of revenge cannot bridge the 
moral gap, which enabled the excessive punishment in the first place. Revenge, in other 
words, settles a specific debt, but this debt suffers from systemic inflation. This urgent and 
timeless problem has led to a dubious solution. 
 
Starting with the Oresteia and extending into the modern legal system, retribution is now seen 
as the correct way to address injury and injustice, as if exchanging revenge for retribution can 
somehow stimulate the moral attitude. Jacoby writes dismissively that the “advocates of 	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draconian punishment for crime invariably prefer “retribution” – a word that affords the 
comfort of euphemism although it is virtually the same.”323 There are, however, distinctions 
worth noting. Martha Minow writes, “Retribution can be explained as vengeance committed 
by someone else than the victim.“324 It is primarily a social response of the community to 
address a mistreatment and punish the offender in direct proportion to the harm inflicted. The 
victim has no say over the punishment. Woodbridge argues that a cultural distain for revenge, 
popularized in English literature during the Elizabethan age, “was an ideological move, 
promoting a state monopoly of violence.”325 As the argument goes, the subjective experience 
of harm might skewer the idea of proportionality and undermine the notion of balance, and 
lead to cycles of violence that undermine state authority, a point equally made by the 
playwrights of Ancient Greece. 
 
The role of community-based justice is to stave off the more existential damages by 
guaranteeing that the victim remains invested in the idea of a just world and the authority of 
nomos, which inherently favours the polis. The victim will be less inclined to take the law into 
her own hands. Had Agamemnon offered his help to the pleading Hecuba, Polymester might 
have enjoyed a less gruesome fate. Similarly, in the Oresteia, it was Athena who recognized 
the potential trouble that would befall Athens if the Erinyes and their desire for ‘getting even’ 
were not respected. Consequently, the tension between ‘getting even’ and ‘social order’ is 
resolved by pitting the offender not against the victim, but against the entire community, 
making the desire for “getting even” a social concern. This pre-empts the emergence of 
private justice. However, there is a difference between collective revenge and communal 
retribution. Jacoby’s comment on draconian punishment masquerading as retribution, when it 
is really communal revenge, is correct. The problem, however, arises when the community 
chastises revenge and forces the victim to censor her punitive desires by imposing 
considerations befitting a moral attitude. This is the criticism found to operate in Athena’s 
decision to use coercion and the fearful faces of the Erinyes to dissuade citizens from 
engaging in revenge. 
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Margaret Walker calls a refusal of the community to acknowledge a crime, a second-rate 
injury.326 It compounds the initial loss of faith by undermining the victim’s claim for moral 
support and denying the wrongdoing. The French philosopher Jean Amery lamented that post-
war Germany refused to give him peace by refusing to confront its Nazi past and the suffering 
it caused him, instead preferring to act as if it had not happened.327 Again, by addressing the 
suffering of the victim, the community repairs the victim’s damaged belief in an equitable 
world, which in turn may resolve one of the biases described by social psychologists. 
However, the community must then still act in support of the punitive desires of the victim, or 
else risk alienation once more. In other words, the group must channel the desire for revenge 
and uncritically adopt the stance of the injured and mistreated members.328 
 
This is the underlying critique in modern state-sponsored justice and reconciliation efforts 
collectively known as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC). Story-telling and 
collective acknowledgments of crimes are supposed to help victims regain a sense of worth 
and standing without demanding that their offender suffer. TRC practices explicitly deny 
recourse to punishment and violence.329 However, in many reported cases, victims during 
these hearings actually gain some satisfaction by seeing their abusers wrangle with their own 
conscience, undoubtedly a form of punishment in its own right.330 This suggests the existence 
of deep punitive desires, which, however, TRC forums do not sanction. Consequently, there is 
a difference between whether a community stands behind the avenger and sanctions the will 
of the avenger, and whether the community stands between avenger and target, mitigating the 
response. Muldoon has criticized TRC practices exactly on these grounds, arguing that a TRC 
qualifies what type of anger response is acceptable. 331  The Commission is tasked with the 
mandate of maintaining a moral foundation between avenger and offender, a foundation, 
however, which in all honesty and likelihood is non-existent.  
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Avengers operate a very different mandate; they need to punish the offender in response to 
the injustice they suffer.332 They address their felt injustice in all the complexity afforded by 
the experience of existential shock and moral disregard. Reducing revenge to retribution 
makes this impossible. Consequently, a denial of revenge is troublesome and should be 
regarded as cause for concern; a point that Aeschylus’s solution in the Oresteia glosses over 
by having the Erinyes use fear and coercion to rein in punitive impulses within the 
community. “From these fearful faces I see great gain for these citizens”, ruminates Athena. 
This compounds rather than resolves the problem. 
 
“A wholesale denial of vengeance as a legitimate motif may be a psychological disaster,”333 
warns Solomon. In equal measure, Seneca argues that frustration of vengeful longings ‘leaves 
a person incomplete, as if he were maimed’. Nietzsche argues that injustices can poison and 
lead to Ressentiment. And in line with this, Dostoyevsky sketches the psychology of a man 
riddled by frustrated desires for vengeance and justice in his Notes from the Underground. As 
could be expected many participants in the Truth and Reconciliation process in South Africa 
remain dissatisfied at what amounts to policies of state-ordered amnesia. Instead of forgetting 
and moving on, they want to see their offenders atone. The tension between social order, 
masquerading as communal justice, and private justice at seeing the offender suffer, is always 
decided in favour of social order. It is done so in the Oresteia, as in all the Greek plays 
dealing with pollution and blood-murder. And equally in TRC practices, justice becomes 
synonymous with peaceful transition; the desire for personal satisfaction is castigated.334 
Revenge is seen as being aligned too much with the desire for suffering and the continuation 
of violence; it stands in opposition to order. But simply ignoring this tension will not make it 
go away. If justice and revenge is the same thing, denying revenge means denying justice; by 
exchanging revenge for retribution, the denial is no less. 
 
Retribution versus Revenge 
 
Revenge is very different from its communal counterpart. The idea that retribution can answer 
the demands of revenge must be scrutinized and relayed back to the point made in Chapter 1 	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on the differing views of the motivation in revenge offered by Euripides and Aeschylus. 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia pioneered the idea of retribution taking the place of revenge; however, 
this mechanism will be shown to leave the experienced injustice unaddressed, which may be 
more damaging in the long run, not least because revenge impulses, echoing Chapter 5 on 
Ressentiment, might go underground and exist in valuation and morality only. Robert Nozick 
has explored the distinction between revenge and retribution in his Philosophical 
Explanations and has come up with four key points to distinguish revenge from retribution, 
which echo the difference between an objective attitude and moral attitude response.335  
 
Nozick’s first point is that “retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done for an 
injury or harm or slight and need not be done for a wrong.”336 One of Nozick’s critics 
maintains that the distinction between a wrong and an injury or harm can only be defended 
when the former is a legally sanctified criminal offence, while the latter is a subjectively 
perceived one, and not necessarily legally established.337 With the remaining points in mind, 
which all highlight the personal and subjective component in revenge, it is safe to assume that 
Nozick would agree with this qualification. Returning to the typology presented in Chapter 2, 
a wrong can be represented in norms and rules, and consequently the emotional reaction 
follows the moral attitude, because the victim does not feel her moral worth has been 
questioned or even discarded, but rather communicates the violation in a way that stresses the 
infraction, implicitly acknowledging that these governing norms are still valid. 
 
Nozick refers to this in his second point, “retribution sets an internal limit to the amount of 
punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally need not 
set a limit to what is inflicted.”338 One of Nozick’s critics charges that some forms of revenge 
may rightfully be condemned as grotesque, implying that limits must exist.339 However, this 
argument fails to acknowledge that the avenger no longer shares the same moral coordinates, 
let alone notion of justice. The objective attitude exists precisely because the bare minimum 
of inter-subjective regard, the mutual recognition of moral worth, has been dismissed. 
Consequently, the punishment in revenge, unlike retribution, is no longer limited by the need 
to pay moral recognition to the target. As far as the avenger is concerned the target deserves 
to be destroyed. 	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Nozick’s penultimate point is that “revenge is personal ‘this is because of what you did to my 
____ (self, father, group and so on)’340. Whereas the agent of retribution need have no special 
or personal tie to the victim of the wrong for which he exacts retribution.” This point was 
raised in the critique of communal retribution; there is something that remains unaddressed 
when the “agent of retribution” exacts punishment, because his sense of injustice and correct 
punishment can never capture the emotional depth of the actual mistreatment. Only revenge, 
exceeding the effects of retribution and thus moral regard, can ensure that the depth of the 
injury is addressed. Similarly, Hecuba exceeds retribution by not only killing Polymester’s 
children but by blinding him as well, proclaiming, ‘his debt is paid, I have my revenge’. 
Nozick’s demand for personal ties guarantees that the affront is perceived on an existential 
level, creating this deep wound; consequently, only creative revenge, not limited retribution, 
can be satisfactory to the subject.  
 
Lastly, Nozick suggests, “that revenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the 
suffering of another, while retribution need involve no emotional tone (…) the thirster for 
revenge will often want to experience (see, be present at) the situation in which the revenged 
is suffering.”341 This point is contestable. According to insights from neuroscience, there is 
always enjoyment in punishment; however, it is true that the thirster for revenge must be the 
author of the punishment in order feel satisfaction. The experience of revenge, as will be 
discussed below, demands authorship of punishment, rather than simply witnessing the 
suffering, which could be accidental and therefore unrelated to the initial crime. As the moral 
philosopher and proponent of retributive justice Jean Hampton claims, “the objective injury 
may not, to an observer’s eye, correspond to a victims subjective experience of injury,”342 and 
thus revenge is always subjectively motivated and informed. Nozick’s distinction between 
retribution and revenge makes the distinction unequivocally clear. Nussbaum’s Nomos of 
Revenge stresses this as well. Hecuba’s new song of revenge, writes Nussbaum, “will prove a 
solitary song.”343 It is now time to turn towards the content of this solitary song and 
understand what exactly it is that avengers seek from their actions. 
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Mimetic Revenge in Euripides’ Hecuba 
 
Nozick states that revenge “need not set a limit to what is inflicted” and that excessiveness 
and cruelty are the norm. Nussbaum, however, suggests that revenge not only follows a 
punitive logic of inflicting suffering, but a mimetic one as well. The punishment, in other 
words, rather than fitting the crime, must resemble it. This provides invaluable insight into the 
moral economy of revenge. In Euripides’ Hecuba, Hecuba makes the xeniatic gesture and 
kills Polymester and his children while in a hospice, returning the initial crime in kind. 
However, the betrayal of nomos cannot be returned, because Polymester never believed in 
nomos in the first place. Instead, Hecuba finds a more fitting punishment: she blinds him. 
Hecuba sees the world through nomos, while Polymester sees the world only through his 
eyes. The act of blinding corresponds to a mimetic form of reciprocity but is only accessible 
from a highly subjective or somewhat poetic point of view. And so Nussbaum argues, “the 
logic of revenge sets the world to rights, most of all by making it reveal the hidden nature of 
its former crimes.”344 The mimetic aspect is vital because it corresponds directly to the 
symbolic contextualization of the crime. Only by allowing the victim to exact her revenge can 
we fully appreciate the mimetic quality of the punishment. This allows us to understand the 
subjective impact of the initial injustice.  
 
This problematizes the established truism that “revenge purposively involves excesses.” If 
revenge is a type of justice, than there must be logic to the punishment. Polymester exclaims, 
“Hecuba destroyed me, she and the women taken prisoner – no, not “destroyed” but 
something worse.” There are those who believe that Hecuba acted excessively, but when she 
retorts: “Never will you restore the brightness of sight to your eyes, never see alive your 
children killed by this hand of mine,” there is a symbolic rationale, a poetic justice, rather 
than “purposive excess” to her actions. In reference to today’s terrorists, Jürgensmeyer writes, 
“Although it may appear as if these acts were meant to win respect of opponents, they also 
signified something else: the movements were attempting to establish themselves as their 
opponents equals (…) they were not only imitating their rivals but also showing their 
superiority in terms that they believe their rivals would understand.”345 As long as there is no 
impetus to explore the symbolic meaning of the crime, the mimetic aspect of the revenge, and 	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the idea of an underlining justice, will be lost. More importantly, the offender will mistakenly 
deem himself a victim of excess rather than a recipient of a finely tuned act of justice. There 
is no loss of irony in the fact that the 9/11 attacks targeted the financial and military symbols 
of American power - the very foundation of American influence in the Middle East. These 
acts were imbued with strong mimetic components, something only acknowledged by those 
who were already attuned to the connection between American foreign policy and regional 
grievances. Others only saw an irrational act of violence and unqualified terror. 
 
According to the social psychologists, Stillwell, Baumeister and Del Priore, it is highly likely 
that in revenge “ both parties see themselves as victims (…) they may downplay their own 
role in causing the conflict and instead see themselves as the relatively innocent party 
victimized by the malevolent other.”346 A ‘precisely calibrated revenge’, as the social 
psychologists postulate, would then depend on a ‘precisely calibrated knowledge of the 
exacted injury’ on behalf of the offender. If these two very subjective impressions fail to 
align, as they most certainly will, the impression of excessiveness is inevitable. Nussbaum’s 
point about the mimetic aspect in revenge allows us to probe into the morality of revenge and 
understand that an act of revenge first and foremost must return the sense of moral disregard 
felt in the initial injustice. This is the basic act of communication in revenge. But more 
importantly, this message can be expressed in any possible way and neede to be tit for tat. For 
instance, if a hegemony feels mistreated and attacked in its sense of esteem and entitlement 
through an of act of disrespect, mirrored in Polymester’s breach of nomos towards Hecuba, 
then the chosen response, mimetically returning this mistreatment, might take a violent form 
through extreme physical punishment, again mirrored in Hecuba’s act of blinding Polymester, 
and found in Löwenheim’s exploration of PATHs. The expression of the objective attitude 
injustice may take different forms, both in how it is experienced and how it is returned, but 
the underlying experience of moral disregard must be the same. 
 
Sanctioned Revenge 
 
There exists considerable research on so-called revenge societies found in the Mediterranean. 
These societies practice a type of sanctioned “blood revenge” that differs markedly from the 
understanding of revenge outlined above. Yet scholars maintain that these societies have 
somehow institutionalized revenge and made it socially acceptable, even desirable. Most 	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notable among these scholars is Jon Elster, who has explored this issue in Norms of Revenge. 
Elster defines revenge as “the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering 
upon those who made one suffer, because they have one suffer.”347 Elster deduces from this 
that, because revenge is done “at some cost or risk to oneself,” it must yield no benefits and 
must be described as irrational. However, he then goes on to conclude that revenge is 
undertaken for a “deep-rooted urge to show oneself to be superior to others”348 and to assert 
one’s honour. Obviously, this is a benefit in itself, which outweighs the costs of revenge. 
However, Elster stresses the fact that “actual revenge would occur only if someone acted 
irrationally.”349 The establishment of socially sanctioned ‘norms of revenge’ makes it 
doubtful whether any act of revenge, governed by these norms, can be described as irrational. 
A subject, consciously adhering to social norms, should be judged as acting rationally, 
because he aims for social approval or honour. A large section of Elster’s exploration is 
dedicated to the case studies of feuds, where he makes exactly the same argument, suggesting 
that acts of revenge are demanded by social codes and that failure leads to a loss of honour 
and social chastisement.350 In other words, these acts of so-called revenge are expected. 
 
Punitive acts that are regulated by social norm, expected by peer and foe alike and done for an 
advancement of one’s honour, do not correspond to the idea of revenge found in the analysis 
of Euripides’ Hecuba or mirrored in Nozick’s philosophical reflections. Elster’s notion of 
revenge rather corresponds to what Frank Steward terms reflexive honour.351 Here a subject is 
intentionally insulted and expected to retaliate in order to prove his honour. However, the 
subject is not expected to retaliate in an excessive manner, but simply to offer a token 
response as proof of good character. This already postulates a moral attitude and sets limits 
on the mimetic potential. A similar dynamic is described in Nisbett and Cohen’s Culture of 
Honour. In their analysis of Mediterranean herding communities, they describe a mechanism, 
where an older member of the herding community intentionally insults a new shepherd. These 
insults “may occur,” they write, “in a coffee shop, the village square, or most frequently on a 
grazing boundary when a curse or a stone aimed at one of his straying sheep by another 
shepherd is an insult, which inevitably requires a violent response.”352 The young shepherd’s 	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act of retaliation is seen as a rite of passage, proving his ability to uphold and honour the 
herding community’s values. 
 
Similarly, Christopher Boehm in his exploration of Montenegrin blood feuds finds an 
extremely complex set of regulations and rules in regard to revenge killings. He writes, 
“Causes for blood revenge lay in a complicated mixture of religious and fraternal feelings and 
also in the highly developed retaliatory responses that could be expected in a warrior society, 
all combined with a keen and compelling sense of honour.”353 In lieu of a centralized 
authority, it would first appear that revenge killing is this endless and uncontrollable display 
of barbarism. This is, however, not the case. Boehm finds a highly developed and self-
regulated mechanism operating with key restrictions. For instance, the killing of women is 
prohibited. Only the killing of men can repay the blood debt; the killing of women is in fact a 
cause of great shame for the family. Furthermore, if a guest comes to the house of a feuding 
family, the feuding will temporarily stop. Harvest or threats from the Ottoman Empire equally 
lead to temporary truces, which are honoured by all sides. However, even if these truces are 
broken, norms exist to regulate these breaches. Boehm writes, “Montenegrins recognized 
“boiling blood” as a very special and all-consuming psychological condition; as a moral 
justification, boiling blood went far in exonerating a person if he broke a truce.”354 Even a 
breach of norms is regulated by norms. There is nothing subjective or symbolic in these acts 
of revenge; they are socially sanctioned and normatively expected. 
 
Elster’s Norms of Revenge and Nussbaum’s mimetic revenge, however, share interesting 
potential for overlap. If both parties can agree to hear each other out and gain insight into the 
subjective and symbolic meaning of the crime, there is no reason why the mimetic aspect of 
revenge should not be assimilated into a collective framework. Indeed, in the case of the 
Mediterranean shepherds, the act of throwing a stone at a sheep is already invested with 
symbolic meaning and understood by both sides. The stone represents much more, and so the 
retribution must address the symbolic crime; throwing a stone in return is not enough. But the 
difference between Elster and Nussbaum is that the injustice – even the symbolic aspect of it 
– is culturally sanctioned. Nussbaum’s Nomos of Revenge rests on the fact that the injustice 
defies expectations and moral acceptability, which sets off a solitary song of justice. This 
introduces the desire for extreme and excessive punishment, because the injustice resolves 	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any concept of a mutual moral regard. This type of withdrawal from communal forms of 
justice and morality cannot be guaranteed if the act of mimetic revenge is expected. 
 
Hence, one must conclude that Elster’s idea of revenge, as explored by Nisbett and Boehm, 
describes a specific social nomos where (blood) equality is established and maintained 
through socially sanctioned retribution. All acts of “revenge” are expected. If one applies 
Nozick’s descriptions to the Norms of Revenge, one finds that Elster is referring to retribution 
not revenge, and that the salient characteristics of revenge, such as alleged excessiveness, the 
avoidance of social approval or the mimetic aspect of moral disregard are obstructed in 
Elster’s Norms. In the words of Milovan Djilas, “revenge is an overpowering and consuming 
fire. It flares up and burns away every other thought and emotion… (It is the) wildest and 
sweetest drunkenness.”355 Revenge is born from a radically subjective idea of justice, rejected 
by others for its excesses, but necessary for the injured to obtain justice. 
 
The objective of Revenge 
 
What does revenge seek? Nussbaum speaks of a mimetic component; moral philosophers 
speak of justice. At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that revenge is a form of 
reciprocity, but one that is entirely past-orientated. Revenge’s cousin, retribution corrects a 
wrong that is experienced as a normative breach and consequently sets limits on the act of 
punishment, because the moral attitude is still in operation. Revenge, on the other hand, as the 
action tendency of rage, responds to a mistreatment that challenges the existential rights and 
moral worth of the victim. Within group dynamics this is tantamount to threatening group 
dissolution, by disrupting the existential investments of group membership, i.e. recognition 
and esteem. Social psychologists argue for the existence of two distinct but not necessarily 
exclusive objectives in revenge. Both offer different types of obtained justice for the victim. 
There is, however, another objective I wish to stress, which I refer to as the Salted Earth 
hypothesis, and which relates directly to the notion of the past-orientation found in revenge. 
 
Comparative Suffering Hypothesis 
 
The first objective is known as the Comparative Suffering Hypothesis and is described thus, 
“the offense caused an affective imbalance between the offender and the victim, and so the 	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victim seeks to reduce this imbalance. This goal is fulfilled when the offender experiences an 
appropriate amount of harm or loss.” 356 This is part of the story, as we know from Chapter 1; 
Hecuba sought to return the offense, mimetically, to claim her revenge by making Polymester 
suffer. However, the social psychologists continue and postulate that if revenge is impossible, 
“seeing the offender suffer from fate should also be satisfactory for the victim (because) it is 
merely the “suffering score” that needs to be balanced” However, relying on earlier research, 
Gollwitzer et al. judge that “in studies where participants were victims, the offender’s fate did 
not diminish their retributive reactions.”357 This suggests that suffering in itself is not enough. 
Seeing the perpetrator worse off does not satisfy victims; they need to feel somehow relevant 
to the suffering - if not causal. This is a strong argument against the institutionalization of 
punishment because it denies satisfaction to the victim even though the perpetrator is 
punished, a point made in the distinction between a normative wrong and an existential injury. 
 
Understanding Hypothesis 
 
The second Hypothesis is known as the Understanding Hypothesis: “Victims seek to deliver a 
message to the offender and the message has the general form of ‘You will be punished for 
what you did before.’” 358 According to this approach, the offender needs to know that 
revenge or punishment is imposed because and of her prior behaviour. According to findings 
by Gollwitzer, Meder and Schmidt, “revenge can only be satisfactory when the offender 
knows why revenge has been taken.”359 This is then the other side of the story, as we know it; 
Hecuba waits for Polymester to emerge mutilated from his tent to charge him with his crimes. 
This also explains why terrorist groups take responsibility for suicide bombings; they need 
their victim to make the connection.  
 
According to the Understanding Hypothesis the act of revenge tries to amend the offender’s 
“belief-attitude structure,” as it communicates: Never do this to me again!360 The act of 
revenge in this sense hedges on the offender’s willingness to acknowledge the wrongdoing, 
atone and change. Unfortunately this aligns too much with retribution and the moral attitude. 	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In Chapter 2, negative social emotions were shown to operate between equals to maintain, 
repair and strengthen social bonds; transgressions are reported and sometimes even penalized 
but the underlying assumption is that both offender and victim will not sacrifice their moral 
equality in the pursuit of personal justice. It is correct that the offender might change and 
acknowledge the mistreatment, following the act of revenge, but it would be incorrect to 
assume that this is what motivates or even justifies revenge. Revenge is a solitary song and it 
seeks to return the subjectively felt sense of mistreatment and injustice to its source. But more 
importantly it seeks to communicate to the offender: How dare you!  
 
A relatively recent study explores whether the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 led 
to an enjoyment in revenge for members of the American in-group, aggrieved by the events of 
9/11. The results find that “those who harboured vengeful desires in 2003 were more likely to 
feel a sense of justice after his death, those who were highest in their needs for vengeance 
indicated that they still “wanted more.” The team of social psychologists conclude that, 
“victims want revenge for the sake of delivering a message and taking revenge can bring 
justice on one hand, but also elicit more “blood lust” on the other.”361 This is an interesting 
finding. As one might be lead to believe, the act of revenge and obtained justice should lead 
to a reduction in revenge impulses; however, in some cases, the result seems to be the exact 
opposite. Even when both hypotheses are met, i.e. the offender group suffers and is informed 
why they suffer, the blood lust continues.  
 
Salted Earth Hypothesis 
 
In the plays of Ancient Greece, revenge is a social taboo because it violates nomos. Even if 
the revenge act is in response to an initial injustice, those engaged in nomos-voiding 
behaviour are deemed to be polluted and exorcised from society. This social death in many 
ways mimics actual death. Woodbridge’s study of 16th and 17th century English Revenge 
Dramas makes a similar claim; revenge is always tantamount to death. The avenger only rests 
if the target is killed, or in a state of persistent misery and humiliation. The ancient practice of 
spreading salt over defeated cities symbolized a curse on its re-inhabitation. These cities were 
destined to remain barren and the inhabitants forced to find a new home. This ancient practice 
is precisely the ill will captured in revenge, and is rumoured to have befallen the city of 	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Carthage following the Third Punic War, although this account is now largely contested.362 
The desire to reduce the victim to a sense of permanent suffering is still found today, and 
explains how revenge aims to leave a permanent mark on the victim. 
 
By way of an example of such salted earth revenge: after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau believed that Germany should be levelled to 
pastureland and that Germans should toil away with nothing but their bare hands for the next 
50 years.363 Equally, General Curtis LeMay wished to bomb Cuba back to the Stone Age after 
the Bay of Pigs fiasco.364 And more recently, the conservative Commentator P.J. Rourke 
captured the American line on Iraq: “Iraq is a mess, but it’s a mess with a message: Don’t 
mess with us!”365 Rather than provide a cul-de-sac, this insight shifts the investigation towards 
the existential nature of revenge. By leaving the offender with a permanent mark, the avenger 
mimetically returns the same felt sense of permanence. This is so, because the experience of 
the injustice, by virtue of its crass nature, has gained a permanent place in the narrative of the 
group; more than an unforgivable crime, it is an unforgettable one. 
 
The Comparative Suffering and Understanding Hypothesis all veer dangerously close to 
retribution, a point that needs to be addressed. The middle path, that the offender must suffer 
and understand why he suffers, is equally represented in moral attitude justice and retribution 
- of course there are limits on how much suffering can be tolerated. Revenge, either because 
of its excessiveness or because of the way it righteously instrumentalizes the target, allows for 
unlimited suffering. However, extreme suffering alone is a poor definition of revenge because 
it fails to illuminate the rich mimetic dimension of the subjective justice. The most salient 
objective found in revenge is its desire to leave the victim with a permanent mark: a piece of 
incontrovertible evidence that the avenger holds the target in total moral disregard and is 
committed to the objective attitude. Revenge, it must be argued, seeks to impose a temporal 
arrest on the relationship between avenger and target. 
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Nietzsche and the temporal nature of Revenge 
 
For Plato, vengeance ‘is senseless and bestial because it looks backward to strike at a past 
deed’. Francis Bacon argues that revenge is foolish, because it amounts to ‘labour in past 
matters’, and Woodbridge concludes from her literary explorations that revenge is “dedicated 
to restoring the past; it aims to de-create a former tainted deed.”366 Nietzsche’s take on 
revenge brings this to a point. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he writes: 
 
“It was”: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. 
Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all 
things past. The will cannot will backwards; that it cannot break time and time’s 
desire – that is the will’s most lonely affliction (…) This, yes, this alone is revenge 
itself: the will’s antipathy towards time and time’s ‘it was.’’367 
 
The real essence of revenge then is the inability to change the flow of time, and redress the 
actual act of injustice. In the now, the injustice is forever stowed away, blocked from redress 
by a wall of impenetrable temporality but bleeding into the present through memory. Revenge 
aims to stop the bleeding. But if the injustice is, as Nietzsche argues, forever stowed away in 
memory, revenge attempts to do the next best thing by eradicating the strongest connection 
the injustice has to the present, namely the offender. This explains why revenge as a literary 
plot usually ends with either the avenger or the offender dead, encapsulated by the saying that 
those who seek revenge must ‘dig two graves’. The connection between revenge and death is 
especially borne out by Seaford’s analysis of Achilles’ “liminality to death”. The exchange in 
revenge, in its purest form, amounts to a rebirth through the death of the offender, a point not 
unlike Fanon’s emancipatory violence. In order to remove the desire for revenge, the initial 
injustice must be removed; however, the next best thing is to kill off the offender in an 
attempt to remove the permanent mark, kept alive and resonant in the form of a flash bulb 
memory of the experienced injustice.368 
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In Herman Melville’s classic tale, Moby Dick, Captain Ahab swears revenge on the White 
Whale. The tale ends with Ahab plunging at the White Whale in desperation, but not before 
Melville delivers one of the finest sermons of bristling vengeance in Western literature:  
 
"All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth 
with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle 
demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, 
and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the whale’s white 
hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole race from Adam 
down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s shell 
upon it."369  
 
Ahab is forever linked to the White Whale for having left him with a pegged leg. Ahab’s 
monomania consumes his life, leaving him with nothing but his vengeance. It is no surprise 
that Ahab dies in his attempt to kill the Whale; Moby Dick is a force of nature. The white 
Whale comes to symbolize Ahab’s madness and towering aspirations. But Melville obviously 
also believes that a life dedicated to revenge can never lead to peace and happiness. Jean 
Amery, the French Existentialist, brings this to a point when he writes how vengeance “nails 
everyone one of us into the cross that is his ruined past (…) it blocks the exit to the genuine 
human condition, the future.”370 Yet with every thump of his wooden leg, Ahab is bitterly 
reminded of the injustice done to him. 
 
Melville anchored Ahab’s injustice in a discernable physiological marker, thus making the 
memory ever-present. Political Scientists speak of schemas of hatred: scripts and knowledge 
structures that allow injustices to be culturally embedded and survive the passage of time. 
Vamik Volkan coined the term “chosen traumas” and explains, “Chosen traumas bring with 
them powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that 
trigger a variety of unconscious defence mechanisms that attempt to reverse those experiences 
and feelings.”371 These past injustices are constitutive of the present-based identity, but at 
great cost. In accordance with Amery’s intuition, time itself becomes warped in places. 
Ignatieff explains how he entered a realm of “pure memory” on his visit to the Balkans: 
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“What seems apparent in the former Yugoslavia is that the past continues to 
torment because it is not the past. These places are not living in a serial order to 
time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and present are continuous, 
agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies. Reporters in the 
Balkan wars often observed that when they were told atrocity stories they were 
occasionally uncertain whether these stories had occurred yesterday or in 1914, or 
1841, or 1441.”372 
 
Unfortunately, the point about “chosen traumas” is that these episodes are politically useful 
for elites. Current hardship is much more easily ascribed to evildoers, than to actual causes, 
which might lead to a loss of power for corrupt and inept leaders. But at the same time, the 
past injustice remains unresolved, because the current revenge act cannot turn back time and 
remove the act of injustice engrained in the cultural narrative of a people. Scholars already 
acknowledge schemas of hatred as a type displacement.373 However, according to Nietzsche’s 
intervention, all acts of revenge are a type of displacement, because they are fed by the 
emotional unpleasantness of a memory that cannot be erased. Such memories feed rage and a 
desire for revenge because the victim allows her experience to still undermine her sense of 
worth, even now. 
 
Returning to Euripides and Aeschylus and their grim view on revenge, Nietzsche’s 
intervention is encapsulating. Euripides argues for the human motivations in revenge, but in 
line with the overarching moral narrative; once a subject engages in revenge, they are polluted 
and no longer valuable to society. Aeschylus makes the same diagnosis but attempts to 
salvage the situation by sacrificing the human motivations and, indeed, claims to personal 
justice, which Euripides holds so dear. But in both cases the revenge act is the final arbiter: 
once nomos is breached, pollution ensues. Nietzsche’s intervention is a step ahead. It is not 
the breach of nomos that pollutes, but the suffering of injustice. In Chapter 1 on Rage in 
Ancient Greece, this was established as the victim-focussed view of pollution; however, due 
to the order-centric solution to pollution, this victim-orientated view is in the minority. 
Nietzsche, then, leads the resurgence in its validity. Once a grave injustice is experienced, 
rage is a foregone conclusion; but critically not even the action tendency of punishment and 	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revenge can undo the past. Hence, those who commit revenge and eradicate the offender are 
polluted just as much as those who fail to commit revenge. The objective attitude persists 
either way; subjects are beholden to their memory. Nietzsche calls such pre-occupation with 
the past Ressentiment; it is marked by an inability to move on. Salted Earth might aid the 
process of moving on by destroying the offender or leaving a permanent mark, but ultimately 
it depends on how the subject or group deals with the memory of the injustice. Schemas of 
hatred are proof that once an injustice is assimilated into the collective narrative, it never 
fades. 
 
Displaced Revenge 
 
Nietzsche’s intervention invariably puts a damper on the idea that revenge can offer 
resolution. If Nietzsche is correct then we must conclude that any act of revenge is 
fundamentally an act of displacement, because the past cannot be undone; even if we argue 
for group entitativity bridging time and generations.374 However, this has not stopped groups 
from engaging in revenge. I want to explore two types of revenge displacements that look 
similar at first glance but ultimately utilize different mandates. In Chapter 3, I explored the 
difference between dehumanization and demonization. The first mandate is argued to co-exist 
with guilt and belies a firm connection between aggression and a suffered injustice; the 
second mandate is more robust and expresses a causal connection between suffered injustice 
and violence. These two mandates can be accommodated within differing revenge strategies. 
For this, I want to stress the differences between two models of Displaced Revenge: 
Scapegoating and Triggered Displaced Aggression. I wish to align these models with the 
overall point raised by social psychologists that rage can turn from righteous to illegitimate. 
But importantly, it can be argued that illegitimacy registers internally within the morality of 
the subject, and not through some external judgement. 
 
Aristotle believes that, “pleasure follows all experience of anger from the hope of getting 
retaliation.”375 The key, according to Aristotle, is to be “angry at the right things and with the 
right people.”376 Scapegoats are the wrong people for the right thing. The concept of 	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scapegoating finds its greatest proponent in the works of French Anthropologist Rene Girard, 
who in turn bases his analysis on the myth of Agamemnon, which forms part of the Oresteia. 
The use of scapegoats, it will be argued, serves a social function that belies any culpability for 
a suffered mistreatment; this will be related back to the point that scapegoats are usually 
dehumanized, because even the morality of the avenger cannot justify the mistreatment. 
Triggered Displaced Aggression, a concept found in social psychology, however, does not,  
and will be shown to function like revenge, by referring to an unrelated but still felt injustice. 
 
In the Oresteia, Agamemnon is confronted by the terrible prospect of either not returning 
home or sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia to appease the goddess Artemis. The reason for 
this is that Agamemnon’s soldiers foolishly killed some of Artemis’ deer without proper 
sacrificial ritual, and now Agamemnon is asked to undo the damage by sacrificing his 
daughter “like a goat.”377 Agamemnon accepts this and, as implied by the ritual, Iphigenia is 
entirely dehumanized, and her pleas are totally ignored. Girard refers to this phenomenon as 
sacrificial semblance. In order to avoid cycles of revenge, Girard explains that subjects sever 
the blood links between victims and murderers. He writes,  
 
“So by killing, not the murderer himself, but someone close to him, an act of 
perfect reciprocity is avoided and the necessity for revenge by-passed. If the 
counter violence were inflicted on the aggressor himself, it would by this very act 
participate in, and become indistinguishable from, the original act of violence. In 
short it would become an act of pure vengeance, requiring yet another act of 
vengeance and transforming itself into the very thing it was designed to 
prevent“378  
 
Scapegoating serves some overall social function, but equally turns the scapegoated victim 
into a non-human. There are obviously two different kinds of relationships operating here: the 
relationship between offender and offended, and the relationship between offender/offended 
and scapegoat. The first relationship, describing the relation between offenders and offended, 
no longer relates to a proper study of revenge because there is obviously a moral attitude at 
work here. There is a desire to maintain the social bonds and sense of community, thus 
necessitating the need for a scapegoat on whom to unload the strife. The key to the success of 	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sacrificial semblance is that Agamemnon acts as the author of his own punishment, thus 
voiding any possibility of excess or undue harm. 
 
The very fact that Artemis accepts the sacrifice tells us that she is more interested in order 
than in revenge. In other words, the validity of the order, or nomos, is never questioned. 
Agamemnon also indicates his willingness to remain part of the ruling order by accepting his 
punishment. Aeschylus, of course, uses the device of the sacrifice to set up his tragedy, which 
culminates in the trial of Agamemnon’s son Orestes and the domestication of the Erinyes. 
Girard does not mention that Agamemnon’s sacrificial semblance can only temporarily arrest 
his own demise. Aeschylus’ deterministic view of revenge means that once an injustice is 
committed the Erinyes do not fail. However, this should be considered a literary point rather 
than a critique of Girard’s mechanism. 
 
Concerning the fate of Iphigenia, she is entirely dehumanized and treated like the object she 
resembles: a goat. Her function is to purge the strife experienced by Artemis and Agamemnon 
and repair their communal bonds. She is entirely unrelated to the initial crime and this, I 
believe, is borne out in the need to dehumanize her. Her innocence demands some form of 
psychological shielding, because Agamemnon would be unable to tolerate the guilt of 
sacrificing a human being, let alone his own daughter. Agamemnon’s wife of course, 
unencumbered by Agamemnon’s debt to Artemis, views the scapegoating as the inherent 
injustice and crime that it is; the same crime that Agamemnon tries to ignore. 
 
In modern times, scapegoating occurs especially when there is no clear culprit at work. Staub 
argues that groups engaging in systematic violence operate a “psychology of hard times” and 
are desperate to understand the reason for their suffering and hold someone responsible.379 
Events like socio-economic upheaval, natural disasters or cultural displacement, according to 
TMT and MST, lead to ontological insecurity, punitiveness and extreme othering.380 Political 
elites offer pragmatic solutions for deep-seated structural problems or naturally occurring 
disasters, and often this involves punishing and blaming scapegoats, who usually come in the 
form of socially disenfranchised targets such as immigrants and minorities. Like Iphigenia, 
these targets are dehumanized and utilized for communal purposes. However, the objective 
attitude at work does not come from an appraisal that the “hard times” are directly caused by 	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the scapegoat. The in-group has no claim to some intentional mistreatment, otherwise the 
target group could be demonized rather than dehumanized; they would be targeted for their 
evil intentions, and their malicious character, rather than discarded for their alleged inability 
to be civilized and their lack of “human” qualities. It would be an issue of justice rather than 
aesthetics. 
 
The alternative, known in social psychology as Triggered Displaced Aggression, differs most 
notably because it still maintains a strong causal connection between the victim and injustice, 
even if the connection is inflated. Here some “minor transgression” acts as primer and allows 
groups to align the “hard times” with an unrelated mistreatment. Social psychologists Schütte 
and Kessler explain,  
 
“Triggered Displaced Aggression is conceptualized to result when the aggressor, 
prior to the interaction with the aggression target, experienced a provocation that 
precluded an aggressive response. The aggressive response is displaced in the 
sense that it is not directed toward the original source of the provocation that 
instigated an aggressive behavioural tendency in the first place. The aggressive 
response is triggered in the sense that it is not invariably directed towards any 
target (as displaced aggression) but only towards such a target that subsequently 
provides a minor provocation. Triggered displaced aggression hence denotes a 
disproportionately aggressive response towards a target that committed a minor 
transgression.”381  
 
Again, the “hard times” are technically unrelated, but rather than dehumanize the target, the 
target is demonized for committing a minor transgression. In John Dollard and Neal Miller’s 
original example a businessman returns home after a hard day at the office; the businessman 
is stressed and agitated because his clients have voiced frustration over his performance to his 
boss. Once at home, his dog is happy to see him and greets him. The businessman, however, 
reacts violently and kicks the dog away because he is messing up his suit. The 
disproportionately violent response at a mildly irritating occurrence at best, is explained by 
the preceding and far greater provocation that acts as an emotional primer.382 The 
businessman, unable to act against the original source of his anger, unloads the entire 	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frustration onto the source of a minor nuisance. However, the point is that the businessman 
justifies the kick because the dog has sullied his suit; the dog has authored a mistreatment and 
deserves punishment. To unpack this mechanism and make it more relevant to political 
science, two accounts of the immediate aftermath of World War II explain how violence was 
redirected towards women for the sole reason that they had fraternized with the enemy 
soldiers. Their treatment corresponds to a Triggered Displaced Aggression. 
 
In Lottman’s book on post-Vichy France, The People’s Anger, he describes how immediately 
following the German surrender, the French people began murdering “in the spirit of 
battlefield justice.”383 However, instead of attacking Germans, who were retreating or under 
military observation, they targeted the next best thing. According to Lottman, the people’s 
anger was directed at French collaborators of the Nazi occupation, specifically women. 
“Some women appeared well fed, well dressed, flaunting and occasionally boasting of their 
liaison with occupation soldiers or privileged collaborators”, writes Lottman. “When 
liberation came, revenge was on the cards.”384 What followed was cruel and sadistic 
treatment of women, sought as proxies for Germans. One witness describes an incident when 
a woman was directly forced to answer for German crimes: “Her hair is sheared of all the 
same; she is stripped naked and forced to run to the pedestal which supported the statue of the 
first duke Decazes, a statue which the Germans removed to melt down the bronze. She is 
raised to the duke’s place, to be jeered by assembled townspeople.”385 The policy of shearing 
women’s heads was also prevalent in occupied Germany at roughly the same time; however, 
it was orchestrated by surviving SS fringe groups, threatening and punishing women for 
fraternizing with American GIs.386 In both cases qualified targets were used to satisfy the 
demand for revenge, because the real target was impossible to reach. However, the point is 
that these targets were demonized, they were all seen evil and at fault for what they had done; 
they were held responsible for the suffering they represented. Their punishment was believed 
to be just and the avengers suffered no sense of guilt. 
 
In schemas of hatred, group members are directly responsible for mistreatments and injustices 
committed many centuries earlier, and they are sought out directly as a form of displacement 	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in “hard times”. Their “minor transgression” is borne out of their group membership. In social 
psychology this phenomenon is referred to as group entitativity.387 However, although they 
are technically unrelated to the “hard times,” these groups are not dehumanized but 
demonized. Somehow the ancient injustice has a direct impact on in-group perceptions of 
their current hardship. The displacement is morally justified on the grounds of this old 
memory, which still influences the moral relationship between in-group and out-group today. 
The memory of the unresolved injustice and the current “hard times” becomes linked.388 The 
ability to demonize these groups, rather than dehumanize them, suggests that some 
righteousness is still being felt. The true nature of revenge, as Nietzsche understood it, is that 
it forces actors to relive their past, even if their current frustration is caused by other factors; 
they frame the suffering through this prism. It follows that the objective attitude cannot be 
resolved through revenge and aggression, because the foundation of the attitude remains the 
injustice, which is encased in the cultural narrative of the group. As long as the injustice and 
suffered mistreatment is kept alive through memory, the desire for revenge continues. The 
key is then to avoid any type of mistreatment and suffering that might make this specific 
memory relevant once more and rehabilitate the objective attitude, which is difficult seeing 
that natural disasters, such as droughts, floods or economic shocks, may always occur. 
 
Returning to the basic difference between scapegoating and Triggered Displaced Aggression, 
and ignoring the added complexity of “hard times,” Triggered Displaced Aggression differs 
because the target is directly aligned with the suffered injustice and becomes as culpable as 
the actual offender. This is the key difference to scapegoating, where the target remains 
unrelated to the injustice. These different revenge strategies correspond directly to whether 
the group practices dehumanization or demonization. Only the latter corresponds to righteous 
rage, even if outsiders judge that the punishment is irrational. This, however, is as irrelevant 
to the avenger as the Nietzschean warning that no act of revenge can ultimately succeed in 
undoing the past. The only silver lining is that even within the extreme morality of revenge, it 
can be argued that the group differentiates between righteous and illegitimate. The need to 
dehumanize the target suggests that the avenger’s morality registers an abnormality (guilt), 
which in turn provides a strong mandate for outsiders to intervene and aid the group in 
confronting the pushback of compassion and moral regard towards the victim. Intervening in 
demonization, however, will not result in anything constructive, as the mandate is ironclad. 	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Groups might even align intervening outsiders with the demonized out-group, because any 
action designed to prevent revenge will invariably entrench the sense of injustice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After a state visit to Finland in 2005, the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, insulted 
Finnish cuisine and joked that all he was given to eat was reindeer meat. Three years later, 
Finland won first prize at America's Plate International Pizza Contest in New York, beating 
Italy to second place. The name of the winning pizza was “Pizza Berlusconi” and the key 
topping was smoked reindeer meat.389 This describes a mild case of retribution. The Finnish 
response returned the insult in a greater and more elaborate manner, in accordance with what 
they deemed just; the Finns could have simply insulted Italian cuisine in return, but instead 
they opted to humiliate Italy. However, this incident failed to spiral into an international 
emergency so it is safe to assume that the moral attitude was not lost in all of this. 
 
Löwenheim and Heimann argue in their piece that revenge is first and foremost described by 
the emotional satisfaction of seeing the offender suffer. However, following insights from the 
field of neuroscience, emotional satisfaction cannot be seen as being salient if it is equally 
present in retribution or any other type of obtained justice. Following Nozick and Nussbaum, 
in this chapter revenge has been described as stemming from a private sense of injury that 
gives rise to a “solitary song,” the so-called Nomos of Revenge. In the Nomos of Revenge the 
offender is considered with Strawson’s objective attitude, meaning that the offender has no 
moral rights and can be readily instrumentalized. This helps explain why punishment in 
revenge is so excessive and believed to be limitless. Nussbaum challenges the notion of 
limitlessness, however, and provides a subjectively informed idea of revenge being mimetic, 
in the sense of returning the symbolic meaning of the crime in the revenge act. This is 
beautifully illustrated by Hecuba’s decision to blind Polymester in order to explicate the fact 
that he has always been blind to the laws of nomos.  
 
Following the insights from social psychology on how avengers obtain justice in revenge, 
known as the Understanding Hypothesis and Comparative Suffering Hypothesis, the issue of 
satisfaction was problematized. The most recent study on the assassination of Bin Laden has 
suggested that revenge could lead to even greater bloodlust rather than a diminution. 	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Following the plot lines in revenge dramas, the offender - or the avenger - ends up dead or 
permanently maimed and humiliated; either through exile or murder. Death is the only way a 
good revenge story can find a satisfactory ending, not only for the cheering audience but also 
for the protagonist. The idea that offender and avenger can share the world without somehow 
resolving injustice is tasteless and perverse. Nietzsche’s understanding of revenge questioned 
this, however, echoing the problematic findings on the assassination of Bin Laden, by arguing 
that revenge is motivated by a monomaniacal focus on the past. Following from this, acts of 
revenge try to de-create the past injustices, but ultimately fail because memory alone keeps 
them alive. Acts of revenge must then be described as doing the next best thing: they try to 
eliminate the living proof, by killing or exiling the offender. In this sense, the obtained justice 
of salted earth was found to explain how revenge seeks to leave the victim with a permanent 
mark, mimetically returning the permanent mark of injustice felt by the avenger. Revenge, in 
other words, does not seek resolution; it seeks to spread an arrested state of being. 
 
The two modes of displaced revenge continued the debate in Chapter 3 on the differences in 
moral mandates. Dehumanization, which belies a connection between victim and injustice, 
gives rise to scapegoating, and echoes many of the concerns made by social psychologists on 
the existence of exonerating patterns in violence. Triggered Displaced Aggression similarly 
acts as a displacement; however, the mandate in operation is demonization because related 
mistreatments are inflated and somehow linked to the new mistreatment. It must be the case 
that there is still a sense of righteousness at work and that victims are demonized for their 
group membership, as postulated in schemas of hatred. Both revenge strategies rest on the 
fact that the actual source of mistreatment is out of reach, and provide a valuable insight into 
both the fluidity of rage as well as the futility of revenge. The next chapter will probe another 
strategy that is entirely predicated on powerlessness and an inability to engage even in 
displacement. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Ressentiment:  Revenge of the Weak 
 
 
The last chapter ended with the assessment that the desire for revenge hinges on how the 
subject deals with the perceived injustice. Following Nietzsche’s urgent intervention, and 
supported by the alignment of numerous insights ranging from social psychology, literature 
and philosophy, revenge is doomed to fail because it aims to de-create the past, a feat that is 
virtually impossible. Revenge then aims to do the next best thing by targeting the closest 
connection between the present and the past injustice: the offender. Nietzsche stressed that 
revenge must always be a type of displacement because it is memory ultimately that keeps the 
injustice alive, not the offender. The inability to change the past becomes the source of all 
frustration and levels the playing field between the weak and the strong; even those who exact 
revenge need to confront the truth that the past cannot be erased, only reframed. However, it 
is probably true that a successful act of revenge aids the process – at least from what we 
gather in the literary explorations of revenge. 
 
However, Nietzsche’s insistence on the temporal immutability of experienced injustices leads 
him to formulate a type of revenge that is predicated on the inability to move on and the 
inability to avenge. Nietzsche of course claims they are both the same, but it is probably fairer 
to argue that the inability to avenge confounds the inability to move on. Hence, Nietzsche’s 
revenge strategy, known as Ressentiment, attempts to gain revenge without forcing the subject 
to risk further injustice or humiliation. It is a revenge strategy that exists purely within the 
subjective valuation of the victim, and mirrors the moral certainty found in the Nomos of 
Revenge. The salient point, and indeed the reason why this is so important to understand, is 
that Ressentiment can exist within any given order without appearing to upset or sabotage this 
order through the use of violence. In many ways, Nietzsche’s Ressentiment continues the 
Euripidean enterprise of understanding revenge subjectivities, while extending the site of 
exploration deep into the realm of the imposed Aeschylian order. Nietzsche found a way to 
prove that inaction, in the aftermath of an experienced injustice, can lead to the blossoming of 
“subterranean” rage. 
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This opens up new avenues of exploration for key themes in International Relations 
scholarship, notably the problem of oppression and post-war settlements. The American 
psychologist and pioneer in the study of narcissistic rage, Heinz Kohut, believed that “in a 
situation where an overwhelming defeat had been absorbed, the presence of reasonable hope 
for a comeback and reversal means vengefulness is likely to be a normal psychological 
response.”390 Even as groups face overwhelming odds, the idea of revenge and justice is 
never dismissed, but simply stored away until an opportune moment arises. All groups share a 
sense of entitlement towards just treatment and moral recognition, and this means they should 
harbour punitive impulses regardless of their strategic situation. 
 
Suspended Revenge 
 
The American Anthropologist James C. Scott describes a type of rage suspension in his books 
Weapons of the Weak and his more theoretical Domination and the Art of Resistance. Scott 
argues that groups suffering from mistreatment and oppression but unable to rebel create 
independent cultural narratives and value systems, which survive hidden from the scrutiny of 
the colonizers, and are ready to take over once the colonial system shows its first cracks. Scott 
explains, 
 
 “The obstacles to resistance, which are many, are simply not attributable to the 
inability of subordinate groups to imagine a counterfactual social order. They do 
imagine both the reversal and negation of their domination, and, most important, 
they have acted on the values in desperation and on those rare occasions when the 
circumstances allowed”. 391 
 
Revenge is simply suspended until an opportune moment arises, and in some cases this can 
take decades.392 The rancour is then kept alive through cultural practices embedded in so-
called hidden transcripts. 
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Social psychologists refer to the Aggression-Frustration Hypothesis to explain how 
frustration can survive and even increase over time. According to Miller, rumination, which 
can be hypothesized to function in Scott’s hidden transcripts, increases: 
 
 “The average level of activation of an aggression-related thoughts, memories, and 
emotions more accessible. Without additional inputs, however, the network should 
return to baseline levels. If, instead, situational (or personality) factors make an 
individual more likely to continue thinking about the provocation, new surges that 
activate the network are likely to be generate. That is, each time a person thinks 
about or re-lives a provoking incident, a new activation spreads through the 
network making its components more accessible and subsequent aggressive action 
more likely.”393  
 
The initial injustice is thus continuously fed and kept alive until an opportune moment arises 
for rebellion. In the meantime hidden transcripts allow groups to vent and joke about their 
situation, making it bearable without losing the underlining emotional tension. In cases of 
severe mistreatment and oppression met with a conspicuous lack of violence and revolt, it is 
“more important to understand (…) the ordinary weapons of the relatively powerless groups, 
foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, 
slander, arson, sabotage.”394 Because a full-blown act of vengeance is not possible, the 
rancour is expressed through these minor and often undetectable acts of rebellion. 
 
The idea of a suspended revenge is extremely useful, because it takes the idea of 
powerlessness as its starting point. As long as groups feel powerless against their offenders or 
oppressors, they opt for ostensible conciliation and submission. It is only when the power 
hierarchies dissolve that revenge finally manifests itself.395 The same underlying issue of 
powerlessness also functions in both cases of Displaced Revenge described in Chapter 4. Here 
the ensuing out-group derogation, predicated on a minor transgression, provides an 
experience of obtained justice despite falsifying the source of the underlying frustration. So 
instead of waiting and biding their time a sensible scapegoat is chosen. Both mechanisms 	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suggest that rage can become dislodged from the initial injustice and become fluid; they also 
suggest that semblances of defeat and submission belie the underlying rage and demands for 
revenge. Powerlessness, in other words, does not affect a group’s sense of entitlement towards 
justice and freedom from oppression. 
 
The theory put forth in this chapter is Nietzsche’s Ressentiment. The concept takes the notion 
of powerlessness as its theoretical starting point. This gives it a similar foundation to 
Displaced Revenge; however, Ressentiment critically differs by denying the possibility of 
third party involvement. Displaced Revenge demands the availability of a scapegoat or some 
culprit to function; the strategy of Ressentiment does not. Consequently, Ressentiment is 
better equipped to explore the dynamics of sustained oppression and injustice prevalent in 
dyadic power structures. Ressentiment also makes claims on identity formation, which can 
help explain how the injured remain docile and avoid rebellion. Scott explicitly denies the 
existence of Ressentiment in the hidden transcripts. He explains by way of a footnote:  
 
“The psychological dynamics of “Ressentiment” depend on the emotions having 
literally no possible outlet (…) In our case, it is the social site of the hidden 
transcripts that provides the opportunity for these emotions to take a collective, 
cultural form and be acted out.”396  
 
Scott argues that the ability to vent through foot-dragging and jokes frustrates the 
development of Ressentiment, which is fundamentally correct. But more interestingly, 
Ressentiment denies the possibility of a belated violent revenge, which Scott’s account 
presupposes; the revenge of the weak obtains justice through different means. 
 
Ressentiment is peculiar because it allows for a sense of justice without recourse to violence 
and revolt. Therefore, violence only occurs once Ressentiment is resolved; however, for this 
to happen the ideational foundation of Ressentiment must dissolve first, which is defined by a 
falsification of strength predicated on transvaluation. What must follow then is a thorough 
investigation of the properties of Ressentiment with a special focus on the claims made for the 
identity formation of the victim in the aftermath of an injustice. Ressentiment, it will be 
argued, is better equipped to explain order and peace following massive defeat, without the 
need to resort to displaced aggression and, critically, ensuring that a sense group entitlement, 	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as postulated by Optimal Distinction Theory, remains intact. For these reasons we can frame 
Ressentiment as another rage strategy. 
 
Ressentiment as Displacement 
 
The term Ressentiment has gained increasing currency over the years, featuring in important 
works on nationalism, identity, electoral politics and social unrest, not to mention in the 
literature on values and ethics.397 The heir apparent to Nietzsche’s Ressentiment appears to be 
the German sociologist Max Scheler, who explored, and possibly even improved, the concept 
in his 1912 treatise Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moral. In much of the recent 
publications on Ressentiment in the political and social sciences, not Nietzsche but Scheler’s 
understanding of Ressentiment provides the sole theoretical basis, with the occasional 
Nietzsche quote thrown in for good measure. However, notwithstanding Scheler’s 
accomplishments, many more philosophers have grappled with the concept, highlighting and 
unpacking different aspects of the theory, leading to a large but still fragmented picture. 
 
To date three major works exist on Ressentiment. Along with Max Scheler’s 1912 treatise, 
there is also the 1981 publication by the philosopher and historian of religion, Richard Ira 
Sugarman, titled Rancor against time: The Phenomenology of Ressentiment, as well as a long 
essay by the noted moral philosopher, and self-described recovering Nietzschean, Robert C. 
Solomon, published in an anthology by Richard Schacht in 1994, and titled One Hundred 
Years of Ressentiment. Lastly, there is also Bernard Reginster’s 1997 journal publication, 
entitled Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation. These remain the key texts dealing with the 
pure theory of the Ressentiment, and avoid rushed application to historical or political case 
studies.  
 
The problem with the political application of Ressentiment to real world scenarios is that most 
of the time the authors in fact mean resentment, and not Ressentiment. These two concepts are 
fundamentally very different, despite Robert C. Solomon’s curious and somewhat frustrating 
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assertion that they are not.398 Ironically, Solomon attempted to rid philosophy of another 
superfluous and “flowery” term, but only succeeded in making Ressentiment the preferred 
choice for writers keen on having their prose sound more distinguished. Unfortunately, most 
of these writers indeed mean resentment and their use of the term Ressentiment is technically 
incorrect. I argue that with the help of these key publications, along with Reginster’s shorter 
contribution, the concept of Ressentiment may be fully unearthed, and returned to its correct 
usage. 
 
In part the problem of misunderstanding can be traced to Scheler’s treatment of the concept, 
which, though not without merit, glosses over some important factors and arguably waters 
down the features of Ressentiment to resemble the mechanism of Displaced Revenge. In a 
passage from his 1912 treatise he writes: 
 
“Impulses of revenge lead to Ressentiment the more they change into actual 
vindictiveness, the more their direction shifts toward indeterminate groups of 
objects which need only share one common characteristic, and the less they are 
satisfied by vengeance taken on a specific object.”399 
 
This passage reads as an endorsement of Girard’s mechanism. As with the malicious 
treatment of women accused of fraternizing with the enemy during the occupations of post-
war Germany and Vichy France, Scheler argues that the repressed impulse for revenge 
develops into a more encompassing lust for revenge, which no longer discriminates and 
latches onto any object resembling the initial target. There is no mention here of Nietzsche’s 
characteristic Spiritual Revenge. Scheler simply argues that if the desired object of revenge is 
out of reach, after some time, the desire becomes so great that a substitute is sought. Again, 
this insight is not without merit, because it suggests that the moral debasement can be 
detached from the initial object and gain a “free-floating” characteristic, while also illustrating 
that the connection between the initial injustice and present-based revenge is false. However, 
Scheler’s treatment falls short by ignoring that Ressentiment can offer satisfaction without 
recourse to third parties. In another passage Scheler writes: 
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“When it is repressed, vindictiveness leads to Ressentiment, a process, which is 
intensified when the imagination of vengeance too, is repressed - and finally the 
very emotion of revenge itself.”400 
 
This is a more disciplined reading of Ressentiment and highlights what Nietzsche calls the 
“anaesthetic” property of Ressentiment. Sugarman in his treatment of the concept has taken 
Scheler’s description and expressed it in a flow chart, which he refers to as the “Hermeneutic 
Circle of Ressentiment” - a linear version would look like this: 
 
Suffering (sadness, sorrow) ! Anger ! Desire for Revenge ! Rancor (desire for 
revenge blocked, postponed, and/or sublimated) ! Ressentiment (denial of desire 
for revenge and anger ! Denial of injury 401  
 
Scheler’s mechanism, made highly accessible by Sugarman, highlights the creation of new 
values necessary to mute the initial sense of suffering. The denial of anger, caused by the 
inability to exact revenge, changes the direction of the affect. Satisfaction is gained by 
eliminating the need for it. But doing so requires an entirely new ontology with a new set of 
values and expectations – even identity. Nietzsche, however, has more to say on the 
construction of these values than Scheler does. While Scheler would argue that the new values 
are somehow founded in opposition to the initial suffering, which is correct, Nietzsche, as will 
be pointed out, offers a much more nuanced picture of the properties of the identity 
reconstruction formed under the duress of powerlessness. Nietzsche’s interpretation remains 
important because it explains the ability to obtain justice without denying one’s impulses and 
desires, i.e. entitlement, which Scheler’s account cannot rule out. The problem with Scheler’s 
interpretation is that it is not concerned with guaranteeing satisfaction but simply with muting 
the sense of suffering. The genius of Ressentiment, on the other hand, holds that it can offer 
satisfaction through the establishment and internalization of moral superiority. The denial of 
injury is not the same, and far less satisfying, than turning the injury into evidence of hidden 
greatness, which in turn can satisfy a group’s demand for esteem and distinction. 
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The Lambs and Birds of Prey 
 
Nietzsche alludes to some of the components of Ressentiment, such as slave morality, in some 
of his other works; however, the most systematic and complete treatment is to be found in the 
Genealogy of Morals. Separated into three essays, this book sets out a psychological history 
of values and morality. The first essay, which is the focus of this chapter, talks about the 
creation of the basic polar valuation of “good and bad” and “good and evil.” Nietzsche insists 
here that such valuations have an emotional basis rather than some objective rational one, a 
point discussed in Chapter 3 and largely vindicated by research in neuroscience.402 The 
second essay sketches a theory on the creation of “guilt”, “memory” and “bad conscience” 
and highlights their relevance in the maintenance of social norms and civilization as a whole; 
a point that can be construed in itself as a damning critique of communal restraint and 
imposed order, echoing later works such as Freud’s classic Civilization and its Discontents. 
The last essay is aimed squarely at the Christian faith and describes how metaphysical 
systems of justice and truth, such as heaven and hell, are mere flights from reality and 
informed by a frustrated desire for revenge. For the purpose of understanding the mechanism 
of Ressentiment the first essay suffices.  
 
Nietzsche utilizes two interesting illustrations. One is a fable about anthropomorphised 
animals enjoying different positions on the food chain; the other is a highly fictionalized 
account of the clash between the Jewish and Roman peoples, framed as a contest between the 
priestly and knightly caste, respectively. These two illustrations are not equal in insight, 
though. They both describe different aspects of the Ressentiment phenomenon; one needs to 
read one through the other in order to gain a full picture.  
 
In Nietzsche’s first illustration the lambs are happily frolicking in the grass when suddenly a 
bird of prey comes swooping down and snatches one of the lambs and flies off. This happens 
many more times and the lambs fear a continued threat to their existence, but more 
importantly, a threat they are powerless to do anything against. Nietzsche writes: 
 
“It is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of 
prey, but that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey for taking the little 	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lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, "These birds of prey are evil, 
and he who least resembles a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb — 
should he not be good?" Then there is nothing to carp with in this ideal's 
establishment, though the birds of prey may regard it a little mockingly, and 
maybe say to themselves, "We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs, we 
even love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.”403 
 
Nietzsche offers a simple psychological analysis of the creation of a basic polar value system, 
and not based on an objective, external moral compass, but borne from a begrudging sense of 
powerlessness. The lambs are physiologically unable to neither avenge their comrades nor 
ward off future attacks. This desire for revenge, likely aimed at physical punishment first, is 
re-aimed on the level of values. Instead of harming the birds, the lambs target their right to 
existence, their way of life.  
 
Initially, this is a similar devaluation to the one found in the moral mandate of demonization, 
paving the way for righteous rage; however, what happens next is different. The lambs derive 
from the devalued qualities of the birds what it is to be good and valuable. Consequently, 
everything the birds represent is evil, and everything they do not is good. The devaluation 
now enters the level of identity structures of the victim and transcends the simple devaluation 
found in demonization. As the lambs claim, “who least resembles a bird of prey, who is rather 
its opposite, a lamb – should he not be good?” The lambs think themselves good, not due to 
some inherent qualities they possess and celebrate, but simply because they are different from 
the birds, which now represent the baseline value of evil. In other words, the lambs believe 
themselves to be good not because of their wool or their hooves, but because they lack claws. 
Nietzsche writes mockingly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra:  
 
“Of all evil I deem you capable: therefore I want the good from you. Verily, I 
have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they 
had no claws.”404 
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Nietzsche criticizes this slave morality because the concept of good is not derived from an 
inherent sense of pride or accomplishment but from an opposition to what is evil, to what is 
deemed threatening. The repressed sense of revenge resurfaces and claims its satisfaction in a 
new permanent morality. The lambs might die at the hands of the birds but at least they are 
superior in nature and virtue. The notion of heaven and hell as final judgment beckons on the 
horizon here. The Ressentiment of the lambs allows for a revenge that exists entirely 
subjectively and seeks its satisfaction not through equalization of damage and suffering but by 
claiming moral superiority through a process of systematic revaluation and identity 
restructuring. The birds, incidentally, are never made aware of this, nor are they interviewed 
as to whether their intentions are indeed evil and malicious as envisioned by the lambs. 
Nietzsche offers a caustic remark when he lets the birds claim: "We bear no grudge against 
them, these good lambs, we even love them: nothing is tastier than a tender lamb." We must 
probably conclude that the birds have no reason to give any second thought to the plight of the 
lambs, in part because they stand for uncorrupted master morality, which Nietzsche took from 
his beloved Greeks, who often acted first and thought later. He describes such morality as the 
following in Beyond Good and Evil:  
 
“The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need 
approval; it judges “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”; it knows itself to 
be that which first accords honour to things; it is value-creating.”405  
 
When we look at the other options the lambs might entertain, we could suggest that the 
devaluation becomes free-floating, along the lines of Scheler’s analysis, and moves away 
from the impossible target of the birds and latches onto something new. A type of Displaced 
Revenge is possible and so is a type of hidden transcript with a platform for venting; however, 
neither strategy resolves the actual injustice, leaving the subject still enraged. 
 
The only viable option the lambs might entertain is to devalue the initial desire sabotaged by 
the birds - their desire to live. The lambs might become ascetic and devalue life entirely. 
Nietzsche opposes this, of course, because it is tantamount to Schopenhauer’s position, which 
Nietzsche dismisses as negative nihilism.406 The same imperative can also be found in the 	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Stoic’s call to empty all attachment of personal significance, a point Nussbaum correctly, and 
in line with Nietzsche’s philosophy, dismisses as self-negating and dehumanizing.407 
Nietzsche is adamant that the desire to live remains uncorrupted in the lambs; the new edifice 
of values, albeit corrupted, honours and supports the desire to live. This is important because 
it translates into a continued and uncorrupted sense of entitlement. Ressentiment, one must 
tentatively conclude, acts in service of a continued sense of worth and desire for recognition. 
Even the desire for revenge is afforded satisfaction through the creation of a sense of moral 
superiority. The lambs are intrinsically better than the birds. In many ways it seems difficult 
to argue that the lambs are not opting for the best possible strategy in light of their situation. 
 
Nietzsche’s depiction of the fable is instrumental but obscures one important point. The lambs 
and birds are scaled differently on the ladder of power due to inherent physiological 
differences. The characteristics of strong and weak appear settled, while the real point, as 
Robert Solomon argues, is that such qualities are always contingent.408 With such concrete 
determinants of power there is no way the lambs can ever avoid the use of Ressentiment; for 
the sake of maximizing satisfaction and maintaining their sense of entitlement, a trans-
valuation of their virtues appears unavoidable. The disequilibrium created by differing 
physiological attributes demands an offset by disequilibrium of spiritual levels, finally leading 
to the competition of non-physical (moral) superiority versus physical superiority. The 
important point, though not advanced in the fable, is that any type of weakness is not 
physiologically determined but self-referential. As Nietzsche writes, it is the “weak as weak” 
that begin the revolt; and the “weak suffer from themselves” he writes at another point.409 
 
The sense of weakness in the lambs is predicated on physiological inadequacy and then 
becomes fact. The lambs have no way to contest their weakness and thus Ressentiment 
becomes a foregone conclusion. What is implicit here is that the victim accepts this weakness 
and works around it. This point is easily missed because Nietzsche equates physiological 
strength with power and physiological weakness with powerlessness, while strength and 
weakness are highly contingent and only take root once the subject becomes convinced of 
their factual validity. In Suspended and Displaced Revenge, weakness is never seen as 
absolute, because it never is; violence always finds an outlet. Any sense of absolute weakness 
and defeat consequently must be self-imposed. Again, Nietzsche does not make this clear 	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because in the fable nature appears as the final arbiter in proscribing strength and weakness in 
the world. Nietzsche’s second illustration makes this much clearer. 
 
The Priests and Knights 
 
In the second illustration, Nietzsche sketches a fictionalized account of a power struggle 
between a priestly and knightly caste of a bygone age. Each caste represents a virtuous 
archetype; the knights are warriors and strategists, while the priests are intellectuals and 
scholars. At first both castes share a precarious balance of power in their dominion over the 
commons. However, somewhere along the line, the knights utilize their strength against the 
priests, overpowering them and forcing them from rule. Consequently the priests are placed in 
a difficult position. They are torn between their desire to rule and their inability to compete 
against the physical power of the knights, without which, they believe, they cannot reclaim 
their coveted throne. What occurs is Ressentiment. Nietzsche explains: 
 
“When the oppressed, downtrodden, outraged exhort one another with the 
vengeful cunning of impotence: “let us be different from the evil, namely good! 
And he is good who does not outrage, who harms nobody, who does not attack, 
(…) “ – this listened to calmly and without previous bias, really amounts to no 
more than: “we weak ones are, after all, weak; it would be good if we did nothing 
for which we are not strong enough”410 
 
The priests refuse to contend with the physical power of the knights and aim their revenge 
precisely against these unobtainable virtues; all that is good about the knight is devalued and 
seen as oppositional to true virtue.  
 
“In opposing their enemies and conquerors they were ultimately satisfied with 
nothing less than a radical revaluation of their enemies’ values, that is to say, an 
act of the most spiritual revenge.”411 
  
But in the process, the priests seem to do more. By devaluing the virtues of their enemies they 
also apparently devalue the desire to rule, because the knightly virtues are seen as qualifiers to 
rule in the first place. Briefly going back the fable of the lambs, this would be the same as 	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having the lambs devalue the birds of prey as well as their own desire to live, because the 
bird’s way of existence is seen as the only way to live, which the lambs, unable to imitate, are 
then forced to debase according to the logic of Ressentiment. This is not what happens 
though; the lambs continue to exercise their desire to live, and consequently the priests 
continue to exercise their desire to rule. According to Nietzsche, the priests simply change 
constituency:  
 
“He has to defend his herd, but against whom?  - Against the healthy people 
undoubtedly, but also against their envy of the healthy. He has to be the natural 
opponent and critic of all rough, stormy, unchecked, hard, violent predatory health 
and power. The priest is the first form of the more refined animal, which despises 
more easily than it hates. He will not be spared having to conduct wars with 
predatory animals, wars of cunning (of the spirit) rather than of force, as it is 
obvious.”412 
 
The priests do not abandon their desire to rule but proselytize new values that are oppositional 
to the evils of the knights. It is, however, unbelievably fortunate that the priests finds such a 
constituency. Nietzsche pays no attention to the possibility that the priests might have 
wandered the lands without ever finding anyone willing to submit to their rule. But unlike the 
lambs, there is a true critique to be levied against the priests, which explains Nietzsche overall 
derision of Ressentiment, and it has to do with his ideas on self-imposed weakness. 
 
In their analysis of the phenomenon, writers have offered differing judgements on what it is 
exactly that Nietzsche dismisses about Ressentiment. Giles Deleuze in his book Nietzsche and 
Philosophy argues, “Ressentiment designates a type in which reactive forces prevail over 
active forces.” He argues that reaction (to a slight or any larger misfortune of any kind) needs 
to be acted out before it leaves “mnemonic traces” and becomes something “felt (senti).”413 
The man of Ressentiment then suffers from a misalignment of the will to act and the will to 
forget. Consequently the Priest, rather than acting out his anger, sulks and ruminates; he 
neither forgets nor acts. The choice besides Ressentiment is then to forget the injustice and 
move on. But Deleuze nonetheless makes it easy for himself; he ignores sustained attacks, as 
the ones suffered by the lambs, or sustained humiliation as the one suffered by the exiled 	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priest. For this to work one would need to substitute forgetting with ignoring; a single event 
can be forgotten but a reoccurrence can only be ignored - which is exactly what the lambs and 
priests attempt. But in order to do so, the salience of the event must be downplayed, which 
demands some fundamental transformation of the relationship between the event (or the 
object) and the subject, hence returning to a re-valuation. In many ways, this mechanism can 
be found to operate between Agamemnon and Artemis; they downplay the salience of 
injustice in favour of continued friendly relations and a reverence for order. 
 
Deleuze’s take on the “will to forget”, however, is important, because he ties in elements from 
the Abuse and Use of History as well as some key tenets of Nietzsche’s own resolution of 
Ressentiment known as the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence. Both works argue heavily for 
the merits of, and indeed psychological need for, forgetting and reframing.414 However, 
forgetting and reframing are not the same, and so it is no surprise that Deleuze does not offer 
an origin for Ressentiment. It appears for him to be a pre-existing condition, much like the 
physiological one suffered by the lambs. Those who suffer from Ressentiment are weak 
because their faculty to forget is impaired, and because their faculty to forget is impaired they 
are weak. Although Nietzsche is a staunch advocate of the “will to forget,” his quarrel with 
Ressentiment remains a different one. 
 
A more instructive view is offered by Solomon who judges that “what Nietzsche despises 
about resentment (sic) is not the emotion but its presupposition of impotence.”415 This 
stresses the question of whether weakness arises from any fixed physiological determinants or 
remains in fact self-referential and in some ways self-imposed. He goes on to say, 
 
“Ressentiment(…) is based on an original perception of oneself, not (…) on any 
natural or socially objective criterion. And so too the weakness he so despises is 
neither the natural vulnerability of the lamb nor the social inferiority of the slave, 
but rather a kind of self-contempt – a refusal to acknowledge oneself.”416 
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It cannot be a refusal to acknowledge one’s weakness because the entire construct of strong 
and weak is arbitrary. Solomon’s question on self-acknowledgment is interestingly reframed 
by Bernard Reginster and posed as a question of integrity. He develops his argument by first 
agreeing with Solomon on the arbitrariness of strength and weakness as fixed determinants, 
 
 “There is no reason to think that, in different circumstances, the feeling of 
impotence would not be created by intellectual, rather than physical, weakness 
(…) the salience of physical strengths and weakness is a purely contingent 
aspect of Nietzsche’s example.”417  
 
The priests refuse to acknowledge their own strengths and virtue as formidable but fall into 
the trap of Ressentiment where “the agent sees himself as irredeemably weak, instead of 
temporarily lacking the strength he customarily has.”418 Here lies the crux of Nietzsche’s 
pronouncements of the “weak as weak” or that “the weak suffer from themselves”. The 
ultimate failure of the priests is that they commit an implicit devaluation of their own virtues 
the moment they lose the throne; they are no longer committed to their own glorious 
archetype but look at the knights as a cause of their failure, and in doing so acknowledge their 
inadequacy and weakness by tragic comparison. Suddenly the injustice becomes fused into 
identity and committed to permanent memory, like Ahab’s pegged leg; the priests carry their 
injustice with them. Virtuous priests would bide their time and use their intellect to force the 
balance; they would wait for the right moment to exact their revenge and reclaim the throne. 
And here Reginster argues quite rightly that the priests lack integrity because they seek to rule 
not because of their own greatness, but because of their inherent opposition to the virtues of 
the knights. Reginster suggests that integrity is kept by: 
 
“An internal critique, i.e. one that relies exclusively upon the perspective (and 
therefore the affects, needs, desires and beliefs which constitute it) of the agent 
who accepts those views.”419 
 
This is not something the priests can boast off, because increasingly their perspective is 
derived from the activity and characteristics of the knights. However, Reginster takes the 
issue of weakness further, which seems incorrect. Reginster believes that the priests not only 	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abandon the validity of their own archetype, but also their desire to rule, “As a last ditch effort 
to gain it.”420 The priests fool themselves into believing that only the knights are qualified to 
rule, and because all knightly virtues are evil, the throne is an expression of this evil. 
Consequently the priests abandon their desire to rule, and ultimately their will to power and 
offer us another source of character weakness in Ressentiment. I believe this is incorrect - 
after all, the priests express their desire to rule by shepherding the weak and sick. Their desire 
to rule remains intact, and by extension so does their sense of entitlement. This is extremely 
important to stress, because it maintains the connection between group entitlement towards 
things like integrity and esteem and Nietzsche’s mechanism. It simply changes the object of 
these group demands, i.e. esteem and integrity are expressed through different values or 
objects than before. For instance, instead of celebrating distinction through hegemonic 
standing, groups now celebrate distinction and esteem through opposition to hegemonic 
standing, and instead of celebrating integrity through material claims over territory, groups 
celebrate integrity through anti-material claims. The desire remains intact, the expression does 
not. 
 
Moreover, the idea that the priests forfeit their desires conflicts with Nietzsche’s celebration 
of the ascetic will, when he claims that the priests are “among the greatest conserving and 
yes-creating forces of life.”421 In accordance with this view, Henry Staten in his book 
Nietzsche’s Voice writes: 
 
“In his description of the ascetic priest as bear, tiger, and fox, Nietzsche admits 
the very power of a type of man his dogmatic typology classes as “weak” (…) the 
terms of Nietzsche’s descriptions suggest that whatever contempt Nietzsche might 
feel for weakness, it is certainly not in place here.”422  
 
The desire to rule is then not abandoned, as much as the lambs’ desire to live is not abandoned 
in the face of existential threat. The weakness is established solely by an abandonment of 
one’s own strength and virtue following a self-imposed view of absolute weakness. Once this 
self-imposed weakness takes hold in the mind of the victim, the apparent powerlessness 
appears almost as physiological fact and makes the strategy of Ressentiment favourable, as 
evidenced by the lambs. Nietzsche’s disgust then is not directed at the priestly will; their 	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desire to rule is intact and strong - something Nietzsche definitely admires. It is their self-
referential weakness, their easy abandonment of their own qualities and virtues that causes 
him to judge them as weak. And when they finally rule again they do so, not as strong and 
virtuous types but as reactive types with their true qualities forgotten. 
 
What does this say about the spiritual revenge? For one, revenge is not abandoned; the desire 
exists and in some cases grows stronger, but what is salient is that the victims of Ressentiment 
will not think themselves able to exact physical revenge, or at least compete on equal terms. 
There is a self-imposed censorship that cannot be undone and furthermore becomes 
internalized through new values and identity structures. Consequently the satisfaction gained 
from revenge is established primarily on a moral level. The claim of moral superiority, which 
comes with the judgements of good and evil, allows for a satisfaction, which is purely 
subjective and does not demand the visibility of the suffering and damage of the assailant. 
This makes the perceived legitimacy of accepted order, evidenced by a lack of rebellion or 
violence, as problematic as in Scott’s account. However, contrary to Scott, the logic of 
Ressentiment, brought to its conclusion, suggests that once the lambs are in possession of 
claws or the priests in possession of physical strength, they will have no use for these 
attributes, as they are deemed morally repulsive, and thus worthless or even sacrilegious. 
However, critically, they will still pursue the same goals and desires but through an espousal 
and celebration of negation values, i.e. clawlessness and feebleness. In other words, those in 
possession of claws and strength are not directly targeted, but indirectly through an exclusion 
from the moral economy: a permanent objective attitude imbued with the same moral 
certainty necessary for violence and revenge but, critically, no longer related to a specific 
culprit or wrongdoer but to representative values and virtues. 
 
The Fox and the Sour Grapes 
 
 
There is another fable often brought up in discussions on Ressentiment. Aesop’s Fox and the 
Sour Grapes deals with similar themes of devaluation, desire and satisfaction, but makes an 
interesting point on the issue of reframing. In Aesop’s fable a cunning fox discovers a bundle 
of juicy grapes. After much effort he fails to secure the high hanging fruits and decides that 
they are in fact sour and hardly worth his time. In a version by Aphra Behn, an English 
dramatist and writer, published in 1687, one reads: 
 
The fox who longed for grapes, beholds with pain 
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The tempting clusters were too high to gain. 
Grieved in his heart he forced a careless smile, 
And cried, ‘they’re sharp and hardly worth my while. 
 
This appears a one-off face saving valuation to avert cognitive dissonance and maintain a 
sense of honour and pride in light of apparent failure. According to Deleuze, the clever fox 
should simply forget the incident and move on. Another version however, published in 1887 
by Walter Crane, an English Artist and Book’s illustrator, reads: 
 
This Fox has a longing for grapes: 
He jumps, but the bunch still escapes. 
So he goes away sour. 
And, 'tis said, to this hour 
Declares that he's no taste for grapes. 
 
Here the devaluation appears permanent; rather than devalue these specific grapes, the fox 
devalues all grapes and commits to a new value system that denies the pleasure of grapes, 
operating as a veiled risk aversion strategy against further failure. It is interesting that the fox 
opts for such a different strategy. In this version, which is a true example of Ressentiment, the 
re-valuation is permanent, while in the former it is merely expedient.  
 
The fable has earned considerable coverage in political philosophy. In his book Sour Grapes, 
Elster argues, “Sour grapes (devaluation) is a mechanism for dissonance reduction that 
operates on the preferences by which options are graded.”423 These preferences are (i) 
misperception of a situation, i.e. the fox could convince himself that he could die snatching 
these grapes (ii) mis-formation of preference, i.e. the grapes are sour and not worth his times 
anyway, and lastly (iii) character planning, i.e. the fox decides to go for another type of food, 
which is possibly healthier for him. Elster provides a clear utilitarian model of social choice 
here. All of these preferences comprise strategies to rationalize away failure by justifying a 
devaluation of the grapes and offering a legitimate reason to abandon their pursuit. Although 
Elster refers to this as a “subversion of rationality,” it in fact appears to be one of the finest 
examples of applied rationality, designed to protect the subject’s self-esteem.  	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In a more dismissive tone, the political philosopher Rüdiger Bittner argues against the 
possibility of successful devaluation because the ‘imagined revenge’ or ‘imagined sour 
grapes’ are not anchored in reality. About the priest he writes, 
 
“As before, one of the two has to go - the compensation or the invention (…) they 
can imagine revenge and invent a story of how to sneak into heaven. But they 
cannot expect relief through the revenge they imagine, and they cannot expect 
happiness in the invented heaven.”424 
 
The fox, in other words, can imagine the grapes to be sour and compensate for his failure but 
he cannot at the same gain satisfaction from this flight from reality. Bittner’s treatment of 
Ressentiment is hostile to say the least. He defends the position “that to be happy and to figure 
in a story in which one is happy are two things.”425 Granted, the devaluation is subjectively 
held and untested in a shared objective framework but still, there is no apparent reason to 
believe that the satisfaction gained from a sense of moral superiority is any less felt than the 
satisfaction gained from physical revenge. We have simply shifted the arena of competition. 
The fox averts an attack on his sense of self by making the grapes out to be sour; he is able to 
walk away with his head held high. The fact that an outside observer might laugh at the sight 
of such vain self-delusion is beside the point. Applying Bittner’s critique to the problem of in-
group biases and moral mandates in violence would explicate the futility of his point. 
 
However, there are some valid criticisms with the sour grapes devaluation, which must give 
pause before adding it to the roster of Ressentiment illustrations. The grapes, at first glance, 
appear to be the object of the fox’s desires - like the priests’ desire to rule, an expression of 
entitlement. When the fox devalues the grapes, he appears to be devaluing his desire. We 
know already that Ressentiment leaves the desire intact. In contrast, Reginster believes that 
the Priest devalues his desire and “condemns all the attitudes that help to secure and sustain it, 
namely the rule to rule. Arrogance, hatred, envy, revengefulness, and the like.”426 
Consequently, Reginster argues in his treatment of Aesop’s fable that should the fox do the 
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same, he would declare “not that the grapes are sour but rather that sweetness itself is evil.”427 
Reginster equates the virtues of the grapes with the virtues of the knights; both must be 
devalued and opposed. However, what new value system arises exactly from devaluation of 
sweetness?  
 
Following Reginster’s logic all grapes that are not sweet but sour must be virtuous and 
desirable. But what about the sour grapes he cannot reach? And if sweetness is evil then why 
desire grapes in the first place? The defining attribute of the grapes is not sweet or sour but 
ultimately the question of obtainability. The clever fox maintains a sense of self-esteem that 
demands that all desirable grapes are obtainable to him. Therefore, all unobtainable grapes are 
devalued as undesirable, i.e. sour. And thus, contrary to Reginster, it is not sweetness that is 
evil but unobtainability, because it challenges the fox’s sense of standing and integrity. He 
desires the grapes as an expression and evidence of his own greatness and strength. 
Ressentiment allows him to entertain the notion that he did not fail at snatching the grapes; it 
allows him to entertain the notion that his standing remains intact. The grapes should be 
viewed as a vehicle for the realization of this identity component. The priestly fox simply 
devalues the vehicle and attributes a negative value in order to uphold his desire. In other 
words, he desires grapes as an expression of his ability to obtain them, and obtainable grapes 
will always be sweet. One can thus judge that the fable of The Fox and the Sour Grapes 
follows the logic of Ressentiment while applying a physiological cause of weakness to the 
fox, in a similar way to the other animal story. However, one must remain alert to the issue 
that the fox never really claims any moral superiority in his ordeal, he merely avoids injury, 
which is a problem encountered in Scheler’s appraisal of Ressentiment. Nonetheless, Sour 
Grapes Ressentiment can prove extremely useful. It is by far the most promising strategy to 
overcome a past injustice, exactly because the example avoids the use of an offender, and thus 
already pre-empts the problem of revenge by focusing instead directly on the framing of the 
injustice. 
 
Before moving on to variances of Ressentiment and how political scientists and philosophers 
have approached the use of Ressentiment, these are the salient points of the previous 
discussion. Nietzsche’s mechanism relies on a series of movements. The first is a growing 
sense of inadequacy, despite a persistent sense of entitlement. This is the true source of 
Nietzsche’s quarrel with the victim of Ressentiment; the priest lacks belief in his naturally 	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given abilities and assumes a defeatist position. Nietzsche maintains that feelings of 
inadequacy are always self-referential, even though some of his examples suggest that they 
may be physiological. Ressentiment then creates a new value system, where notions of good 
and desirable are created out of a negation of the virtues that represent the assailant or 
malefactor. These so-called negation values are not representative of the subject’s own ability 
or qualities but are based solely on the diametrical opposition to the assailant’s existence and 
way of life. The spiritual revenge is finalized when the subject gains a sense of satisfaction by 
celebrating a feeling of moral superiority vis-à-vis the assailant. The initial attack or action, 
engendering feelings of weakness and inadequacy, is then avenged in the mind of the victim, 
because the offender must forever suffer from his own wickedness. So even if the victims, the 
lambs and the priests, gain power, they will not be interested in exacting physical revenge – 
just as the Fox is no longer interested in even low-hanging grapes. Instead, Ressentiment 
creates a world where the moral devaluation of the offender is echoed in every decision taken. 
All morally good actions resonate with the moral certainty found in violent revenge. The 
justice comes from being unlike the offender and in fact morally superior. The evil virtues, 
values and practices of the offender, including the use of violence, are permanently chastised. 
As in the act of successful revenge, there is a temporal arrest, but in Ressentiment the avenger 
alone experiences this arrest. 
 
Variances of Ressentiment 
 
Moving out of pure theory, it is time to operationalize Ressentiment. There are roughly four 
interpretations or variances on Ressentiment to be found in the political and social sciences. 
Some of these are close to the interpretation outlined above, while others go as far as actively 
confusing Ressentiment with resentment or physical revenge. These variances are the 
following (i) ideational Ressentiment (ii) revolutionary Ressentiment (iii) nihilistic 
Ressentiment (iv) anaesthetic Ressentiment – the last one being the closest to the 
interpretation above and concerned entirely with satisfaction. 
 
(i) Ideational Ressentiment is not primarily concerned with revenge; it takes its cue from an 
interpretation by Max Scheler and establishes Ressentiment as existential envy. He writes,  
 
“Envy does not strengthen the acquisitive urge, it weakens it. It leads to 
Ressentiment when the coveted values are such as cannot be acquired and lie in 
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the sphere in which we compare ourselves to others (…) Therefore existential 
envy, which is directed against the other person’s very nature, is the strongest 
source of Ressentiment. It is as if it whispers continually: “I can forgive 
everything, but not that you are – that you are what you are – that I am not what 
you are – indeed that I am not you.”428 
 
If a subject cannot get something she desires, she might delude herself into thinking that the 
object of her desire is not worth having; and, more importantly, whoever does obtain the 
object, is tainted by it. This is covered in the debate on Aesop’s Fable. The clever fox 
dismisses the grapes because he cannot get to them. They are unobtainable and all 
unobtainable grapes are not worth pursuing and hence, they are sour. Now if the fox were to 
encounter another, more able fox, and witness him snatching those unobtainable grapes, he 
would very likely conclude, disparagingly, that this fox is odd for pursuing and enjoying sour 
grapes. The fox’s envy at the success of the other fox is repackaged in order to ward off 
realizations of lesser value and failure.  
 
Existential envy has featured prominently in historical studies on nationalism and culture. The 
noted philosopher and historian of Ideas, Isaiah Berlin, believes that much of the German 
counter-enlightenment, pioneered by such writers as Herder, Schelling and Fichte, is a 
reaction to the failure of German culture to produce anything comparable to French and 
British high culture in the 17th and 18th century.429 The Counter-Enlightenment that would 
later give rise to German Romanticism took as its genealogical basis the accomplishments and 
beliefs of the French and British enlightenment and turned them upside down. Rationality 
gave way to Fichte’s Sentimentalism, Universalism to Herder’s Regionalism etc. In a similar 
vein, Leah Greenfeld, the nationalism scholar, believes that the concept of the Russian soul, 
featuring so prominently in the works of great Russian writers, such as Pushkin, Dostoyevsky 
and Tolstoy, is equally a reaction to the failure of not measuring up to Western success. 
Poignantly, she judges that the Russian Soul, with all its ostentatious mysticism and 
celebrated contradictions, “was a transvaluation of Western values, the creation of a new 
model, this time imaginary in every sense, and comforting, able to serve as a basis for 
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individual self-esteem.”430 The Slavophile movement of the 18th century championed the 
notion of Russian exceptionalism and vehemently opposed all cultural imports from Europe, 
fearing the spread of moral decadence and cultural rot allegedly befalling the continent.431  
 
Yet even this ideational antagonism, concludes Iver Neumann, was an “adaptation of ideas 
whose genesis was inextricably linked to the very same double revolution which the 
Slavophiles so heartily despised.”432 Their diametrical opposition to Western culture, in other 
words, was a continuation of the very Counter-Enlightenment Isaiah Berlin diagnosed in 17th 
century Germany. Ironically, despite the Slavophiles insistence on being wholly different to 
all of Europe, their philosophical similarity to Romantic thought stresses the point that 
ideational Ressentiment cannot escape the narrow confines of negation values. In this line of 
thinking, the success of the Enlightenment’s materialism inevitably gave rise to German and 
Russian idealism, because a full-frontal rejection of these unobtainable Western virtues 
remained the only thing available in order to guarantee much desired equality and esteem. 
 
In more recent cases, ideational Ressentiment has been used to illustrate continued emotional 
opposition to certain groups. Again, there is no sense of satisfaction here, the envy is alive and 
the ensuing tension remains palpable. Wendy Brown in an article titled Wounded 
Attachments, published in 2004, argues that all political identity is established against the 
failure of measuring up to the idealized liberal archetype of the white, middle-class family-
man propagated in film and literature. Brown explains, 
 
“In its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, politicized 
identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion both because it is premised on 
this exclusion for its very existence as identity and because the formation of 
identity at the site of exclusion, as exclusion, augments or “alters the direction of 
suffering” entailed in subordination or marginalization by finding a site of blame 
for it.”433  
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The very feeling of exclusion becomes an end in its self and the basis of a new identity. The 
inability to measure up to the ideal type of politicized identity engenders a sense of frustration 
and failure, which, anchored in an oppositional identity, finds expression in a resentment 
against the political ideal. Brown however, reintroduces revenge. She believes that ideational 
Ressentiment is “a will that makes not only a psychological but a political practice of revenge, 
a practice that reiterates the existence of an identity whose present past is one of insistently 
unredeemable injury.”434 The culprit is the idealized identity, inherently unobtainable. The 
clever fox is faced with a similar culprit in the form of unobtainable grapes; however, he gains 
satisfaction by devaluing them. In Brown’s example the same mechanism is at play, but she 
insists that the tension remains. The rage caused by the suffered injustice turns to a permanent 
rancour. One must conclude that the Ressentiment process is arrested; as indeed it should have 
been in the case of the priests, if they had been unable to find a new constituency. The priests 
luckily escape the fate of an ideational Ressentiment; they gain a new dominion over the 
commons, and so the suffered injustice loses its existential importance, despite still resonating 
in negation values. 
 
(ii) Revolutionary Ressentiment takes the ideational antagonism further into violence and 
physical revenge. I have already argued that this is a grave misreading of Ressentiment. First 
of all, it ignores the fact that Ressentiment is a strategy of revenge; if complete, the 
satisfaction is equal to physical revenge, and thus rules out violence entirely. Secondly, 
revolutionary Ressentiment describes an anger that lashes out after years of rumination; 
strictly speaking, revolutionary Ressentiment is a clear and simple case of Suspended Revenge 
as described by Scott and his hidden transcripts. Max Scheler writes adamantly that “there 
will be no Ressentiment if he who thirsts for revenge really acts out and avenges himself, if he 
who is consumed by hatred harms his enemy, gives him a ‘piece of his mind’ or even merely 
vents his spleen in the presence of others.”435 There is no evidence of negation values or a 
permanent change in identity. 
 
Still many writers argue otherwise. Meltzer and Musolf write “Ressentiment-related passivity 
may at times become a lengthy, dynamic, transitional stage between treatment defined as 
wrongful and retaliation or rectification.”436 At other times they collapse the difference 	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between physical and spiritual revenge completely, “Ressentiment may issue in action when 
the conditions from which it derives become defined as mutable and feasible, that is, when 
corrective action is perceived to be practical.”437 However, Ressentiment is primarily 
concerned with the problem of absolute weakness. Hence, Ressentiment starts from the 
premise that the victim suffers from an absolute and self-imposed weakness, and so it makes 
no sense to claim that Ressentiment one day “may issue in action”. Musolf and Meltzer try to 
have it both ways. 
 
The French historian Marc Ferro makes a similar claim, “in history, resentment has been the 
matrix of ideologies of protest, on the left and on the right. The frustrations that produce it – 
broken promises, disillusionment, and wounds – provoke an impotent anger that lends it 
substance.”438 Ressentiment supposedly is the stuff of revolutions. In a similar vein, Peter 
Sloterdijk provides the German version of Ferro’s analysis and claims that the Muslim World 
offers a refuge for all those plagued by Ressentiment against the West. Rather colourfully, he 
speaks of Rage Deposits that, once accumulated, offer enough currency for action.439 Other 
writers such as Greenfeld and Solomon also maintain that Ressentiment is actionable. 
Solomon writes, “if resentment has a desire, it is in its extreme form the total annihilation, 
prefaced by the utter humiliation, of its target”440 Greenfeld writes in agreement: 
“Ressentiment not only makes a nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful 
stimulant of national sentiment and collective action.”441 These views can probably be 
resolved by looking at the specific genealogy of the moral mandate; drumming up hatred and 
disgust at an offender, in order to demonize and legitimize violence and brutality might 
necessitate the same diametrical opposition found in Ressentiment’s negation values, but the 
genealogy is a different one. These groups target a specific offender, not a specific virtue. 
And of course those who favour action do not suffer from self-imposed weakness. Their 
inaction has different causes. 
 
Revolutionary Ressentiment, in order to differ from Suspended Revenge, would need to 
continue the Ressentiment negation long after the violence has ended. Even after freedom 
from oppression is restored, a residual grudge and negation morality would still be in 	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existence. This goes back to Nietzsche’s critique of revenge as being past orientated. 
Revolutionary Ressentiment, in order to be theoretically consistent, would need to 
automatically be a form of displacement, because the initial injustice and self-imposed 
weakness are still felt and are still integral to the ideational foundation of the subject. But the 
problem is that Ressentiment targets a virtue and not an offender, so the prospect of a 
revolutionary Ressentiment aimed at a specific offender, who is responsible for the injustice, 
is problematic and should be regarded as a reading of Suspended Revenge.  
 
(iii) Nihilistic Ressentiment is the most dangerous variant. It values nothing and subjects can 
easily be expected to bring down the temple over their heads. Greenfeld writes of post WWI 
Germany:  
 
“It fuelled and directed, rather than defined, nationalism defined by indigenous 
cultural tradition. It allowed goal-orientated expression of the aimless Romantic 
spirit. Blended with the Romantic Weltanschauung, Ressentiment focussed its 
passionate but diffuse bitterness and hatred of the world.”442  
 
Max Scheler writes warningly, “impulses lead to Ressentiment the more they change into 
actual vindictiveness, the more their direction shifts toward indeterminate groups of objects 
which need only share one common characteristic.”443 One can easily discern the motivations 
of a nuclear terrorist in these writings, but not one motivated by notions of an afterlife; rather 
a person who holds nothing dear and seeks revenge on the world for a terrible 
mistreatment.444 The sense of entitlement is still in operation but every form of expression is 
instantly devalued. 
 
Nihilistic Ressentiment is the culmination of a long process, where no virtue is regarded as 
morally virtuous. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the prose of the Russian writer Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky. In his Notes from the Underground, he sketches the psychological profile of the 
quintessential Man of Ressentiment. What follows is a lengthy self-analysis undertaken by the 
protagonist, explaining his problem through the application of a telling analogy:  
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“And the point is that he looks on himself as a mouse of his own accord; nobody 
asks him to do so; that is the important thing. Let us now look at this mouse in 
action. Suppose, for example that it too has been insulted (and it will almost 
always be subjected to slights) and desires revenge. Perhaps even more fury will 
accumulate inside it than inside l’homme de la nature et de la verite. The nasty 
means little desire to pay back the offender, in his own count may gnaw more 
viciously inside it than inside l’homme de la nature et de le verite because 
l’homme de la nature et de la verite, which is innate stupidity, considers his 
revenge to be no more than justice, which the mouse, with its heightened 
awareness, denies that is any justice about it. At last comes the act itself, the 
revenge. The wretched mouse has by this time accumulated, in addition to the 
original nastiness, so many other nastinesses in the shape of questions and doubts, 
and so many other unresolved problems in addition to the original problem, that it 
has involuntarily collected round itself a fatal morass, a stinking bog, consisting of 
its own doubts and agitation (…) of course, nothing remains for it to do but shrug 
the whole thing off and creep shamefacedly into its hole with a smile of presented 
contempt in which it doesn’t even believe itself.”445  
 
Dostoyevsky’s Man from the Underground resents all and everybody. He cannot help 
himself; crippled by doubt and self-loathing, he sees ridicule and disrespect in very act. Yet 
he cannot act himself. He takes it, and funnels it into the “fatal morass (…) consisting of its 
own doubts and agitation.” Max Scheler writes of such psychological disposition that “if the 
desire for revenge remains permanently unsatisfied and the especially if the feeling of “being 
right” (…) is intensified into the idea of a “duty”, the individual may actually wither away 
and die.”446 Again, despite the dangerous notions inherent to Nihilistic Ressentiment, the crass 
vindictiveness is not a prelude to action but rather compensation for the lack thereof. As 
Dostoyevsky stresses, the Man from the Underground thinks himself a mouse, even though he 
is a very capable man – and not only capable but wholly superior in every way. But he cannot 
prove it, because he is unable to espouse any value or virtue for long, except for a perverted 
sense of amour propre. But even this is shown to be hollow. When Liza, the young prostitute, 
admits her unconditional love to him, he mockingly rejects her. The psychological profile 	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Dostoyevsky sketches for us is a sense of entitlement in constant flux; as it challenges and 
undermines every form of expression, it ultimately ends up rejecting everything and everyone 
– except itself. 
 
(iv) Anaesthetic Ressentiment is the final variance, and the one most closely aligned with the 
original texts. To bring this out, we will not reiterate the points above; instead, we will take a 
different path. Perfectly functioning Ressentiment will look very much like Nietzsche’s high 
morality, meaning that the subject will be free from vindictiveness and speak with pride about 
her actions and values. The noble spirit, writes Nietzsche, “experiences itself as determining 
values; it does not need approval; it judges ‘what is harmful to me is harmful in itself.’ 
Successful Ressentiment must look very similar to this, because through the newly created 
sense of moral superiority, the psychology of Ressentiment “experiences itself as determining 
values” - at least it believes so. Max Scheler writes:  
 
“Ressentiment man (…) feels ‘good’, ‘pure’ and ‘human’ – a least in the 
conscious layers of his mind. He is delivered from hatred from the tormenting 
desire of an impossible revenge, though deep down his poisoned sense of life and 
the true values may still shine though the illusionary ones.”447 
 
The real problem of Ressentiment is of course that subjects suffer from self-referential 
weakness and this problem is resolved by simply viewing the weakness as strength; yet a self-
referential one nonetheless. The noted philosopher and Nietzsche translator Walter 
Kaufmann, who began the slow but gradual process of disenthralling Nietzsche’s philosophy 
from the grip of Fascist ideology, describes the man of Ressentiment thus:  
 
“To be kindly when one is merely too weak and timid to act otherwise, to be 
humble when any other course would have unpleasant repercussions, and to be 
obliging when a less amicable gesture would provoke the master’s kick or switch 
– that is the slave’s morality, making a virtue of necessity.”448  
 
Ressentiment believes that those who do not use their claws are good, but in fact they only try 
to hide the fact that they have none. Nietzsche’s true nobility, however, believes that those 	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who do not use their claws are good, despite the fact that they have their own. This noble 
morality demands no recourse to evil in this formulation. We remember how the lambs 
needed knowledge of evil before they could establish good, i.e. non-evil. Both Ressentiment 
and moral nobility end with the same moral dictum but the genealogy is widely different. One 
is designed to cover up a weakness; the other has no such weakness and is thus possibly 
motivated by a greater concern than simple self-preservation. The weakness in Ressentiment 
is introduced by focussing on something that is lacking; in an ideal world of only noble 
morality, the lambs would claim: All those with hooves are good, to which the birds reply: 
Aye, and equally all those with claws. In such an ideal world, the lambs, however, would deal 
with their fate differently. 
 
We can illustrate the point by looking at a statement made by Mahatma Gandhi in 1947. 
Gandhi is, of course, known as the champion of peaceful resistance; his marches, hunger 
strikes and awareness campaigns are widely accredited with bringing down the colonial 
machine in India. Invariably portrayed as a saint of colonial protest for avoiding the use of 
violence and bloodshed, he is a noble figure and hailed for his progressive values and ideals. 
Unfortunately, a genealogical investigation illustrates that his higher ideals and values are 
borne from strategic limitation, coupled with an unwavering sense of entitlement. Gandhi did 
not avoid violence because he was strong; he did so because he believed he was weak:  
 
“Had we adopted non-violence as the weapon of the strong, because we realized 
that it was more effective than any other weapon - in fact the mightiest force in 
the world - we would have made use of its full potency and not have discarded it 
as soon as the fight against the British was over or we were in a position to wield 
conventional weapons. But as I have already said, we adopted it out of our 
helplessness. If we had the atom bomb, we would have used it against the 
British.”449 
  
Gandhi confesses that his espousal of non-violence was reactive. He might very well believe 
that non-violence is the way forward; however, this was not taken for granted back then. As 
Nelson Mandela rightly states, “for me non-violence was not a moral principle but a strategy; 
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there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective weapon.”450 A noble espousal of non-
violence would have admitted the availability of guns, armies and nuclear weapons and still 
opted for non-violence as the dominant tactic. To bring this to a close, anaesthetic 
Ressentiment works because it somehow manages to resolve the existential severity of initial 
injustice. Nietzsche’s priests, along with Gandhi, are fortunate in that their Ressentiment 
proves a successful tactic. Equally, German and Russian thinkers were fortunate that their 
rejection of British and French enlightenment philosophy gave birth to a fruitful philosophical 
tradition that became so much more than a simple anti-Enlightenment. These successes are in 
no way given to the formulation of negation values, and so ideational Ressentiment remains 
the most likely variant. 
 
Ressentiment as past-orientated Revenge 
 
Ressentiment and Scott’s hidden transcripts share much interesting overlap; both stem from an 
injustice, which is most easily approached through the notion of permanent oppression. Both 
strategies create problems for the idea that a lack of violence translates into acceptance of and 
submission to order and oppression. They both deny the possibility of scapegoating, because 
in both cases powerlessness and strategic ineptitude is defining. However, when the order 
breaks down and the offender loses his grip on power, Scott’s hidden transcripts lead to 
violence; the revenge act is simply suspended and the rage is kept alive through hidden 
cultural practices. Ressentiment is different. When things change, Ressentiment does not lead 
to violence and bloodshed as dictated by a desire for revenge; instead, Ressentiment does 
something far more damaging. Ressentiment already offers revenge by changing the 
ideational constitution of the victim; the offender is deemed morally repulsive and unworthy. 
The victim internalizes this moral stance and in turn claims a type of superiority that can 
afford satisfaction by allowing the belief that the offender leads a morally worthless life. 
However, in exchange for such satisfaction, the moral position is engrained. In other words, 
the objective attitude towards the offender is imbued with moral totality. What this means is 
that once the victim gains strength and power – and also before, of course - all their decisions, 
informed by negation values, express this subterranean rage. Compassion and moral regard 
are forever out of the question; so rather than seek revenge directly, Ressentiment actions 
punish the offender indirectly by always maintaining a moral disregard of actions or events 
that benefit the offender - a type of permanent Schadenfreude. 	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However, I believe that the tale of the Fox and the Sour Grapes provides another reading of 
Ressentiment that transcends the confines of Nietzsche’s Ressentiment theory and in fact 
echoes key tenants of Nietzsche’s other important theory known as The Doctrine of The 
Eternal Recurrence of the Same, which Nietzsche maintained to be the key to resolving “the 
will’s inability to will backwards.” The Doctrine, to paraphrase, demands that subjects 
constantly evaluate whether an event or incident should be deemed significant or insignificant 
for the purpose of the subject’s self-styled narrative. In this sense Nietzsche allows the will to 
actually will backwards, by censoring events according to whether they are deemed 
constitutive of identity, as self-defined by the subject, or are merely accidents, irrelevant in 
the grand scheme of things. Nietzsche’s take on identity must be described as extremely fluid. 
Acting becomes as important as forgetting. He makes the same claim in the Use and Abuse of 
History, when he argues that an inability to forget leads to “dyspepsia” and that nations must 
always maintain a critical stance towards their history, culling and rewriting the past as 
demanded by present circumstance. It is likely that Nietzsche would approve of the fox’s 
decision to move on and instantly devalue the grapes, which, because of their unobtainability, 
appear damaging to the fox’ self-styled narrative. But he would equally admonish the fox for 
not attempting to snatch other grapes, if grapes are truly what he desires. However, as argued 
earlier, the fox desires grapes as an expression of pride and self-esteem, which can be sought 
from other sources. However, the fox is not free from rage; he simply hides it better. 
 
In Nietzsche’s two examples, Ressentiment is aimed at the values of the offender, i.e. the 
birds and priests, evidenced through the ideational foundation of the negation values. The fox, 
on the other hand, appears to have no offender, or so it seems. In order to move on and admit 
that the grapes are sour, the fox must at the same grapple with his initial decision to pursue 
these grapes, as well as his stubbornness to attempt to snatch them despite repeated failure. If 
the fox decides to devalue the grapes, he must also critically devalue his past decision to 
snatch them, as both elements are constitutive of each other. If snatching sour grapes is hardly 
worth the fox’s time, then his past self surely should not have wasted all this time engaged in 
such a futile endeavour. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that the fox must orchestrate a 
Ressentiment against the very decision, and constitutive values that led him to attempt to 
snatch unobtainable grapes in the first place. In other words, the fox’s success in disinvesting 
his injustice of emotional attachment relies on disinvesting himself from this episode. This 
then explains why the fox cannot snatch any other grapes; his new identity is based on the 
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negation of his former grape snatching self. This irony is not lost on Nietzsche, who of course 
chose a well-known Persian moralist to teach The Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence as 
amorality.451 But it equally suggests that the moral devaluation in Ressentiment can be self-
contained and successfully avenge the injustice through self-directed moral derogation. This 
ultimately leads to a moral distancing towards the defining virtues and values of the past self, 
as it would in regular Ressentiment towards the defining virtues and values of the offender. 
The offender simply turns out to be the past self. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to address Nietzsche’s urgent intervention that no existential injustice can 
ever be fully addressed, because no act of revenge can rewind time. However, despite this, 
revenge is still sought as the next best thing and indeed salted earth revenge has historically 
been understood to aid the healing process, as the offender remains in a persistent state of 
misery and humiliation. However, Nietzsche’s own fascination with the temporal 
immutability of injustice places him on a different trajectory of exploration that goes deep in 
to the heart of concepts like order and stability. James C. Scott’s fascination with the 
Weapons of the Weak, and how oppressed people and groups create counter-ideologies to vent 
and ultimately overturn the hierarchical structure, proved an invaluable starting point. Scott’s 
point that relatively innocuous practices such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage”452 can belie gaping moral 
rifts and suggest pent-up rage and rancour, remains invaluable. Ressentiment turns out to be 
yet another weapon of the weak which, however, operates in a markedly different manner. 
While Scott’s hidden transcripts keep the desire for revenge alive and suspended until an 
opportune moment arises, Ressentiment is predicated on a self-imposed absolute weakness 
and offers satisfaction right away. 
 
Without recourse to regular revenge and justice, and as part of the devil’s bargain, victims 
permanently change the foundation of their moral universe. Whatever is now deemed good 
and virtuous is a direct negation of the values and virtues of the offender. Nothing about the 
victim’s value system is borne from any celebration of his or her own specific values and 
virtues. The lambs are no longer good because they have hooves and wool, but simply 	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because they lack claws. The entire arena of competition shifts from the devalued physical 
realm onto the elevated moral realm. But at the same time, in order to claim moral superiority, 
the devaluation needs to be permanent. Consequently, and this is where Ressentiment differs 
so markedly from any Suspended Revenge or any type of Displaced Revenge, the moral 
derogation of the offender informs all decisions and judgements the victim makes, and not 
just in regard to the offender. So even though physical revenge is never pursued, the 
offender’s virtues and values are forever encased in the objective attitude. Even if the victim 
then gains power, their revenge will be this indirect moral disregard, slowly building a world 
where there is no place for the offender, or anyone resembling him. This is a certainly sombre 
prospect; however, following the short assessment on Sour Grapes Ressentiment, the same 
mechanism can be used to create a world where the past self can be held in moral disregard; a 
point Nietzsche made clear when he chose a renowned Persian moralist to teach freedom from 
morality. In this sense, Ressentiment is potentially much more than a revenge strategy of the 
weak or the other half of the so-called Rage Binary. While a type of obtained justice can be 
afforded in moral debasement and identity reconstruction, the mechanism can do much more 
than just offer justice through Schadenfreude. It can alter the very perception of the suffered 
injustice. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Reconciliation Strategies: A Critique 
 
 
Literature on inter-group reconciliation has moved away from a stubborn emphasis on 
economic growth and security and broadened the investigation to include emotional factors as 
well. In fact, these emotional factors have slowly been etched into the foreground. Issues such 
as moral inclusion and social recognition are seen as vital in state sponsored reconciliation 
efforts.453 This thesis has argued that the problem at the heart of violence and aggression is not 
the desire to punish or even the enjoyment of punishment, but whether punishment is 
restrained by concerns for the moral recognition of the offender as equal. This boiled down to 
P.F. Strawson’s distinction between moral attitudes and objective attitudes governing the 
treatment of offenders. This distinction was found to dictate the difference between 
compassion and instrumentalization; anger and rage; retribution and revenge. Efforts at 
reconciliation must grapple with this distinction and ensure that objective attitude is resolved 
before committing to post-conflict settlement. In particular, the occurrence of hard times can 
reawaken dormant antagonisms and return groups to their ancient opposition, resulting in 
disorder and bloodshed. 
 
The last chapter found James C. Scott’s ideas on Suspended Revenge and so-called hidden 
transcripts to be invaluable for the study of false acquiescence and the idea of disorder 
existing within order. In his latest book, Seeing like a State, he stresses the need for state-
sponsored projects to cultivate and utilize metis, a type of knowledge predicated on insight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 For some examples see Daniel Bar-Tal, “From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution To 
Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis,” Political Psychology 21, no. 2 (2000): 351–65,; Jodi Halpern 
and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 26 (2004): 561; Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations 
after Wrongdoing (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Trudy Govier, 
Taking Wrongs Seriously  : Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace / 
(Humanity Books,, 2006); Thomas Brudholm, “Revisiting Resentments: Jean Améry and the Dark 
Side of Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” Journal of Human Rights 5, no. 1 (2006): 7–26,; Emma 
Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, “Emotional Reconciliation Reconstituting Identity and Community 
after Trauma,” European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 3 (August 1, 2008): 385–403,; Daniel 
Philpott, Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
	   186	  
into local customs, values and motivations.454  The same argument for the need of such 
knowledge can be made in the case of reconciliation and state-ordered assimilation of various 
groups into the overarching order. Historically, and in line with Scott’s arguments about the 
existence of hidden transcripts, it has been the failure to recognize local customs and 
entitlements in hierarchical structures that has ultimately given rise to resistance and 
alienation. With the help of local engagement and commitments, individual groups share in 
the success and esteem that comes with the survival of an order in which they become 
emotionally and ideationally invested. Scott translates metis as type of cunning or wisdom, 
and seems to offer an antidote against the problem of disinterest and rancour sustaining the 
hidden transcripts. However, in order to understand the irony in Scott’s use of the term, we 
need to briefly return to Ancient Greece, where the ideal of metis was invariably linked to 
state power and the Goddess Athena. Metis indeed stood for cunning and wisdom, but was 
heavily influenced by how it was used and for what.455  
 
According to one of Athena’s genesis myths, she was created in the union between Zeus and 
his first consort, the female Titan Metis. However before Metis could give birth, Zeus 
swallowed her, fearing a similar fate to his father Cronos, who was slain by his offspring, 
namely Zeus. The act of swallowing Metis meant Zeus was able to internalize her cunning 
and wisdom. Since then he has been the source of prudence and knowledge, ultimately 
justifying his claim to be the source of nomos. But more importantly, Zeus was now able to 
neutralize the other side of metis, which was a Promethean cunning and propensity for revolt 
and renewal, exactly what Zeus feared would happen if Metis gave birth to his offspring. As 
the myth goes, Athena sprung from Zeus’s head, exemplifying her connection to his cerebral 
wisdom and knowledge. However, in line with Zeus’ plan, Athena felt no desire to challenge 
him. Consequently, metis was no longer aligned with revolt, rebellion or renewal, but with 
order, state power and stability.  
 
In the myths in which she features, Athena takes a more active role in the day-to-day 
governing of human affairs, exemplified by her active participation in fate of Orestes. 
"Casting her strong shield over both sides, and letting neither win unjust advantage,"456 Athena 
uses metis in the service of the polis and ensures harmony through the use of reason and 	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persuasion.457 It is especially her ability to foresee troubles borne from injustices that stresses 
the constructive role of her metis. Returning back to Scott’s use of the term, the connection 
between Athena and metis invariably approaches the concept of order and favours the 
survival of the state over revolution and revolt, and Athena, as the ”pure and terrifying 
symbol of state power,”458 knows how to persuade warring sides to come together for the 
greater good. But at the same time, she will not refrain from using force and fear should 
subjects decide to oppose her order. In arguing for the role of metis, Scott unwittingly 
unleashes Athena’s mandate to maintain order and stability and crush local knowledge and 
custom, should their metis prove too rebellious for the good of the state. In other words, local 
custom is ostensibly honoured and celebrated but ultimately devalued and instrumentalized 
for the good of the state. It is the satin glove hiding the iron fist.  
 
Precisely in this light reconciliation literature has turned towards the use of persuasion and 
reason to bring warring sides together, barely hiding the bias towards imposed order and state 
power. This strategy has centred on the importance of emotions and moralities, rather than 
laws and infrastructure. Bleiker and Hutchison write:  
 
”Successful reconciliation requires opening up political spaces through which 
feelings of injustice can be worked through collaboratively. Key here is a social 
environment through which fear and anger can be recognized in ways that allow 
divided societies to overcome ideas about justice that centre on retribution or 
revenge.”459  
 
The problem is, however, that if groups are committed to their type of justice, expressed in 
revenge, halting this punishment means undermining their claim to justice. A collaborative 
social environment, as the one envisioned, sets limits on the punishment that may be exacted 
or even demanded. Daniel Bar-Tal, whose research centres on entrenched and prolonged 
conflicts, approaches the same phenomenon. He refers to the moral mandate as a “conflictive 
ethos”, and explains: 
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 “It is not surprising that they are viewed as validated truth and thus constitute a 
reality for group members during the intractable conflict. Alternative beliefs are 
blocked, censored, rejected, or perceived with mistrust and suspicion. However, 
despite these difficulties, the process of reconciliation demands changes of the 
conflictive ethos.”460  
 
Bar-Tal also stresses the need for open spaces and dialogue between warring sides in order to 
create the possibility of a shared narrative that can slowly resolve historic injustices scattered 
throughout the past. Both approaches diagnose the right problem but they fail to elaborate a 
working prognosis. Bleiker and Hutchison and Bar-Tal start from the premise that groups 
already acknowledge each other’s claims. Undoubtedly there is considerably headway made 
when both sides sit together and are willing to listen to the each other, or even acknowledge 
the other side as recognizable equals. Objective attitudes, which sustain rage and endless 
violence, the very problems that are being addressed, do not permit this; consequently such 
rushed negotiations may be disingenuous and doomed from the very start. 
 
Muldoon offers a critique of reconciliation literature through the prism of the objective 
attitude. He writes quite correctly, that “the central question is not how justice should be 
understood, but whether it is legitimate to ‘sacrifice justice’ for the sake of other goals such as 
historical truth and social reconciliation.”461 The question amounts to whether reconciliation 
can succeed without a sense of obtained justice. The answer should be a resounding No. 
Following the ideas on Suspended Revenge and Ressentiment, the desire to obtain justice can 
go “underground” or remain suspended, kept alive by the memory of the injustice. Without 
tackling this problem, even in times of stability and peace, the challenges of “hard times” may 
reawaken these antagonisms and return reconciliation efforts to square one. 
 
This chapter will take a brief look at reconciliation efforts both old and new. With the help of 
Nietzsche’s Ressentiment and the knowledge of moral mandates, these efforts will be tested to 
reveal whether a lack of violence truly stems from a genuine resolution of the objective 
attitude and an ability to move on. The first two policies are historically informed and date 
back to the time of the Greeks. Lustration and the creation of a Common Enemy have proven 	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politically useful strategies to overcome past injustices and forge new alliances borne from 
necessity. The next set of strategies is more modern and found in TRC practise around the 
world. These are storytelling, remembrance and acknowledgment, along with the Christian 
imperatives of forgiveness and apology. Finally, the last set of reconciliation practises are not 
really covered in any literature and are born from a historical investigation of the Culture of 
Defeat.462 The analysis will revive the Nietzschean mechanism of Ressentiment and seek to 
probe into the possibility of a past-orientated revenge act, reframing the very perception of an 
experienced injustice, and thus resolving the issue before it becomes a problem. This will be 
put forth under the heading of Nietzschean Vindication and rest on a use of Sour Grapes 
Ressentiment, described in Chapter 5. 
 
Lustration 
 
Lustration is a common historical practice found in the aftermath of defeat. It fosters a sense 
of communality borne from a joint vilification and sacrifice of the losing side’s leaders. The 
military and political elite are punished, executed or exiled. These men shoulder the entire 
fault and responsibility for the war; this in turn creates new moral imperatives and a sense of 
shared identity between victors and defeated. The Nuremberg trials served such a function in 
post-war Germany, and in post-war Iraq, it was the public execution of Saddam Hussein. 
Displacing all responsibility and fault onto scapegoats and then sacrificing or exiling these 
scapegoats purges the community of its anger and strengthens group cohesion through a joint 
act of purifying violence.  
 
The practice was already evident in the time of the Greeks, and covered in Chapter 1 on 
pollution and in Chapter 4 on scapegoats. The practice of ritualized sacrifice purifies the 
community and channels disparate negative emotions towards a common target. Girard 
explains: 
 
“The old pattern of each against another gives way to unified antagonism of all 
against one (…)“There now appears true community, united in its hatred for one 
alone of its number. All the rancour scattered at random among the divergent 
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individuals, all the differing antagonisms, now converge on an isolated and unique 
figure, the surrogate victim.”463 
 
A peaceful new community is created by the communal act of agreeing upon the culprit and 
brandishing them. However, these scapegoats are not dehumanized but demonized, because 
they are held responsible, and for good reason, for the present suffering and defeat. To 
facilitate this, newly defeated countries are always described as liberated rather than defeated.  
 
For the defeated citizens, lustration invites a type of spontaneous amnesia, as past identity 
tropes and allegiances are suddenly suppressed or rationalized away. Herf and other scholars 
on post-war Germany have remarked on the uncanny ability of Germans to distance 
themselves from their Nazi involvement and even claim the mantle of victimhood.	   464A 
similar process was evident in Japan in the aftermath of Second World War. In both countries, 
the criminal cliques around Hitler and Tojo were accused of having led good and honest 
Germans and Japanese astray.	  465 The strategy of lustration makes no moral claims; it does not 
seek to educate, but merely to return to business as usual. Lustration is fundamentally a 
forward-looking strategy with little care for the past. It allows for the total exoneration of 
remaining group members. 
 
The symbolic act of sacrificing military or political leaders exonerates the common citizen, 
whose failure to stop the leaders nevertheless implies serious culpability. For instance, in the 
case of post-war Germany, Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury under Roosevelt, 
favoured a much stronger approach that amounted to nothing short of a salted earth revenge; 
Germany was to be stripped of all industry and returned to state of agricultural subsistence 
toiling away while the world watched. In his words, “if the German people are to make the 
best use of their soil, they are going to have to substitute the work of human hands for 
machinery for several years to come.”466 Morgenthau believed that Germany’s crimes could 
not simply be ignored, but that all Germans needed to atone for the failure of not having 	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stopped their government. In the words Morgenthau’s contemporary, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, “such methods do not prevent war, they breed it.”467 Lustration and amnesty hardly 
satisfies the desire for justice in the light of an unprecedented crime; however, the desire to 
concentrate on the past and deny a move towards a future makes reconciliation virtually 
impossible, as the objective attitude remains entrenched. 
 
Lustration also necessitates a type of Ressentiment explored in the last chapter. The defeated 
develop Sour Grapes Ressentiment by distancing themselves from their initial support of 
these national goals and policies. There is an evident devaluation and derogation that 
manifests itself through a shared scapegoating of those leaders once lionized and respected. 
This change in valuation must be Ressentiment-based, because the new identity stands in 
diametric opposition to the past value, i.e. the new identity is based on negation values. 
Although much more research is needed, one might hypothesize that the sense of victimhood 
and powerlessness is displaced away from the victors towards the past military leaders to 
enable a sense of communality with the victors. For this to occur, first and foremost, the 
victors must be friendly and welcoming to the defeated in order to encourage mutual 
solidarity. The possibility of hidden transcripts remains a possibility. This scenario will be 
further explored later on, in the section on Nietzschean Vindication. 
 
Common Enemy 
 
A well-known Arabic proverb reads ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. A more Realist 
influenced reading of this proverb would suggest that ‘in the face of a bigger enemy, my 
enemy becomes my friend.’ Briefly returning to the illustration of post-war Germany, the 
Truman administration quickly dropped the previous administration’s punitive stance, instead 
opting for an economically and politically vibrant Germany that could act as a buffer against 
Soviet expansion. Some scholars argue that the prospect of a Soviet threat was decisive in 
setting the foundation for US-German reconciliation.468 Germans and Americans could easily 
agree that the real question of the day was how to contain Soviet expansion and ensure that 	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Communists would not infiltrate the nascent political community. Discredited Nazis morphed 
into experienced Russenkämpfer. According to American political advisors stationed in West 
Germany and writing at the time, this was seen as gamble; they feared that such careless 
treatment of Nazi criminals would lead to an inevitable surge in Nazi ideology somewhere in 
the near future.469 
 
The notion of a common threat has great purchase in social identity theory. In Wendt’s 
seminal essay Anarchy Is What States Make Of It, he postulates that rising interdependence 
and the emergence of a ‘common other’, personified in a shared enemy aggressor or 
something more abstract like nuclear war or climate change, may facilitate collective identity 
formation. Forced to confront a joint threat, new behavioural routines emerge that shape 
identity and lead to greater synchronization of interests and values; prolonged exposure to a 
common enemy welds disparate identities into a common one. According to the moral 
philosopher Amartya Sen the problem of violence is then simply a question of identity 
prioritization. The justification for violence according to Sen, “operates through prioritizing 
some identities and downgrading the relevance of other identities, including our broadest 
identity of a shared humanity, but also identities linked to economic, political and other social 
commonalities”470 Wendt and Sen tackle the same problem from different angles; while 
Wendt argues that disparate identities can evolve into a common, Sen argues that disparate 
identities must devolve into a common one.  
 
On closer inspection, Wendt’s insistence on increased ideational interdependence cannot 
guarantee a lack of violence by actively suppressing difference, pre-empting Sen’s argument. 
Neumann writes that “any difference no matter how miniscule may be inscribed by political 
importance and serve to delineate identities.”471 Awareness refines practices of exclusion and 
inclusion but it does not favour one of the other. Threats can overshadow differences but they 
can equally inflate them. If the objective attitude already exists, displaced aggression is more 
likely than an alliance in the face of hardship. And even in the case of alliances borne from 
necessity, when such hardship ends, there is no guarantee that old mistreatments and 
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injustices, if they are of an existential nature and engrained in the collective narrative of a 
people, might not regain centre stage. 
 
Story Telling 
 
A relatively recent contribution to reconciliation practices, storytelling is considered a key 
part in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) and is used in the aftermath of civil war 
and prolonged civil strife. Victims are encouraged to speak of their mistreatment in a 
communal setting; other members of the community listen and validate the victim’s claims. 
Alleta Norval, a critic of TRC-type reconciliation, writes that the practice of storytelling 
“does not bring the dead back to life, but it brings them out of silence; for their families, it 
means the end to an agonizing, endless search.”472 The practice of letting individuals tell their 
own story, Norval argues, de-sacralises the nation-state and democratizes memory. In a 
similar vein, Walker explores the importance of communal validation in the problem of 
second-injury mistreatments, when the victim is denied communal support by way of joint 
condemnation of the act.473 The policy of storytelling rests on the notion that individual 
stories must be heard and remembered and never silenced by some grand state-sponsored 
narrative. These forums, however, are also open to the offender. Those responsible for the 
crimes and suffering are equally encouraged to partake and tell their story without fear of 
reprisal or censure. The point is to nurture new social bonds and allow the other to become 
human once more through the acknowledgment of personal narratives. 
 
The legal scholar Martha Minow explains, “to try to understand those beliefs is not a 
capitulation to evil nor merely a pragmatic effort to avoid laying the ground for further group 
conflicts. It is a recognition of the filters of meaning and memory that lead people to view 
their own conduct and beliefs as justifiable”474 The process of re-humanization can help 
bridge the moral chasm and lead to new practices of inclusion. This is precisely the 
Euripidean enterprise that tries to educate the audience. Instead of vilifying those who commit 
murder and breach nomos, they should be regarded as fellow humans, motivated by familiar 
concerns and fears; understanding their motivations makes them much more relatable. This 
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can break the cycles of vengeance by dissolving the exclusionary position harboured towards 
them. 
 
The act of getting offenders involved, however, comes at great cost, because offenders are 
usually lured by the promise of amnesty. Hayner argues that “the political discourse of 
reconciliation is profoundly immoral, because it denies the reality of what people have 
experienced.475 One participant in Argentina’s TRC states poignantly: “We are being asked to 
reconcile with our torturers, and they’re being asked to do nothing.”476 Writers such as 
Minow and Walker stress, however, that many victims do not seek payback. 477 Instead, many 
victims seek to forgive their torturers as a token of agency, but more importantly, as a sign of 
moral superiority. The desire to withhold revenge can be a sign of Strawson’s objective 
attitude, meaning that the criminal is excluded and not even worth the act of revenge. This is 
anything but reconciliation - this is Ressentiment. 
 
Another issue with storytelling and victim-centred restorative justice is that the audience 
ultimately judges and validates the victim’s emotions; hence, anger that seems excessive is 
automatically chastised, leaving the victim feeling excluded. Muldoon writes, “it is entirely 
possible, for instance, that the audience will refuse to recognize the legitimacy of certain 
emotions (the anger of the black activist, the grief of the white widow) and in doing so force 
the story-teller to re- evaluate her self-understanding.“478 Consequently, in order to “win” 
recognition, victims must self-censor and abide by public norms; this, Muldoon concludes, 
means “those who have suffered abuse will be asked to sacrifice themselves for the sake of 
social harmony.”479 Storytelling and recognition of abuse, in other words, are modulated by 
social concerns and in the worst case scenario chastise and alienate victims whose punitive 
desires undermine the goal of social harmony. 
 
In the TRC of Columbia, however, the idea that offenders should avoid punishment was 
quickly scrapped in light of repeat offenses.480 Rather than seek meaningful reconciliation, 
militarists understood the policy of amnesty as a licence to act with impunity. Colombian 
political leaders departed from South African practices by postulating that reconciliation 	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without a punitive element is a farce. The short-lived policy of amnesty with impunity only 
lead to vengeance killings and escalation, feared already in the time of the Oresteia. So 
instead of hoping for reconciliation on good faith, offenders earned prison time, allowing both 
the victim time to cool off, and the offender to realize that actions carry heavy consequences. 
The Colombian departure from common TRC practices mirrors an older wisdom predicated 
on the Greek concept of pollution. The victim is expected to seek revenge and so the offender 
must abdicate his position in society in order to allow the bloodlust to subside. Although 
ancient practices of exiling the offender are overhauled, the practice of imprisonment satisfies 
the desire of the victim to see the offender suffer, and makes no undue demands on the 
victim’s moral integrity. In some ways Columbia’s TRC practices are more democratic; they 
recognize that victims will express their rage through vengeance killings and consequently 
they deal with this reality rather than deny the emotional reaction by qualifying the idea of 
legitimate victimhood. 
 
Public Remembrance 
 
Restorative Justice scholars argue that the act of recording the testimony of victims and the 
offenders makes a greater point for the ideational foundation of a society. The practice 
confronts what Hayner calls the “conspiracy of silence” by lending authority to hitherto 
denied events.481 “The alteration of forgetting and remembering itself etches the path of 
power,”482 writes Martha Minow. According to Catalina Cruz, collective narratives not only 
have descriptive but also proscriptive properties, in as much as they frame the limits of 
imagined possibilities for a nation.483 According to Spinner-Halev, “to decide that some past 
injustices but not others should be remembered and that some past injustices have normative 
force (…) assumes a certain interpretation of history and a certain view of the present and the 
future.”484 The act of remembering not only vindicates the victims but makes the crimes part 
of the national heritage. As Norval puts it, “when the past is redesigned so as to explain (and 
thus legitimate) the present, what is at stake is more than the here and now.”485 Remembering 
attempts to construct a future where the past can never be repeated by placing a moral censor 
on the event. 	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The act of official remembrance of an injustice certainly validates the victims and creates 
normative markers in the history of the nation. However, without the necessary emotional and 
moral reconciliation, it may also give rise to revenge identities, as the sense of injustice 
remains alive and continuously bleeds into the present. Acknowledgments validate the moral 
mandate of the injured. Without sustained efforts to address the emotional trauma, any 
acknowledgment will only entrench the sense of righteousness felt by the victim. The fact that 
history is continuously reworked should give pause and raise the point whether the 
remembrance of an injustice might not one day provide moral justification for some gruesome 
and belated revenge. Norval argues “the continuous reworking and re-elaboration of the past 
point towards a fundamental impossibility: the impossibility of completion as such.”486 The 
importance is to ensure that whatever future develops is based on a sense of shared norms and 
justice; any remaining traces of moral exclusion can have dire consequences. The concepts of 
schemas of hatred and the prospect of Suspended Revenge become extremely relevant at this 
point.  
 
Apologies 
 
Apologies are seen as an integral part in the reconciliation process. States have adopted the 
practice of official apology to address past injustices. When offenders apologize, the desire 
for revenge and levels of punishment are said to diminish.487 Critically, apologies shift the 
burden of blame from the victim to the offender. An admission of guilt can be deemed to offer 
a token of damage and compensation. In this sense an apology can be seen to partly rectify the 
imbalance caused by the initial injustice. It also stresses the offender’s willingness to re-join 
the moral community and acknowledge their moral obligations towards others. An apology, in 
other words, brings the incident within the moral domain and re-enforces the notion that all 
members, victim and offender, must invest each other with moral regard. Revenge cannot 
operate between subjects that no longer regard each other only as means. 
 
When family members of some of the victims confronted the South African police colonel 
and assassin, Eugene de Kock, during the South African TRC he showed no remorse and 
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refused to apologise for his crimes.488 Similarly, Adolf Eichmann showed little genuine 
remorse for his involvement in Nazi crimes.489 The notorious Nazi politician and military 
leader Herman Goering, during the Nuremberg trials, made a spectacle of the proceedings and 
even managed to garner a rise in popularity amongst ordinary Germans, whom he valiantly 
defended in court – but equally he showed no sign of remorse.490 These notorious killers, 
when put on the spot, defended their actions as necessary, entrenching their beliefs even 
further. None of them saw the need to apology because none of them believed they had done 
anything wrong. Apologies play an important role in reconciliation, but only if they are 
genuine. 
 
Genuine apologies demand an admission of guilt. The subject acknowledges she has 
committed a wrong and feels a sense of remorse at her actions. The act of apology 
communicates to the victim that her mistreatment was wrong - and more importantly - will 
not occur again. An apology goes hand in hand with a change in values and perspective. In 
other words, an apology is a sign of moral change. The legal and civil rights scholar, Roy L. 
Brooks, writes, “apology, most importantly, is an acknowledgment of guilt rather than a 
punishment for guilt.”491 Speaking in relation to the problem of American slavery, where 
Brooks is trying to make the case for an official apology to Black Americans, he argues that 
an apology comes in stages; (i) Government confesses the deed (ii) Government admits the 
deed was an injustice (iii) Government repents (iv) Government asks for forgiveness (v) 
Government avoids repetition of the act. 492 Whether the victim is still alive or not is relevant, 
because “the atrocities’ moral stain does not perish with the victim.”493 Melissa Nobles, 
author of The Politics of Official Apology, qualifies Brooks’ argument about the need to 
apologize for past injustices:  
 
“If the past has no bearing on their present status, it follows logically, although 
not inevitably, that an apology has no place, especially if that apology – in 
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acknowledging group identity, land loss, and political and cultural autonomy – 
implies that such lands and autonomy should be somehow restored.”494 
 
This is certainly logical - apologies are not meant to rid the criminal of his guilt; they are 
meant to communicate to the victim that their mistreatment was wrong. “At bottom”, writes 
Nobles, “an apology is an acknowledgment and moral evaluation of wrongdoing.”495   
 
An apology is much more than an admission of wrongdoing though. It is an admission of 
moral failure and responsibility. Somewhere the transgressor went wrong in his thinking and 
lived his life according to a warped moral compass. For the men in the docks, such as de 
Kock or Goering, showing remorse or even apologizing brings with it an implicit 
acknowledgment that their life, their entire way of existence and understanding the world, is 
wrong and morally worthless. Such self-directed Ressentiment necessitates the assimilation of 
a new sense of right and wrong, a new moral compass. In other words, an apology is an 
application for membership to a new moral community and proof of the moral attitude. 
Evidently, this was something for which neither de Kock nor Goering saw need. 
 
Many writers warn against partial apologies. Apologies, to be complete, must be more than 
simply words; they must inform action. Melissa Nobles argues that “partial apologies can 
actually aggravate matters when the evidence clearly points to liability on the apologizer’s 
part. Here, a partial apology is viewed as an attempt to evade full responsibility, not accept 
it.”496 In other words, a partial apology avoids the necessary change in the moral compass; it 
is not an application form but a letter of deniability. This kind of half-hearted apology was 
evident in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib torture pictures. Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld apologized for the incident but ultimately laid the blame on “a few bad apples.” 
This was a problematic strategy because he could not guarantee that the incident would not 
occur again. The metaphor of bad apples suggests that moral rot occurs naturally and is part 
of the business.  
 
By refusing to take responsibility, Rumsfeld furthermore implied that he did not have his own 
military under control, which was equally damaging. Either through his incompetence or 
warped moral compass, Rumsfeld had to go. This example shows, however, that certain 	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crimes are morally so reprehensible that certain members are required to re-apply to the moral 
community. They are temporarily suspended due to their action, and become situated on the 
borderlands between the moral and objective attitude. Rumsfeld felt no need for this, 
however, and his rotten apple excuse suggested that things would go on.497 A much more 
cynical person would suggest that Rumsfeld simply apologized for getting caught. Gibney 
and Steiner bring this to the point when they write, “powerful states have used apology as a 
means of acknowledging certain truths – which has proven to be a very useful way of 
ignoring other, larger truths.”498 Hence apologies need to be more than just words; the 
application needs to be submitted with a resume showing a change in attitude and action.  
 
Acknowledgment 
 
According to the Ethics Scholar, Jeff Spinner-Halev, apologies come last. They do not initiate 
but rather complete the long and arduous process of reconciliation. “It is better that an 
apology come at the end of a process of political reconstitution, not at the beginning, where it 
may simply be a false promise.”499 This needs to be directly contrasted with Roy Brook’s 
argument that “focusing on compensation before apology is the moral equivalent of playing 
the cart before the horse”500 Brooks believes that an apology must come first; then one makes 
good on it. Spinner-Halev, on the other hand, suggests that one must first show a change of 
heart in order to prove that the apology is meant. Brooks sets himself up for the possibility of 
a partial of false apology – one that is meaningless. An apology for an injustice or 
mistreatment might be made for the wrong reasons, and only a careful analysis of genuine 
behaviour and values-in-action can illustrate whether the original mistreatment is truly no 
longer possible because of a newly required moral attitude. 
 
Acknowledgments can be superior to apologies by being more realistic about the nature of 
past injustices, echoing Nietzsche’s intervention. “Unlike apology”, writes Spinner-Halev, 
“acknowledgment does not presume anyone is responsible for the past, but acknowledgment 
does presume responsibility for the present and the future.”501 At first glance this appears to 
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be an evasion of responsibility, similar to what Rumsfeld did; however, Spinner-Halev 
qualifies his argument:  
 
“Justice does not mean that people or communities take responsibility for the past, 
but rather that political communities take responsibility for the present and future. 
Injustices that occurred in the past cannot be undone, as the sceptics claim. 
Political communities can and should work to undo current injustice.”502  
 
This needs to be contextualized within Spinner-Halev’s greater point about the tragedy of 
history, and indeed foreshadows Nietzsche’s own solution. Slavery, colonialism, exploitation 
are known injustices but without them certain Western nations would be far less well off. 
Apologizing for these crimes necessarily implies that, given the chance, the West would do 
things differently and sacrifice its current benefits. Spinner-Halev dismisses such fuzzy 
hypothesizing in favour of a concrete dedication to present injustice. Rather than apologize 
for its past crimes, the West illustrates its change of heart by actively undoing current 
injustices and warding off future ones. This change of heart, however, rests on the 
acknowledgment that the past crimes are indeed regrettable. In other words, the West atones 
for its past crimes by taking a greater responsibility for current ones and thus indicates her 
moral acknowledgment of the past ones. 
 
Acknowledgment implies total knowledge of the moral, ethical and inter-subjective 
implications of the act without placing the victim in the difficult position of accepting the 
offender back into the moral community, as is most always the case with apologies and any of 
the state-sponsored reconciliation efforts in TRC. Accepting an apology can act like a forced 
closure by removing the right to be angry with the offender.503 Moreover, acknowledgment 
cannot be faked, because it always depends on genuine moral reflection. Consequently, 
according to Jennifer Lind, “all over the world, countries fear their neighbours who fail to 
acknowledge past violence.”504  
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If a nation glorifies past atrocities, as with Japan’s overtly provocative insistence on 
honouring war criminals, it may suggest that such atrocities are viewed as legitimate state 
practice. On the other hand, if nations totally ignore atrocities and chose to forget, as with 
China’s insistence on the non-occurrence of the Tiananmen Square massacres, it may equally 
suggest that they believe such atrocities to be legitimate as long as they are kept off the books. 
Either way, by not taking responsibility for known atrocities and by not showing moral 
acknowledgment or explicit condemnation, states legitimize such atrocities as possible state 
practice. It also dishonours the victims. In this vein, the TRC’s main mandate of recording the 
stories of past atrocities and etching them into the country’s national consciousness serves a 
dual purpose; it vindicates the victims but also ensures that such atrocities become part of the 
national story and enjoy universal condemnation. In contrast, groups who refuse the practice 
of acknowledgment, atonement or contrition, but still offer an apology, cannot be expected to 
have undergone a change of moral values, because such change makes the need for atonement 
and contrition indispensable.505 One might hypothesize that the old attitude is still in place. 
 
In the case of post-war reconciliation in Europe, West Germany had to make many acts of 
contrition before her former enemies, most notably France, began to trust her and view her as 
part of the European community rather than an inevitable threat. For instance, the ten-year 
anniversary of the end of the Second World War went without any recognition in West 
Germany. The only early official mention of the war was a designated holiday to honour 
German resistance against the Nazi regime. Putting men like von Stauffenberg on 
international display showed the world that Bonn chose to honour a set of victims of which 
the whole world could feel proud.506  
 
In the infamous knee-fall incident, when Willy Brandt stood in front of the war memorial in 
Warsaw in 1970, he later recalled: “Under the weight of recent history, I did what people do 
when words fail them. In this way I commemorated millions of murdered people.”507  Such 
genuine and spontaneous gesture of atonement from a head of state is a remarkable display of 
character, both personal and national. But it is no apology and for good reasons. An apology 
is best viewed as a letter of application for membership in a moral community. In contrast to 
Brooks, Spinner-Halev suggests that such application will have a better chance if it includes a 	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resume and character references. Acknowledgment and atonement provide such references 
and show that the candidate has earned the right to be considered for membership. 
 
However, the application in the end will only be successful if the community makes the 
formal gesture of accepting the apology. In this sense, Spinner-Halev suggests that the act of 
apology is mere formality, that by the time the transgressor applies for membership, he has 
already proven his compatibility. An apology is without doubt a grand gesture that can do 
much more harm than good when it is an empty one. The main problem with apologies is that 
they make emotional demands on the victims; they imply that the transgressor should be 
forgiven. A change in values and identity are essential but such change takes time. An 
apology acts as the finalization of a long and arduous process, because it is up to the victim to 
sign off on the development by letting go of her vindictive impulses. By accepting an apology 
the victim no longer harbours an objective attitude towards the transgressor and believes the 
sense of moral recognition to be reciprocal. 
 
Acknowledgment of past crimes and displays of atonement and contrition suggest that the 
transgressor no longer perceives past actions the same way. The moral regard has changed, 
and so has the value system and responsible ideational structure of the assailant. The chasm 
between victim and criminal is bridged by the sole efforts of the criminal. Moreover, as 
already stated elsewhere, acts of acknowledgement and atonement place no demands on the 
victim. There is no implicit command to accept such overtures, no ulterior motive of moral 
blackmail. Acknowledgment simply puts on displays the transgressor’s new sense of 
morality. In ancient Greece, the criminal was still liable to be exiled from the polis, because, 
regardless of intentionality or contrition, he remained polluted and the victim was expected to 
seek revenge. The only thing acknowledgment and contrition can achieve is the genuine 
appreciation that the crime will never occur again. The initial injustice, however, remains, and 
so it remains up to the victim whether they seek to forgive the offender or remain invested in 
a position of moral exclusion. 
 
Forgiveness 
 
Forgiveness is the epitome of reconciliation. More than accepting an apology, forgiveness 
indicates that the past injustice or mistreatment no longer carries weight for the relationship 
between victim and offender. Forgiveness between groups is often practiced after the initial 
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offender generation has passed on; thus, forgiveness tends to be limited to forgiving the group 
rather than the offender.508 In many ways, this practice indicates a sober assessment of the 
nature of injustice. Rather than persuade and negotiate, the emotionally charged generation is 
allowed to pass away, before states “officiate” normal relations. Opting for immediate 
forgiveness after a severe injustice or mistreatment might mask a deeper problem, where a 
reluctance to punish is predicated on Ressentiment. 
 
Unwillingness to seek revenge against a criminal might stem from the notion of moral 
superiority, i.e. the belief that a criminal is not worth even the revenge. This might seem 
superficially agreeable; however, such an attitude hides a deep-seated antagonism that cannot 
lead to true reconciliation. In essence the victim still holds onto the belief that she is better 
than the offender by not giving in to her retributive urges; however, in reality her celebration 
of difference merely hides the same moral mandate, which enables violence in the first place. 
The objective attitude is still in operation. Avoiding physical revenge in some cases can lead 
further away from reconciliation and entrench the moral chasm. Forgiveness must be 
predicated on a genuine willingness to accept the offender as a moral equal. 
 
“Forgiveness”, writes Paul Laritzen, ”acknowledges that the civic relationship is worthy of 
respect and restoration.”509 It is the willingness to respond positively to the perpetrator’s 
efforts at atonement. One the one hand, this indicates a remission of negative emotions 
towards the criminal, while on the other hand, it also implies that the victim will make an 
effort to re-establish the broken relationship. Walker, however, argues that “victims are 
deeply sensitive to the ways provided or denied them in coming to terms with the wrongful 
harm others have done.”510 The act of forgiveness is a grand gesture and, like an apology, 
must come at the end of a long and tested process of reconciliation. Forgiveness, however, for 
all practical purposes needs to be contrasted with the act of forgetting.  
 
In her analysis of TRC practices in Mozambique, Priscilla Hayner found that the policy of 
forgiveness was complicated. In the words of one participant: “Would you really be able to 
kill all the people who had committed atrocities? If you did, how many people would be 
left?”511 The general amnesty laws passed in Mozambique were a blanket case exempting all 	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parties from responsibility. Although the laws acknowledged the crimes they also suggested 
that they be forgiven, and that no party had to admit to them. In this case at least, Hayner 
comes to the conclusion that “the word reconciliation is a word used to mean forget the past 
and be tolerant.”512 However, in the case of Mozambique the conclusion was that the policy 
of forgetting and moving on, politically, was favoured at a state-level and seen as necessary 
for avoiding further cycles of violence. In this sense, the community understood the endless 
devastation wrought by the Erinyes and favoured the health of the polis over individual claims 
of revenge and justice. This was not fundamentally different from South African policies. 
However, Mozambique supplemented this state-sponsored amnesia with traditional forms of 
reconciliation. Mozambique initiated healing mechanisms that resolved personal claims, 
allowing victims to claim justice by choosing how they dealt with the crime from an array of 
tribal practices, without impinging on state affairs. 
 
Hayner discovered some fascinating ancient rituals, which allowed criminals, i.e. soldiers, 
who had murdered, to re-join their community and be forgiven. According to tribal belief, the 
ghost of the victim sits on the criminal’s shoulders and the community must organize a 
special ritual to purge the ghost and re-humanize the criminal. Once completed the criminal 
re-joins the community without question - even from the family members of the murdered. 
Another traditional ritual allows the family members of the victim to take the criminal to a 
river and submerge him under water; it is then up to the family members to allow him to 
resurface or drown. Unsurprisingly, the criminal is always allowed to resurface and by doing 
so is re-born, often taking the place of the lost family member in the community, i.e. the place 
of the victim.513 These are examples of genuine and freely determined decisions. Although 
the state-sponsored line is ‘forget and move on!’ traditional practices ensure that victims and 
criminals reconcile in a meaningful way. This is in many ways superior to the victim-centred 
restorative justice found in South Africa, which makes demands on the validity of the victim’s 
emotion. Recognition and agency are not qualified by TRC courts but experienced through 
ritualistic acts that force victims to engage directly with their vindictive urges. The decision to 
forego revenge and forgive is up to the victim. 
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Forgiveness & Punishment 
 
Forgiveness, according to Martha Minow, is not about forgiving the crime but rather the 
underlying intention, going back to Chapter 2 on the appraisal of intentionality in the 
construction of either an objective attitude or moral attitude emotion. Forgiveness, 
 
“recognizes wrongdoers as human beings, fallible and limited, capable of choice 
and worth, neither monstrous nor beneath contempt; in forgiving one needs to 
humanize, rather than to idealize or to demonize, the wrongdoer, because that puts 
the wrongdoer back into a world or moral relations that morally valuable 
forgiveness affirms.”514  
 
In other words punishment and forgiveness can go hand in hand. Punishment after forgiveness 
is still considered reasonable and just, but predicated on a moral attitude not an objective 
attitude, turning revenge into retribution. Minow argues that the “one forgiving must give up 
a right to revenge, but one might forgive and not give up the belief that it is right for the 
wrongdoer to accept his or her punishment.”515 In other words forgiveness and punishment 
are not mutually exclusive, only forgiveness and revenge are. What Minow is describing is 
the movement from the objective attitude to the moral attitude. She advocates an absence of 
revenge, but not of retribution. Moral attitude emotions are necessary for justice, as denying 
any of these emotions under the guise of forgiveness undermines the notion of justice and the 
moral worth of the victim. Forgiveness must not lead to a repression of natural urges for just 
punishment, but simply lead to a change in the moral regard of the transgressor. 
 
Opting for immediate and unqualified forgiveness fails to honour the normative constraints of 
inter-subjective behaviour. Without such rudimentary communication no shared concept of 
justice can arise and no moral community can coagulate. Following Nietzsche’s intuition 
about the Christian notion of unqualified forgiveness, denying the offender the punishment he 
deserves means regarding him as not equal. This is similar to Strawson’s objective attitude 
and its implicit exclusion of equal membership in the community. In other words, forgiving 
because someone does not know better implies that the offender is different and possibly sub-
human. To be afforded equal rights, actors must enjoy full accountability for their actions. For 	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this to occur, forgiveness, as inherent to the moral attitude, and justice, need to coexist. In 
other words, forgiveness must be limited to turning a desire for an objective attitude 
punishment into desire for a moral attitude punishment.   
 
Martha Minow makes this point: “In theory, forgiveness does not and should not take the 
place of justice or punishment. Forgiveness marks a change in how the offended feels about 
the person who committed the injury, not a change in the actions to be taken by a justice 
system.”516 Continuing with Nietzsche’s intuition about Christian morality, unqualified 
forgiveness only stalls the inevitable punishment, because the Christian God determines that 
‘revenge shall be mine in heaven.’ Rather than genuinely preach forgiveness and peace, 
mistreated Christians secretly take solace in the fact that their god will punish the wicked – 
and for eternity no less. Nietzsche is fundamentally correct when he deems this type of 
forgiveness to be disingenuous and hollow, and representative of a deep-seated 
vindictiveness. 
 
Another important criticism of unqualified forgiveness stresses the moral intentions of the 
offender. Jean Hampton points out that, “one who is charged for behaviour which she does 
not believe was wrong tends to regard the forgiveness as an affront, a patronizing and 
insulting gesture, just as an innocent person will take offense at being granted a pardon for a 
crime she didn’t commit.”517 This sheds a different light on the forgiveness versus 
punishment problem, and is equally instructive. By forgiving the offender the victim is 
imposing a moral regard on the offender, which the offender might reject. Consequently, 
overtures of reconciliation and forgiveness, which rest upon the belief that an injustice has 
occurred, take on a very different meaning should the offender believe his own actions to be 
informed by a sense of justice and righteousness, albeit a subjective and disjointed one. In an 
almost Kafkaesque fashion, the offender is forgiven for a righteous deed. Hence, one-
sidedness in forgiveness can be as useless and misleading as one-sidedness in apologies. 
 
These points on the merit of punishment notwithstanding, genuine forgiveness at the end of a 
long process of reconciliation is favourable and allows for closure and the same must be said 
about an apology. Without transformation though, neither forgiving nor apologizing is very 
effective; they just white wash the offense. Although there is an awareness of right and 	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wrong, there is little suggestion that the breach might not be repeated. Scholars like Lind fear 
that the practice of official apology has become a stay-out-of-jail-free card, lacking the 
emotional gravitas necessary to suggest a true change of heart. Unfortunately, atonement and 
reconciliation are lengthy processes though and sidestep the generation most affected by the 
injustice. Revenge on the other hand may offer immediate emotional satisfaction to the 
victim; equally, the exact opposite, a lack of punitive desires, though for the wrong reasons, 
might give equal satisfaction because the offender is viewed as morally inferior and not even 
worth an act of revenge, a clear sign of Ressentiment. Neither type of strategy aimed at giving 
back to the victim is particularly attractive. The victim, through action, can become like the 
maligned offender or, through inaction, become unlike the offender. Either way, moral 
inclusion is denied.  
 
Nietzschean Vindication 
 
Because the victim ends up detracting value from the offender in response to the value taken 
from her, revenge strategies are always framed by the injustice suffered. As covered in 
Chapter 4, for Nietzsche, revenge is always a tragic consequence of the inability to address 
and change the past. In On Redemption, Nietzsche states,  
 
’It was’: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. 
Powerless against that which has been done, the will is any angry spectator of all 
things past. "518 
 
Nietzsche dismisses practices of reconciliation because they ultimately all fail to undo the past 
injustice. In accordance with the discussion on revenge in Chapter 4, the felt powerlessness in 
addressing past injustices commits international actors to an identity informed entirely by the 
past, like Ahab who is reminded of his own injustice with every thump of his wooden leg. 
The Auschwitz survivor, Jean Amery, shares Nietzsche’s concern on what amounts to 
powerlessness towards the past, “absurdly, it demands that the irreversible be turned around, 
that the event be undone. Resentment blocks the exit to the genuine human dimension, the 
future.”519   
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In order to address the problem of vindictiveness, Nietzsche offers an important practical 
insight. He admonishes victims to view their offender as someone who has done them a great 
favour rather than an injustice. “When, however, you have an enemy, do not requite him good 
for evil: for that would make him ashamed. But prove that he has done something good to 
you.”520 Nietzsche stresses that injustices are the product of framing and that the victim has 
full control over whether she decides that the mistreatment constitutes an injustice or not. 
Nietzsche explains, in the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same, that any past event is 
either termed significant or insignificant depending on the present context and whether the 
event is deemed relevant for the subject’s chosen future. If a past event proves relevant it will 
be absorbed into the self-styled narrative regardless of the severity of mistreatment. Nietzsche 
is adamant that such personal philosophy demands amor fati – a love of one’s fate. If an 
event, however, is deemed unimportant for the self-styled narrative, it is relegated to the ranks 
of accident and forgotten. In other words no act of injustice or mistreatment is allowed to 
leave a permanent existential mark, except in a positive and life-reaffirming way. This is 
Nietzsche’s way of allowing the will to control even the past, by qualifying each event along 
the lines of present-based signification.521  
 
There are some immediate issues with this. Nietzsche’s admonishment to accept one’s enemy 
as a friend, for the reasons given, denies the enemy’s subjectivity. To play this out with 
Hecuba and Polymester, Nietzsche’s suggestion amounts to Polymester emerging from his 
tent, mutilated and childless, thanking Hecuba for making him face his crime and teaching 
him the importance of nomos; hardly the emotional response Hecuba desires. And yet this is 
what Nietzsche implies. In this scenario Polymester welcomes Hecuba into his moral circle 
and avoids any notion of rage or revenge or the sense of having been mistreated. This strange 
scenario echoes Hampton’s point on patronizing forgiveness. Polymester’s sense of identity is 
so immensely fluid that all the pieces of his self can be re-arranged at will, thus muting the 
sense of injustice to his person, because his “person” forever changes with the whims of fate. 
Hecuba on the other hand is left wanting; Polymester pre-empts her revenge by denying her 
the satisfaction of his suffering and the possibility of a permanent mark. Nietzsche writes,  	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“To be incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds 
seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an 
excess of the power to form, to mould, to recuperate and to forget … Such a man 
shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eats deep into others.”522 
 
This is the same dehumanizing language witnessed in the objective attitude as well as in 
witness accounts in TRC, thus suggesting that Nietzsche’s take on the enemy is one of moral 
disregard because their subjective position and desires are discounted and deemed irrelevant. 
 
Concerning the possibility of signification, Nietzsche scholars like John Richards and 
Alexander Nehamas would go as far as suggest that the Eternal Recurrence allows any past 
event to be deemed insignificant and forgotten. This seems incorrect and moreover belies 
Nietzsche’s choice of protagonist. Zarathustra was a historical figure; a famous Persian 
preacher alive sometime in the 6th or 7th century. Nietzsche believed that the figure of 
Zarathustra deserved redemption, and thus gave him a rebirth as the teacher of the Doctrine of 
the Eternal Recurrence. The tragedy of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra lies in the fact that his future 
is governed by a desire to redeem his past mistake, to make good on the fact that he taught a 
morality which would imprison man. All of the encounters in Thus Spoke Zarathustra are, in 
one way or another, disciples of Zarathustra’s Persian morality; and confronted with his own 
mistakes, in so many varying forms, Zarathustra’s only recourse is to try to correct his 
mistake by teaching liberation from his youthful folly in the form of the Eternal 
Recurrence.523 The ultimate lesson in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is really that the past cannot be 
avoided, and that neither suffered injustices nor committed crimes can be fully ignored. But it 
remains open to the subject to decide how to incorporate these events into a narrative that 
affirms the past rather than deny it. 
 
Jean Amery went around Germany for decades seeking a release from his rancour. “No one 
wants to relieve me of it, except the organs of public opinion-making, which buy it. What 
dehumanized me has become a commodity, which I offer for sale.”524 Thomas Brudholm in 
an essay comparing Jean Amery’s and Primo Levi’s legacy, argues that Amery’s 
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“Ressentiment could and should (have been) pacified if German society came to join the 
resentful victim’s wish for an undoing of the past.”525 In Amery’s words:  
 
“All recognizable signs suggest that natural time will reject the moral demands of 
our resentment and finally extinguish them. The great revolution? Germany will 
not make it good, and our rancour will have been for nothing. Hitler’s Reich will, 
for the time being, continue to be regarded as an operational accident in history. 
Finally, however, it will be purely and simply history, no better and no worse than 
dramatic historical epochs just happen to be, blood-stained perhaps, but after all a 
Reich that also had its everyday family life.”526  
 
His offenders never properly atoned for what he had suffered; the injustice remained with him 
until his suicide.  
 
Applying Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to Amery’s case would be misguided; 
the limits of the Doctrine are evident. Some injustices are so encompassing that they cannot 
possibly be deemed insignificant just for the sake of whitewashing the past and supporting a 
chosen narrative. Both Nietzsche’s fictional account of Zarathustra and Amery’s own account 
are proof of this. Although Amery carved a purpose out of the unspeakable things done to 
him, his rancour never truly faded away. Moreover, no one in their right mind would claim 
that such crimes are necessary for the sake of amor fati. A true resolution of rancour might 
never have been possible, even if Amery harboured a moral attitude towards Germany and 
Germans.  
 
However, vindication, by way of carving purpose out of the unspeakable, can mitigate the 
desire for revenge by changing the nature of the suffered injustice, and thus reducing its 
existential importance. Susan Jacoby, author of Wild Justice, writes that  
 
“Vindication suggests the process of clearing oneself of a false charge or of 
overcoming injury and humiliation by proving oneself to the world… some men 
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and women aim at vindication by attempting to build themselves up, others by 
tearing down their enemy.”527  
 
A favourite example is the story of Samuel Pisar.528 Samuel Pisar suffered a similar fate to 
Amery. However, after his release he travelled to Australia and studied law, and much later he 
would gain post-graduate degrees from Harvard and the Sorbonne. Pisar became an activist 
and human rights lawyer. He travelled on both sides of the Iron Curtain and worked tirelessly 
to ameliorate the suffering caused by the Cold War tensions. Despite Pisar’s past, he never 
sought revenge against Germany, nor was he limited in his growth by his internment in the 
concentration camps. “His victory against Hitler, his vengeance, would be the undoing of 
Hitler’s work,” writes Jacoby. “The best revenge is a life well-lived.”529 
 
Pisarian Vindication is the most promising strategy for resolving the existential severity of 
the past injustice. It accepts the crime but severs the ties between victim and criminal; the 
victim no longer must choose between becoming like the offender and becoming forever 
unlike the offender. Ressentiment and revenge rely on mandates founded on moral opposition; 
in both cases the victim is beholden to the offender for satisfaction. Vindication makes a 
different claim: the victim chooses a path that independently affirms her worth. The initial 
loss of moral worth is not returned as in revenge, but simply neutralized. “Samuel Pisar’s life 
was his own self-justification or upholding of his own honour against the brutal challenge of 
Nazi wrongdoing”, writes Govier.530 Vindication turns the crime from a moral wrong into an 
evaluative mistake, meaning that the offender was always mistaken in his moral devaluation 
of the victim. The proof lies in the success the victim has enjoyed despite the suffered 
injustice and mistreatment. In Nietzschean parlance, the victim creates her own moral value; 
the vengeful victim on the other hand cannot create value and must take it by detracting from 
the offender. In creating a valuable and meaningful life, the initial injustice is downplayed and 
gradually reduced to existential insignificance.  
 
In International Relations, nations always reinvent themselves through a constant process of 
signification; salient historical episodes are either downplayed or highlighted depending on 
the present day context. Historical memory is as pragmatic and slippery as the politicians who 	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use it. Nations that suffer a great defeat overcome their grudge by espousing new foundation 
myths that make reconciliation easier. They also search for historical episodes, untainted by 
the discredited regime, that allow a new sense of pride and meaning - a new destiny. John 
Dower531, Wolfgang Schivelbush532, Jeffrey Olick533, Heinz Kohut534, Richard Ned 
Lebow535 and many others have looked at the collective memories and values of nations after 
defeat. All agree in some way or form that changes occur very quickly; that tainted identity 
structures are swiftly replaced with untainted ones; that nations steadfastly look to re-establish 
a sense of pride and standing, usually in spheres of economics and technology; that old 
mistakes, if not entirely ignored, are deemed ill-judged and regretted as mistakes, but also not 
worth pondering. 
 
Nations, more than their citizens, ignore episodes in the past that undermine claims to 
greatness and distinction. Groups, of course, have a mandate to provide their members with 
esteem and a sense of belonging. In this sense even injustices and mistreatments can be 
reframed according to this overruling imperative. In Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Athena of course 
played into the Erinyes’ vanity and desire for recognition when she offered them a cult of 
worship and a temple beneath Athens. In his book Cultures of Defeat, the German historian 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch captures this phenomenon from an interesting angle, he writes,  
 
“The future promised (…) a new role for the nation in the international 
community. It is a short step from understanding defeat as an act of purification, 
humility and sacrifice – a crucifixion of sorts – to laying claim to spiritual and 
moral leadership in the world.”536  
 
Moral and spiritual superiority is the mark of Ressentiment, but a Ressentiment against 
whom? At first glance this could be Ressentiment aimed at the military superiority of the 	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oppressor and victor, because defeated groups obviously lack the military power to fight or 
rebel. However, in the long run such Ressentiment and value opposition should sustain a 
continued grudge, which cannot be argued to have existed for instance in occupied West 
Germany. On the contrary, the occupation cost not a single life and cultural relations only 
grew in strength and depth over the years. This automatically disqualifies hidden transcripts 
then. The most likely scenario must be Sour Grapes Ressentiment where the past identity 
tropes are dislodged and derogated in favour of new ones that promise a sense of continued 
esteem. 
 
The moral superiority trope is then constructed as negation value to the dismissed values of 
military strength and global ambition. Again, the diametric opposition of values is key to 
proving the existence of Ressentiment. Ressentiment cannot create new values; it simply 
negates the values of those responsible for the suffering. In relation to post war Germany, 
Bartov explains that the “Nazi” became an elusive enemy, a type of archetypal evil providing 
the ideational contrast to the good German.537 It is worth stressing that such type of Sour 
Grapes Ressentiment can only function if the Nazi identity trope is totally disinvested and 
Germans are permitted to distance themselves from their past involvement and even 
culpability.538 Although the research is slim, many scholars point out that America’s stringent 
and punitive stance towards post-war Germany between 1945-46, exemplified by the 
Morgenthau Plan, led to a resurgence in Nazi ideology and shifted the blame for current 
suffering onto American occupation policies, especially because of the felt vindictiveness in 
denazification and anti-fraternization decrees.539 This would have side-tracked the Sour 
Grapes Ressentiment development into a Suspended Revenge development against the 
American occupiers, with a continued trickling of rage through innocuous practices such as 
foot-dragging, sabotage or jokes – not unlike what happened in the East. 
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In those few instances when defeat is accepted, occupations welcomed and peace and stability 
established the reason is not a lack vindictive impulses or a lack of spirit. Group Rage can 
engage in Displaced Revenge, Suspended Revenge or Ressentiment in order to express an 
entitlement for justice and revenge. In the few instances, however, of peaceful occupations, 
the rage is redirected towards a different target, one that is shared by occupier and occupied 
alike, leading to type of communal purification, explored earlier in the practice of lustration. 
The delicate process of Sour Grapes Ressentiment can only succeed if those engaged in rage 
manipulation are not prevented from adopting a new identity based on negation values. 
Further mistreatment felt in the present might sabotage such a delicate process and lead to an 
adoption of different negation values, preventing a past self-directed Ressentiment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored some of the most prevalent strategies of political and 
emotional reconciliation, ranging from lustration, common enemy creation, storytelling, 
public remembrance, moral acknowledgment, apologies and forgiveness to Nietzschean 
vindication. Each one of these strategies enjoys practical advantages and disadvantages. 
Storytelling, for instance, despite claiming to be victim-centred, makes strong demands 
on the emotional qualification for victimhood, possibly harbouring deeper, more anti-
democratic impulses and ultimately favouring social order over personal justice. In 
addition, often the desire to forego revenge masks a deep-seated Ressentiment and 
moral disregard for the victim. Traditional forms of reconciliation such as lustration 
prove to be a type of Displaced Revenge that demands the existence of a commonly 
agreed-upon scapegoat, taken from the ranks of the offender. Common enemy creation 
similarly demands the existence of an evil other, while even more dangerously basing 
the alliance on fear and anxiety, emotions easily prone to manipulation. Forgiveness and 
apologies are final acts after a long, arduous and often generation-bridging process of 
atonement and moral acknowledgment. Arguably, they are the most promising and 
deepest forms of reconciliation, but equally the ones that take the longest and are the 
most vulnerable to setbacks and misunderstandings.  
 
The most interesting and promising strategy for reconciliation comes through a type of 
Ressentiment, which in itself constitutes a revenge strategy. Building on existing 
literature on cultures of defeat and how groups often reinvent themselves immediately 
after defeat and espouse new narratives imbued with pride and a sense of greatness and 
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distinction, the act of revenge is found to operate in a peculiar way that neither suggests 
repression of vengeance impulses nor some hidden rancour. Instead, a type of Sour 
Grapes Ressentiment creates a new identity diametrically opposed in value to the 
foregone “evil” identity trope. The rancour and rage are not aimed at the source of the 
injustice, i.e. the military victors, but attached to those seen responsible for the defeat, 
i.e. the old political and military elite. The purification found in such acts of lustration 
can be explained through a type of past self-orientated Ressentiment. The evidence lies 
in the fact that the post-defeat identity is based on a negation of the values of the pre-
defeat self, which logically align with the values of the military victor. 
 
Nietzschean vindication, explained in the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, is thus 
similarly a form of Ressentiment, because Zarathustra is forced to establish an identity 
and a set of doctrines that stand in opposition to his past days of moralizing. Instead of 
teaching morality, he teaches freedom from morality, embracing his negation values. In 
this sense, even Zarathustra cannot escape the will’s loneliest melancholy, i.e. the 
inability to will backwards. In the larger picture of things, this insight is instructive. 
Even Nietzsche’s inspired solution cannot eradicate the rage. Like others he can only 
manipulate it - placing him on equal terms with Athena and her own solution of 
domesticating the Erinyes. Rage, if it cannot be prevented, must be managed. The 
question then is how to channel rage without risking cycles, not only within the polis 
but also within International Relations, where communal imperatives cannot easily be 
reproduced. Nietzsche’s Ressentiment, ironically, provides an answer.  
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Conclusion 
 
Rage Strategies: An Outline 
 
This thesis has explored the phenomenon of rage in International Relations. It was argued 
from the start that extreme violence and brutally in inter-group relations can be explained with 
the help of emotions. But as with every emotion, whether on the individual or the group level, 
there exists a trigger. Despite the potential for extreme violence and devastation, the rage 
emotion first and foremost responds to an injustice that fundamentally undermines the 
existential rights of the group. It is a reaction that is borne from a fundamental and 
incorruptible sense of entitlement toward group survival and flourishing, both ideationally and 
materialistically. Rage flows from a sense of compassion and belonging, which members 
harbour towards each other and their group. But this very sense of compassion and belonging 
translates into merciless violence and brutality against those who threaten the group. In 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Athena’s domestication of the Erinyes cemented these in-group 
dynamics; unfortunately, despite claiming otherwise, this was never a solution to the problem 
of rage; it merely succeeded in displacing the aggression outwards. Rage was not something 
that could be extinguished - only managed. 
 
One of the problems in rage was found to be the element of self-righteousness. Those engaged 
in violence and devastation operate moral mandates that justify mistreatment and violence. 
The moral mandates, according to social psychologists, become psychological truths; they 
warp perceptions and motivate groups to engage and act out their punitive desires. 
Scholarship on inter-group relations is still relatively new, and there remains little to no 
consensus on the interaction between morality, emotion and violence between groups. We are 
only now acknowledging that inter-group hostility depends on appraisal and process. The 
overarching problem that is found to operate in inter-group aggression, and one that was 
diagnosed by Gustav Ichheiser some 65 years ago, is the propensity of groups and nations to 
interpret universal concepts like justice, peace and fairness through “unconscious” national 
biases. Failure of groups to respect each other’s claims to universal ideals immediately 
disqualifies them as barbarian, evil or sub-human. This underlying problem in inter-group 
dynamics is elevated to new heights, as groups qualify their revenge as a type of justice. 
However, the problem is that there is no shared sense of justice in operation here; and so what 
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justice means, and how it is obtained, is disjointed and subjective. Consequently, what 
appears to be justice for one group is revenge and excess for another. But at the same it is 
impossible to convince groups of their unjust behaviour without acknowledging that justice is 
a function of perspective, and that ultimately an imposition of one universal idea of justice 
(and order) runs at the cost of silencing all those distinct and unique perspectives that exist in 
a world populated by myriad groups and nations. 
 
The desire to impose a universal order to deal with the problem of revenge, undermining the 
possibility of private justice and moral mandates for action, is certainly attractive but is also 
misguided. Arguably, it worked in the Oresteia because individuals need their community for 
fundamental and existential reasons. When nations have attempted to assimilate other groups 
into some overruling order or normative community, sooner or later cracks begin to show. 
Scott’s theory of hidden transcripts and Löwenheim’s theory of PATHs, along with Fanon’s 
classic example of emancipatory violence, all suggest that an imposition of order ultimately 
backfires, as groups resist such oppression and sooner or later revolt. The problem is that any 
legitimacy in an imposition of order is inherently contested, and must rely on some form of 
coercion. Unfortunately groups often bid their time and submit strategically before revolting, 
providing hegemonies with a false sense of legitimacy and stability. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 explored a binary pathway in revenge. The traditional view of revenge as 
merciless and violent was one of two pathways; the other pathway was approached through a 
reading of Nietzsche’s Ressentiment: It appears to be like acquiescence and submission but 
equally maintains a continued moral exclusion, which, however, does not lead to open 
violence and bloodshed, because the subject engages in a permanent identity reconstruction, 
trans valuating and permanently debasing ideas like violence and the use of force. What 
unites both pathways is the objective attitude and inability to harbour compassion and moral 
recognition towards the target. Either revenge pathway can offer a type of obtained justice, 
but neither can lead to a renewed moral attitude of compassion. Nietzsche, who frames 
injustices as temporal problems of existence rather than problems of strength and competence, 
best understood this tragic insight. Nietzsche’s contribution then shifts the focus of the 
discussion away from present-based revenge and focuses on a resolution that aims straight at 
the heart of the problem: the will’s inability to will backwards. 
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Despite this damning verdict on the futility of revenge, groups and nations still engage in this 
practice. Punishment remains an emotionally informed and legally sanctioned response to 
injustice. Following the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, I have constructed five distinct revenge 
strategies that follow the binary of either traditional revenge, expressed as the Nomos of 
Revenge, or as spiritual revenge, expressed as Ressentiment. I will outline each of them and 
provide rage markers, i.e. objective indicators of their existence and operation, as well as a 
few famous examples. 
 
 
Rage Strategies 
 
 
Hegemonic Revenge 
 
Open and violent revenge is the most detectable form of rage. It seeks to openly punish and 
humiliate the offender. Following the hypotheses explored in Chapter 4, revenge seeks to 
make the offender suffer and have him understand why he is suffering. However, following 
further points about the need to distinguish revenge from retribution, the salience of revenge 
lies in its desire for permanence. Because of the existential dimension of the suffered 
injustice, which is ruminated upon and encased in collective memory, revenge seeks to 
mimetically return this permanence by leaving the offender with a mark. In Quentin 
Tarantino’s first instalment of his revenge fantasy trilogy, Lt. Aldo Raine, the leader of the 
Inglourious Basterds, a fictional group of renegade American GIs in World War 2, favours 
the punishment of carving swastikas on the foreheads of captured Nazis, leaving them with a 
visible marker of their crime, and preventing the possibility of forgetting or moving on. It is 
precisely this forced arrest that best captures the desire in revenge. Explained as the salted 
earth hypothesis the act of revenge tries to eradicate or permanently humiliate and maim the 
offender. Because the act of revenge returns the initial felt injustice, the objective attitude is 
further entrenched, making reconciliation or a return to normality impossible, and leading 
instead to cycles of revenge.  
 
Groups that have been mistreated view the offender as evil or unjust. Punishment in this sense 
must be argued to be in line with a sense of justice. All groups operate the same sense of 
entitlement towards recognition of their drives for integrity and esteem. This is what makes 
revenge so damaging for notions of order or shared morality. The act of injustice sets the 
injured apart from the rest of the group and the ensuing mandate overrules laws, treatises and 
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even regard for others. But at the same time, denying punishment for an injustice is 
tantamount to denying the sense of entitlement to just treatment. Historically, it has been 
powerful states or hegemonies, unencumbered by the demands or constraints of power 
relations, that have exacted revenge against weaker states, often enough eradicating their 
culture and sense of self by assimilation. In the righteous mandate of rage, the only 
determinant is strength and military competence. It returns groups to a state of anarchy, where 
each group operates its own sense of justice and morality. 
 
Rage markers:  Demonization, e.g. labels such as evil or predator, historically informed tropes 
like Fascist, Communist, Nazi or Terrorist; strong cultural focus on the committed injustice or 
felt mistreatment; disinterest in long-term strategic goals. 
 
Examples: US Middle-East strategy post 9/11; Nazi Germany’s global strategy; US allied 
occupation strategy under FDR and Morgenthau (1945-1946). 
 
Displaced Revenge 
 
Displaced Aggression is equally a type of open and violent rage; however, the subject is 
limited by the fact that the initial offender is out of reach, either due to power relations or 
because the culprit is an inanimate object. Following the discussion in Chapter 4, two modes 
of Displaced Revenge are found to operate in this scenario: Scapegoating and Triggered 
Displaced Aggression. Each type corresponds to a different mandate and suggests a different 
relation to the suffered mistreatment. Scapegoats are largely dehumanized because they 
remain unrelated to the initial mistreatment; consequently, aggressors opt for psychological 
strategies of exoneration to combat the guilt arising from self-acknowledgment of immoral 
behaviour. There is no moral certainty or righteousness at work here. The other mode, 
referred to as Triggered Displaced Aggression, is closely related to schemas of hatred, when 
past injustices are invoked to justify violence in the face of present-based but technically 
unrelated hardship. The operating mandate is demonization and it indicates that the violence is 
still portrayed as righteous and in response to a suffered injustice. 
 
Displaced Revenge tackles the problem of powerlessness by simulating moral certainty 
through schemas of hatred or scapegoating. Either way, however, someone or something 
other has committed the actual mistreatment. One might hypothesize that the moral mandate 
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in Displaced Revenge is predominantly predicated on dehumanization rather than 
demonization, as the connection between suffered injustice and victim must be based on 
manipulation of evidence and inflation of culpability. In Girard’s seminal example, 
Agamemnon treats his daughter Iphigenia like a goat, ostensibly to offer an “equal value” 
sacrifice in response to the loss incurred by Artemis. However, a deeper point is that 
scapegoats must inherently be disinvested of human qualities in order to shield the 
community from the fact that they are unable to morally justify their behaviour even against 
the backdrop of a suffered hardship. Dehumanization occurs in displacement, when the actual 
offender is out of reach, and is the mark of illegitimate rage. 
 
Rage markers: Brutal and open violence, likely to be a greater use of dehumanization labels 
to indicate the terse relationship between injustice and target, preceded by severe socio-
economic or natural upheaval leading to hardship and insecurity. 
 
Examples: Nazi Germany’s persecution of Jews; American derogation of foreigners and 
Muslims post 9/11. 
 
Suspended Revenge 
 
Hidden Transcripts indicate hidden rage and rancour. Scott’s discovery of these 
independently operating counter-cultures and narratives seriously questions the idea that a 
lack of violence and ostensible submission translate into endorsements and acknowledgments 
of hierarchical order based on domination and strength. Scott is able to show how groups 
entertain ideas of counter-orders and continuously vent their rage through culturally codified 
practices that elude agents of domination. Once the hegemonic structure begins to crack, 
however, these hidden transcripts are formalized and inform a new order based on a reversal 
and rejection of the previous hierarchy and domination. The revolutionary movements in 
Eastern Europe following the downfall of the Soviet Empire in part vindicate Scott’s thesis 
and illustrate how even long-term established power structures can suddenly be swept away 
by the explosion of suspended rage. Social psychologists have offered further evidence that 
time lags and ruminations can strengthen the emotional register. The revenge pursued in these 
instances is no less bloody than in actual revenge. In many cases the act of revenge can appear 
even more excessive because of the contrast to previous decades of relative peace and 
stability. 
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In Suspended Revenge, rage continuously trickles through the cracks of the ostensible order. 
In the Soviet Union jokes provided a platform for a veiled venting of rage, allowing subjects 
to criticize and berate their government without risking punishment. The sense of strategic 
inadequacy is evident in hidden transcripts, but subjects simply bide their time and wait until 
the hierarchical structure shows it first cracks. Foot-dragging, indirect boycotts and 
disinterestedness in the political survival of the regime all provide a form of venting while 
also precipitating the ultimate demise of the order. Suspended Revenge is a type of cold and 
calculated punishment that waits until the offender is too weak to react. Decades of pent-up 
aggression and rage can lead to a spectacle of epic violence and bloodshed. Suspended 
Revenge, more than any other strategy, honours the old dictum that revenge is a dish best 
served cold. 
 
Rage markers: foot-dragging, sabotage, culturally encoded counter-ideologies; unwillingness 
to support and continue  existing hierarchies and social order, veiled demonization.  
 
Examples: European Soviet states, post 1970’s; Arab Spring, 2012 onwards. 
 
Ideational Ressentiment 
 
Ideational Ressentiment shares a similar foundation with Displaced Revenge and Suspended 
Revenge, but here the powerlessness transforms the ideational foundation of the victim. 
Rather than vent and bide their time, subjects engage in a moral revenge by devaluing the 
offender’s way of life. But in order for such spiritual revenge to succeed, the victim must 
forego any generic sense of virtue and espouse negation values as the foundation of identity. 
In Nietzsche’s essay in the GOM, the lambs exclaim, “All those are good who have no 
claws.” The lambs no longer base their sense of good on the fact that they have hooves or 
wool, but that they lack the salient characteristics of the birds. Political theorists, engaging 
with the concept of Ressentiment, argue that Ressentiment leads to irresolvable tension, as the 
initial injustice is expressed through a grudge and rancour towards the offender. This is 
similar to the venting process in the hidden transcripts; however, Ressentiment is different.  
 
Ressentiment establishes a moral superiority by sabotaging the offender’s sense of good and 
virtue. The victim creates a morality where the virtues of the offender are revaluated as evil 
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and bad, and the offender’s negated attributes then become the source of a new set of virtues 
and morality. The tell-tale sign of Ressentiment is that it cannot create independently new 
values, but simply espouses the negation of existing ones. Consequently, Slavophiles and 
Romantics developed the concept of anti-enlightenment, Gandhi created the doctrine of non-
violence, and Nietzsche’s priests celebrated a lack of strength and power as virtues. All these 
examples illustrate that the revenge in Ressentiment leaves the victim chained to the identity 
and salient values of their offender. The satisfaction of berating the offender comes at the cost 
of a permanent falsification of the self. For political scientists, however, the existence of 
diametric-oppositional values means that Ressentiment can be detected. Ressentiment means 
that the victim remains unable to create culture, orders or values that are not in some way or 
form reliant on the culture, virtues and successes of the offender - but now simply expressed 
as negation. 
 
Rage markers: negation values, inability to produce new ideas and virtues, permanent desire 
to stress superiority in niche cultural and moral terms, virtues prefixed by the term “anti;” 
overt and moral disgust at concepts like power and use of force, i.e. attributes seen lacking. 
 
Examples: Russian and German Anti-Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th century; post-1970’s 
Arab Anti-Americanism 
 
Sour Grapes Ressentiment 
 
This variance of Ressentiment remains the only rage strategy that can offer lasting peace and 
inclusion through a cunning manipulation of the rage dynamic. In Aesop’s The Fox and the 
Sour Grapes, the fox, unable to snatch delicious grapes, avoids a sense of failure and 
powerlessness by judging the unobtainable grapes to be sour and not worth his while. To 
avoid further possibility of failure, he discounts all grapes as sour and effectively shelves his 
desire for grapes. The lie about the grapes serves a similar function of falsification found in 
Ressentiment, and like ideational Ressentiment it allows for a continued sense of esteem and 
even superiority, because no grapes truly worthwhile - i.e. sweet – can be beyond the fox’s 
reach. But in order to maintain the sense of self, the fox must also berate his earlier efforts to 
snatch those grapes and waste his time. In other words, the failure to recognize that the grapes 
were sour from the start becomes the offense, along with the failure to snatch them. 
 
	   223	  
Cultures of defeat that assimilate culturally and emotionally into new orders are said to 
undergo a change in narrative and identity. Old identity structures and narratives are 
exchanged for new ones that can support a sense of pride and esteem and offer promises of 
future greatness and hope. The identity tropes responsible for the defeat and failure are 
immediately divested and demonized. This process occurs naturally as long as the victor does 
not insist on further punishment, needlessly prolonging the moral exclusion and providing 
new mistreatment. This interesting rage manipulation occurs when the defeated nation 
establishes itself as a victim of the criminal activity of its previous regime, thus demonizing 
their previous leaders and siding with the victors. This mechanism has been the underlying 
wisdom in post-violence strategies of lustrations as well as communal purification practices 
found in Ancient Greece. But rather than lead to Displaced Revenge, Suspended Revenge or 
Ideational Ressentiment, Sour Grapes Ressentiment devalues the past identity trope held 
responsible for the defeat and the ensuing suffering. 
 
Rage markers: establishment of new identity tropes based on negation values of past regime, 
demonization of past leadership; strong cultural focus on future and renewal, conspicuous 
silence about involvement in past regime; willingness to engage in lasting peace with the 
victor. 
 
Examples: West Germany, post 1947; Japan, post 1945; US Confederate States, post 
Reconstruction. 
 
Erinyes beneath Turtle Bay 
 
Rage in International Relations can be blamed on Athena’s ingenious solution to domesticate 
the Erinyes. Unfortunately, although she saves the polis, she simply outsources the problem. 
The Erinyes are tasked with directing internal anger and strife outwards, favoured by Athena 
nonetheless because war increases the fame and glory of Athens. The three distinct types of 
existential threat experienced by groups, and outlined in Brewers’ Optimal Distinction 
Theory, more or less correspond with Athena’s metis on how communal integrity and esteem 
can be guaranteed. The Erinyes, in other words, are alive and well in International Relations. 
Because their domain is extended from personal justice to group justice, the exact same 
problem of cycles and revenge must necessarily manifest on the international stage. Current 
conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and the South China Sea are testimony to this. 
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Athena’s solution, however, only succeeds because subjects are invested in the survival of 
their community; they are willing to exchange personal justice for social harmony. The fear of 
pollution and exile suffices to create discipline and reverence for the polis. Attempts to extend 
the sense of citizenship through notions of cosmopolitanism have tried to emulate this 
mechanism. However, the concept of a global community still fails, because individuals fail 
to develop a sense of belonging beyond their group identity; in other words, they do not 
require some “world nation” for their own existential needs. Misguidedly, international bodies 
like the UN or the ICC have tried to broaden the scope of nomos beyond the Westphalian 
emphasis on non-intervention, and with limited success. Powerful nations like the United 
States, China or Russia remain unwilling to subscribe to international laws that negatively 
affect their sense of entitlement. Moral mandates are still experienced predominantly at the 
group level, and manage to overrule global morality and established laws. Sooner or later, the 
psychology of hard times, through global warming, natural disaster or resource shortage, will 
force exclusions predicated on group membership into the open and rationalize acts of 
violence as necessary and righteous. Before the Erinyes ever move into their new home 
beneath Turtle Bay, human nature will evolve beyond its dependence on group identities. 
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